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P R E F A C E 
Hhe Sueas Canal's conatructJLon was oontpXatad and 
opened for navigation in 1369• However, the international 
raginie for the navigation thrcw^ tlie Canal vas ostablished 
by the Convention of Constantinople of 1838* It lies 
at the junction of Africa and Asia# and is a giateuay to 
Last and v^ est* It holds strategic position from geogs^s^ical# 
co(nB»r64»l and military points of views* Consequently* 
it has became a bone of contention between the najor 
powers to cc«trol«. this crucial point on sea passage and 
more so often after creation of Israel* 5ince the creation 
of Israel* Egypt* of wttich the ^uez Canal is an integral 
part* hed been victim of three wars (1956* 1967 and 1973) 
and naturally then* the problem regarding navi^ aition 
throu(^ the Canal arose due to its bloclwada by - gypt* 
Several questions arose froia tiw points of views cf 
intomational lav and as well as politics* The purpose 
of this study is to discuss and analyse the problem both 
from legal and political points of views* 
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c HAPTER : 1 
SUEZ CANAL:CONSTRUCTION ANI) 
SiCNIFiCANCE 
tint Stt»g canal i Construction o^rid 5ic[nificanc» 
In the hub of ^^isDoKurasla, one o£ the s c a t Important 
ar.d o l d « « t s\ar.««iac« navigable water»Wi»y in t h i s twentiath 
century i s the suo? canal* i t connects two open s(;£t««the 
^J&<Utcrrt.ne£:n end the ><ed i^ea, '"^ypt, wV»lch l i e s at the 
junction of •• f r i c a and .-.sis, i s i ac^turcl .^i.ttwcy to East 
and ?vc£,t.» I t 6.1v.'..ys held t ctrvitegic poait i^n I-LOIH yaogra-
phicwl, conj»e£cial «^ aid militj^ri* pointer of views, Z'nb construtc-
t ion o£ an in teznat iona l canal ir'>j})«naly incre«t>ed i t s 
impoxt£>.nce anc s ig iUl icance* Xha aiynilict^iC^i \jZ J iu 
waterway h^fi ixen iecoynised irow the ancient t i«ie»| o f 
course^ to a much l e a s extent th-an n<»f«>a«.days, ilie sues 
Canal hcive i;> en considorod as econonvical :ap'e«dy« gafe , and 
sho^d3» t^ that shortens the Lcmdon » aomcay itater zx>ute 
replacing the o ld Cap)^ route« 
The h i s t o r y of Egypt proves tha t the idea of 
construct ing the Canal jsetween the Meuiterranetin and the 
Red oeas goes back to the ancient t iuses. erudit ions claim 
that the f i r s t navigable Canal l ink ing the l^ile Kiver with 
the i^ sd Sea seems to have been b a i l t during the 2oo0 B.C, 
in reign o£ the Pharaoh of the 12ta:i dyn«atj^« s^tsoatrif. I t 
s t a r t e d £r£»t thm Pdluslac north of the c i t y of i^bas t i s 
to Wadi Aimilat e a s t *rards «ind i ion turned u>ath through 
2) 
Bittttr La)c« to th« R«d S«a«^ During th« nsxt nany rsar* 
this eaoal was availablad to navigation* 
Tha canal waa coRiplataly naglectad aftar tha daath 
o£ Sandgtria and tha political changes in Egypt prevantad 
tha maintenanca of tha canal* KmnoB, tha canal was disusad 
and slited up* In 973^33 B*C*« tha king Solowan Coinplataly 
ignorad tha routa and looking for another indapandsnt roulBS 
to India» conatructed tha Port of Esion^Gabar at tlia haad 
of tha Gulf of Agaba*^ Attas^jts i inada to raclain tha canal 
during tha raign of F^araoh Ne<dio II in 612 B*C* failad* 
A Paraian King* Daxiri^ Hvataaoaa in "521) 3*C* 
ra«axcavatad and anlargad tlia Canal by oomieeting tha 
Bitter Lakes with tha Red Saa throu^ a small Canal but 
it was unfit for navigation if ttm !iila flooded* UiMlar 
1* se^onfiald« H*J*« Tha Sues Canal in world Affairs* 
Constellation Books* Londksn (19S2)«PX 3| Andra* Sieg* 
fried# Stiaa And Panama* Jonathan Capa« Londbn (1940)« 
P* 38| Marlowaf John* Making of tha Sues Canal* tha 
Cresset Pxaaa London (1964)» P* 1| Wilson, Arnold T*# 
The Sues Canal* Oxford University Prass, l.«midoo* (1939) # 
(Chapter-Z), P* 1 at aaqi UAR Year Book 1960* Forwarded 
by oireotor General of information oapartiaent of sgypt* 
P* 68* 
A«p*8* Bindra points out that the canal i^ich 
connected the Nile with the r;ed Sea was built during 
in 1490-.147S B*C* saa 
2. Ibid*, P* 3* 
3* Schonfiald, Gp* cit*« P* 3, Siegfried, Andre*, op* 
cit*, P* 38* 
4* Ibid., PP* 3-4f UAR Year Book* 1960, P* 68* 
3) 
Ptoleimr ghill«telt*>u« II la 286 B.C. and Ptoleny E w r y t a s 
I I I in 246 B.C., th© origiDSl canal wa» one® again wad* 
f i t for navigation. I t was axtandad via tha Bittar lAlcaa 
to tha liad Saa. I t atartad a t CXysraa* a t a routa from 
whara tha fSodam Suas atarta. Ptolaiasr Htilidalphua had 
proi osed to cut t3ia canal dijpact throu^ lathuiaa but 
i^ondonad hia plan bacauae o£ a popular baliaf that laval 
of tha Rad Saa %ma hi^^or than tha i%ditarranaan aaa t^ieh 
la ter proved wrtmg. 
Latar« neglected Canal i*faa found aaaantial by Ronaaa 
for commarca purposea. tianca, in 98 A.D., the Emoar^r Trf^|a|| 
reclaimed tha Canal. I t vaa ranarad as "Tran^an canal" or 
"Rcwaan Canal* and used for aoina tiraa. I t waa oac» ag^in 
6 
out o£ use by the end of tha third century. 
With tha Arab conquaat of sgypt in 7th A.D«« ^iJjyi^ 
AKtfriJbn»alwva raopanad tha l2ila«*Bad Sea water way in 641-42 
A,o. Ha had an idea to dig a Cai^l d irect ly eoimeeting 
the two aaaa. 'Qim idea was not put into practice cm tha 
ground that i t would be conaparatively more advantageoua 
to tha ahipping of Christian Countries. Further, the 
cutting e^ ^ a Is^uns* i t was feared, would axpOMi tha 
6. Ib id . , P. 4y S i e ^ r i a d , Andre*, op. c i t . , PP. 3SU39* 
6. Ibid., P. 39fUAR Year Book I960, P. 69| Harlowa, op.eit.« 
P.2. 
4) 
Qntlro Egypt to b«lng £lood«d by the K«d Sea* Thus* 
instead of conetrueting • iwv eaiuil« the Arabs tised for 
navigatioQ the Canal of Romans and renamed It as "(^ ana^  
of the caliph". However It was finally closed in 776 A.D» 
by the Second Abbaasid Caliph^ Abu»Djaafaral^iSansur to prevent 
its use by the people of Medina \A\o had rebelled against 
7 
his authority* Thereafter* no more wss beared about it 
until the !lapolean*s Expedition of Egypt at the end of 
the 18th ^ntury* 
Flaanwhile in 1498* Vasco**de Gans succeeded in makiag 
his voya^ to the South down the v^stem Coast of Africa* 
around the Cape of Good Mope route* This opemed a long but 
useful waterway to India and Far Bast for trade and 
comroeroe* Thereafter* the ancient route vas neglected* 
However* at subsequent intervals* the plan for the direct 
cutting of a Canal was put forward but was alfways opposed 
by ^ttonan Sntperor* Turki(^ Pasha of Hgypt suggested the 
reopening of the Old Nile<*Red Sea Canal with access to 
the ^«diterranean• But the then Tux)ciah Sultan* eventually* 
refused to perraxssiiuB CUM to heavy expenditure involved 
8 
and other difficulties* 
7* Schonfield* N*^* op* cit** PP* 4-5; Siegfried* Andre* 
op, cit** PP 39*40* Marlowe* op* cit** P* 2* 
8* Ibid** P* 6. 
5) 
v;lth thm paasagtt of t ls»* a t tho end of 18th 
century £uro|«an statas bfteara* more intar»«t*d In th i t 
•pe«ay rout«« owin? to two rvasona* f irs t ly* by the X8th 
cantury trate with India incraaaad •normous2.y« aacondly* 
dtxe to (la->coXonisatlon« thm r ivalry of colonial pouMtrs* 
BtitiBh and Fronch««hiftad to thia region* Conaaquantly 
thia region balanca 8tr»tegical more imfportant and f u r ^ e r 
construction of a Canal meant eaaiar and apaedient route* 
Trade from India to Europe vsm alao became very d i f f icul t* 
The only 8oluti<m to overcome i^iM d i f f i cu l ty ims to cut 
a Canal from Sues to Cairo or to reclaim the ancient 
Canal* France* too« wee ccmteisplating to reopen the old 
o 
route ttirouq^ ^gypt* 
France* asnong other £^ ui^ 3pean atates* held a leading 
poaition in the eastern Hediterrenean and becauwi of 
Qpaographicftl location* her interes t in th i s co nereial 
routo through Egypt was bound to be more than that of 
any otn'^ jsr European States* However* Frencdi goimmnant 
dia not taXe any o f f i c i a l step to serve her interest 
i mediately* Thcu^ her agents and mercnants were nego» 
t ia t ing treat ies in Egypt for giving the transport 
9 . Ibid*, P* 8* 
6) 
facilities* Suddenly political situation took a turn* 
ihe authority ot TuzlciSh representation had v«ealcened in 
:*gypt and needed to be changed* It required a more stable* 
strong and responsible government* In 1793, war broke out 
between Britain and France and in 1798 an expedition* 
coTnnandod by ISapolean took place* Kapolean occupied**Egypt» 
It is said that one of the aim of the l^polean*s axpedition 
was to connect the two sea 1E^ cutting a Canal through 
IsthuTis) of Sues* 
^^polean himself took a keen interest in the Sues 
Canal porject* A survey was instituted and cosqpleted by 
J*M* liepire* a faaious engineer* But the survey foundings 
were against the cutting of direct canal between the 
Mediterranean and the Had Seas* as ^mm under reign of 
Ptolemies* It «ms pointed out that cutting of a direct 
canal across the Isthunai of Suas was impracticable owing 
to the differences in the level of the two seas* The level 
of the Red Sea was about thirty feet^  hi^er than the 
level of the r^diterranean Sea* Ihey* the surveyers* 
therefore* were in favour of reopening the old Nile«>Red 
10* Ibid** PP* 10»lly also see A*p*s* Bindra* <^* oit**P*3* 
11* 2chonfleld* op* cit* P* lly Also aee Harlowa* John* 
Anolo Bovptiaa Relations-18QQ«»19S3« The Cresset Press, 
London (1959)* P* 16* The Hidd^f £aat ^ m|1i4Bft3>,-ti4 
EconoiBie StirveVi. Royal Inst i tute of International Affair** 
I.ondon* 11950)* P« 147| Siegfried* Andre*op. cit*«P*55* 
But in accordance to the i::ncylop<!dia of Britaniea* 
tiifi lavel of the Rod Sea was 33 fee t hi^i»r than the 
^^diterranean Sea* see tha Bncvclopedia of aritayioa.T .nniton 
Vol* 17, P* 767* 
7) 
•«a CaiMil route and postpond th« ld«a of cutt ing a direct 
canal* 
During the f i r s t half of X9th oentury* the project 
of ccmetructing the Canal was taken up Saint siraonians ^ o 
died in 1825 without talcing any definite step to acG^xanplisii 
ie^ 
1) 
12 
tiie <:4>ject« Ta^n in 1834« Foumal* a Frenc3i?nan# anplied 
for a concession to the Canal peoject but was r«fusi^« 
Again in 1841« Llnant Say prepared a datailad schetne to 
]?uild a canal between 3ues and i'eheraicera but fai led* Then 
after some years in 1846^ (infantine organiM(d an intecnatimtal 
financial giroup in Paris Xnown as * ^ e soe ie te 'd studss du 
canal dte Sueg** in order to wA^m ccmsplete study o£ the Canal 
project keeping in view the financial tkod technical 
14 
aspects* 
By that t ine Britain becaioe interested in th i s 
s p e e ^ route«»£:gyptian route and consequently viewed w i ^ 
disfavour the Canal project designed by Prance because 
of i t s s trategic and eonvsereial iii^rtance.i^e^bwithstanding 
tlie advantage of th i s route was demonstrated by ihoraas 
t^ghom in 1830 by loaking a Journey from London to Boubmj 
12* Zbid,« P* t6« 
13* Marlowe* op* cit** p* 62* 
14* Ibid** P* 62| also see schonfield* op* cit*« pp* 16>»17* 
By 
and in 1837 an agreement botwaen tha British govanunant 
and t)M Paninaular and Oriental Conpan/ \mm concludad for 
tha carriaga of maila»^ Tharafora^ a« a raault of thia 
devalopiaant* British govammant soda an altemativa scharna 
for tha construction oi Railway lina batMaen Aiaxandria 
ai^ 3aas» The Suez Canal Society vms quite unabla to 
procaad further than i t s pralininary inveatigation* In 
fact* aa<^ ooatending poiiar ims trying to aain asoandary 
ovar Idta o^ar* Bach powar triad to includa cgypt in ifcn 
own Sj^ara of influanea* Hoiiavaif« s^ ohamad Ali Paaha« 
Viceroy of Egypt, rejected both the railway and,canal 
p ro j ec t s . He accurately rea l i sed tha t such projects would 
be of no benef i t for Egypt and wi l l cons t i t u t e a th rea t 
to the independence of Egypt, Of course, Mohamad Ali was 
in favour of granting a concession for the Canal but he 
held back because of the European r i v a l a r y . In 1849, 
Mohamed Ali died without coiranitting himself to e i the r 
project and was succeeded by Abbas Pash, Abbas Pasha 
granted cocession for the railway project in 1851, 
I t was complete in 1854 by put t ing the Canal project on 
the shelf . 
15. I b i d , , P, 15, Marlowe, op. c i t . , PP. 43-49. 
16, I b i d , , P, 15 
9) 
Vpto i854f the Canal project %»• even at stand atlil* 
No doubt« ti#o project! were regarded on two different 
ground* that* the Canal project involved a geographical 
^ange and therefore* became an international iasue and 
railway project was yet within internal sphere* Abbas Paadui 
had not ready to initiate the canal project without an 
agraontant between int^ '^ rested pov«rs and witlicnit the approval 
of cttormn Eraptro. On technical side, the lev@l of two 
saaa t#exe surveyed repeatedly and* in 18S2 Linant Bay 
foimdout that the talk o£ differences between the levels 
of the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea waa totally a 
myth* nie two seas lies on same level* 
In 16S4* Abbas Pasha died and succeeded by Mahaned 
3aid Pasha* aaid Pasha granted a eoneeasion to Ferdln -
and De Lesseps* a French diplomat* \iin.o happened to bs 
a friend of Said Pashai he lived in Egypt with his father 
ii^ o had been French consularMSeneral in £^ gypt* on hearing 
the rarws of accession by said Pasha* De Lesseps congratxio 
la ted hin^ and in return* he received an invitation to 
17* n>id.* P. ai 
iO) 
visit Egypt* OB »ov«rnb«r 7$ 18S4tf D« ii^mamj^ rvaehed 
Alexandria and on Novenlaar 30« ldS4« ha obtained tha 
18 
eoneMisaion for tha Canal project* Ihe concession %ia8 
valid for 99 yeazti since the opening date of the Sues 
canal* 'Zhe Sues Canal would be<uinia* the concession provided^ 
property of Egyptian government upcm tiie payment of an 
indeminityi to be f iseed by amicable agreement or by 
19 
arbitration* Itia eonoeasion authorised £or formation 
of an Zntemational Conijany known as **The C<Mapaanie 
tniversell du Canal raritiiae de Sues," to administer it* 
It is surprising that oe Lesseps obtained the 
concession so easily Mhile other strived far years* Said 
ii^ aiha announcenient in thm asaenbled crops of n^ inisters 
and Foreign eowiKjils about his intention of granting tlie 
concession for the Canal construction can» as a bonbshell 
to all* dut tltm deoisi«» had been made suddenly and thera 
was BO opportunity by nanoeuvering interested powers* 
The constjruotlon of the Canal* h<Mfever# was further 
delayed* I3)e concession was officially pronulgated in 
18* Xbid*« PP* 23-24| also see i^ arlowe op* cit*t P* 63| 
Lenosowsjcl, George* |ttf ^ i^f4lf ^ oj^ Ifl W i l J S I f U t 
(III ed*} Cornell University Press* X/ondon (1962)* 
op* eit*« P* 147* For text of the concession of 1854 
see Appendix « A« 
19* See Article X of the Concession of 18S49 Appendix • A* 
XI) 
1855 with m reservatlcn that this need ratification hf 
20 The ctt^Min Sultan beforw construction starts* But« at 
Constantinople^ the British influence was so strong that 
it could successfully prevented the Sultan from approving 
the concession* It considered the ^ ole scheme as a FrencA) 
political move to establish its supramacy over Egypt and 
felt that a Canal would threaten its suprarnacy in eastern 
21 trade cor^ fnanding cape route* 
In 1855« De Lesseps formed An International Scientific 
Congnission to examine and report on the technical aspects 
of the Canal project* The expendition was very successful 
and in 1656« Cormission submitted their report in favour 
of direct Canal between thm ^ ^diterranean and the Red 
22 
oGd80 
The Corrsmissicn reconvnended as follows i 
1* The yadi-Tumulat route was inpractical owing to the 
expense involved* 
2* There «ras no InsurnK^ur.table deff iculty in the direct 
route across the Isthumsi 
20* riarlowe« op* cit*« P* 63* 
21* See the St tetnent of the British Prin»->Minister# Lord 
PmAmeTutone, Schonfield, op* cit*« P* 26 
22* Ibid*« PF* 29»30| liAclo^ft op* c i t * , P* 64* 
12} 
3* Th« suitable poxrta could b« constructed a t •mdh and 
o£ the CanalI and 
4* Ihe whole project would not cost then £8^000#000 
ItKsluding the %ror)ca connected with i t * 
Thia Coimnission** Report completely changed the 
aspects o£ the Canal project and upon i t s recon«nendation« 
The Concession o£ Noventesr 30« 18S4 was replaced by a 
liaw /ict oi£ Concession o£ January 5, 18S6 by the Pasha ot 
i^ igypt* The Concession contained similar provisions but nas 
23 
siibject to ratification by the ottoman Sultan* Ihe 
conceesion £onauiated £ull statutes o£ the Sues Canal 
Company and provided^ int@r alia, thati 
In addition to a concession* the conqpany had taken 
a strip o£ land in the .<adi<»Tuinijilat# linking the area o£ 
the concession with the Kile £or the purpose of di giny a 
S%ieet Vi'ster Canal to meet the need of the Canal sons for 
the period of concession/ and 
The ccMnpany %#as to be freed frcHn taxation in respect of 
this land and «ms to enjoy the benefit deriving txxm its 
24 
concession* 
23* Schonfield* op* cit«» P* 30* Also see i^i^sowsskl* op* 
cit*# P* 610| MarlowSf op* cit*« P* 65* For text of 
the concession of January 5, 1856* see Appendix • B* 
24* Karlowa* op* cit** P* 65* 
13) 
Owing -to British opposition, De Lessepsi, in 185a# 
plac«d hi» Canal project and the con^ny undor the prote-
ction of Hapolean III emphasing the principle of freedom 
from govemroantal interference. Zn the tneantieney Oe Lessepe 
was advieed to go i^ead the Canal project* Hence* the 
eoopany ordinary ^ares vera kept in the raar^et* The 
concession (of 18S6} fixed the capital at 200 millioB and 
was divided into 400#000 shares of 500 frano«« each bearing 
statutory interest of five percent* The subscription list 
of shares was opened cm Oetc^ Der 1858« and closad oo at t^ e 
end of o^ven^ aer 1858* Out of the 400#000 sha:i^ s 207,111 m 
shares were taken up by France^ 177« 642 by Sgypt# and the 
recnaining 85«S06 shares i^ich were alloted to Britain* the 
United States and the SovJ^t«^^ssie* were remained unsold* 
25 
as they had not been {^rchased by t^ose countries* 
Undoubtedly* the resul t M&B very disappointing* 
France had taken up more than half shares in tota l mnrioer* 
iDe i^aseps wanted that a l l vjestem Powers should participate* 
financially* in the Canal project by purchasing the 
researved nucaber of shares a l lo ted for them* Fortunately* 
by that tims Turkish GovemRiant recognised the u t i l i t y of 
the Canal scheme and considered i t as a d^nsstice under* 
taking just l ike tlie railway* Therefore* De Lesseps did not 
25. Ibid 
Andre 
*^ P* 66| Schonfield* op* cit** P* 35| Siegfried* 
* op* cit** PP* 69«>71* 
U) 
wBlt for the Sill tan* s ra t i f i ca t ion of th« conceasicm and 
atartad tSia construction work of th« Canal on April 25, 
1859^*« It %#aa violat ion of Turkiah aover«ignty» 
Howaver, i t wa» not an aaay task* At the aarly ataga 
of conatruction work. Said Paaha became alarned and realisad 
the dancer* De Leaaepa, %Aiile, incurrable optimiat, waa 
forced to rea l i se that he could not hope to overcome a ^ i n a t 
the forces arranged acalnat him. The financial contradieticm 
between De Lesaepa affirmation and Said*a denial about 
the unaubscribed aharea was another inzninent prd&lem* The 
French Government had a l so pressurised Said Paaha to talw 
up unaold aharea* 
A cr la ia waa reached in 1863 when the (Ottoman Sultan 
fonttally ordered to eeaae forthwith a l l the conatruction 
work on the canal by force* The Sultan demanded that the 
conpany abould return certain Egyptian territory «• vjadi* 
ittiiulat in the Canal sonei he alao deimnded abolit ion oi 
forced labour* In fact , oe l<esaepa aucceeded in iitpleiBenting 
27 
th^ suppleinsntary addition to the concesaion by whicA) 
native labour for the conatruction work of the Canal %faa t o 
be provided by Egyptian Government* Conaequently, on 
26* Ibid*, c^* c l t * , P* 72* Schonfield, op* cit*« P* 37| 
F^prlowe, op* c i t * , P* 67| Lencaowaki, op* c l t * , P* 611f 
T e^ Mid< f^ E(^^% - A Po;^vi<;;^^ ay^ d <^?9H9^ i-9 ^^jfy^y, 
op. axy c l t * , P* I47i 
27* Sea '«rlowa, c^* c i t * , P* 65* Siegfried, Andre*,op* 
c l t * , P* 73* 
3akiiiiitfiaf$^liH^^iii$pS$^^* 
15) 
April $0 1363« two notss WBxm dispatched^ ono to th« 
ottORttn Anbassador at London and S^ aris^  and othar to tha 
Viceroy of aenrot^  Said ^aaha^ In which raaortatlon o£ land 
and abolition o£ foread labour were oondltiona for the 
28 
rat i f icat ion of the Concession* i^anwhila* Said I*aiha 
died on January 1863 and w»s succeeded by Istnail ^aiAia 
'^o conmittad himself in favour of the Canal* ^ agreed 
to take up the remaining unsold shares 85*506 as well as 
the 95,516 orlgiiMil shares a l lo ted to Egypt* the negotiatloii 
over the questions «^ resortation of land and supply of 
forced labour now were transfersd to Paris* In i864# i t was 
agreed that laatter be referred to arbitration* Napolean 
agreed and appointed an AH f^f^i^ N^^\mUm IrlffM^^fJ . 
in Mardh 1864 t o examine the question* the Cmvnittee nads 
following award on July 1864 s 
1* the forced labour on the canal should be abolliihed« 
i^ich was contncted by Said Pasha to supply labours 
according t o the ccxipany req':irer«nts* The company «ms 
awarded an in<tominity of 38*000,000 francs for giving 
up th i s right* 
2* The coR^ny should return lands of the canal zontm to 
^QTPt* which isiMiil Pasha considered detriirental to 
23* Schonfield, c^* cit*, P* 39* 
U) 
Egypt's independence upon the p«yin©nt of an indeminity 
of 84»000*000 francs by Isctiail Pasha, 
3 . rhe f u l l amount of Indeminity should be paid to the 
29 
company within period of 15 years* 
l!his agreement was accepted by both parties* 
Consequently* Ottoman Sultan rat i f i ed the Act of concession 
of 1856 on FArch 19, 1866?*^ with the rat i f icat ion of the 
coiK;easion# a l l p o l i t i c a l and diplomatic hinderences %#ere 
renioved from they vmy of the Canal's construction* The 
construction of Canal proceeded rapidly cornploted oa August 
1669* The Canal construction took t@n years instead of s ix 
yesrs as envisaged in the Canal's scheme* The delay was 
because of cl imatic and physical d i f f i cu l t i e s* vhich were 
minor but particular was British and French rivalary* 
The Turkish Siatan was so weak in authority in 
tigypt that no attempt was taken even the work started 
without i t s rat i f icat ion* In His individual capacity De 
Ltesseps took steps %diich violated the sovereignty and r i ^ t s 
29* Ibid** PP* 39«mi0« a l so see ^'«rlowe* op* cit** P* 69* 
Siegfried* op^ c it«* F* 73* mrlowe* op* cit** PP* 212»213< 
30* Schonfield** P* 40 | tiencsoiraki* qp* cit** P* 611f A*p,s* Qindrm* pp* cit** P* S| Haskin* Halford L** The Middle 
East* the MacHlllian Company* Kew York (1954)* P* 4 1 | 
r'arlowei op* cit** (Ohapt* XI}*P* 218 e t seq* For text 
of Act of Convention of February* 22* 1966* see Sues 
Caiml Problem* A documentary Publication* the Departinent 
of Stats Ptdolloation 6392* PP* 9*lf | white paper on the 
^iationalisation of the Sues l^'aritirae Canal conyany* 
PtiblislMd by the Goveciwiant of £>gypt* 12th of August 
19S6* Government Press Cairo* 1956* PP. 29*34* 
17) 
of Ecypt* But vhon dbjact ions v«r<i r a i s e d , i t sought 
patronage of Napolaan I I I . Thar«fot«# h« got th ings moved 
in suedi a vMiy t h a t the p r inc ip le of Sovereignity was 
seemingly accepted but the provis ions of award were 
d i c t a t ed by French govermnent. 
The inaurgat ion oereracmy of the Sueae Canal had takea 
place o f f i c i a l l y on lioaninber 17« 1869 in the presence 
of many crowned head of ..Europe and e l i t e s of the %rorld» 
31 
'Xtie :inpress of France^ ^ugenu« was gu«*t of hcmour* 
France won diplcwmtic victory over all contenting powers 
by establishing great Suez Canal for the concoarcial advan« 
tage of world* 
The Staea Canal is singularly direct channel starts 
from the Maditerranean sea« In the inner side of the caaal 
lies Port Said end Port Faud* Ttxe Canal than passes to 
Lake Balah* Again ti^ e Canal cuts to l>ake Tiiasah* ht the 
northowest end of lAkc Timsah is aituated Ismailia Canal 
%mich extends -snd joins the Nile River near Cairo* Along 
t^e Israailia Canal is 3%met water Canal* From Lake Timsah« 
the Canal passes to Great Bitter Lake and by Great Bitter 
Lake it Joins Little Sitter Lake* Tae Canal came end of its 
courwe^ The Gulf of Sues* In fact« the Sues Canal continues 
31* S»ld«« K* 4Sf else s«Mi.Schon£ield« op* clt,» P* 42f 
Marlowe, op* cit*, F* 70f Siegfried, op, cit*, P* 75. 
i t ) 
t o ^h« «t«t passing throu^i Port Tiiaflk and than f a l l 
into tha Bad Sea by tha harbour of Port Ibrahim. 
The to ta l coat of tha Sues Canal was £ 16,000*000 
of which £ 4,500,000 was subscribed by tha ordinary 
shareholders and remaining ii'ertt frc»n cgyptian govermnaBt* 
The cost of construction of tha canal was greatly asGoaadad 
beyond the estimated cost of Expert Corrwission's Report 
of 185S,*^ 
imDrovament In the Sues Canftl i 
After construction, the Sues Canal %fas ayproxiraatsly 
100 miles long and varied in width between 139«>300 feat 
at surface* The Canal had depth of 26« 2 f ee t (8 mster) and 
72• 2 f ee t (22 im»ter) a t bottom* The average gross tcmnags 
of transit ing ships %#as 17000 tons and h i ^ e s t aut^orisad 
draught was 24*6 feat (7*5 meter}* The navlgaticm spMNl 
33 
was 6*12 miles ( 10 km*} pet hour* The rapid growth of 
navigation through the Suez Canal necessiated major 
in^roverf^nts in theiater way* By 1383 the Canal becains 
so congest-d that soma ships chose to go throuc^ the 
cape routs* As the 3r i t i i^*s shipping interest was grsatly 
affected, the British consul fozred the Sues Canal 
cem^ny to nrnlm iisproirattnenta in the Canal and in i t s 
32* Ibid*, P* 71 
33, UAR Year 8ook> I960, P. 74| Also see Iha Middle Ea^t 
East And llorth Af t i e s . 1971-72, Europa Publ i ca t i^Ctd , , 
Loxulcm, P* 54* 
19) 
policy* Consequently^ the Coti^ pany fixed certain amount 
of Canal earning for making iRi|>roverenta in the canal* 
During the period 1870-1954, The Suez Canal Conpany 
34 
had carried out seven projects for i t s in^rovement* In 
1948« traf f ic was increased h i ^ l y that the Ccmqpany dteided 
to ent>arOc on the Seventh project* I t included t^e cutting 
of a by-pass Canal-Farouk Canal-betveen Kantara and Balah 
Lake on the eastern side of the Suez Canal* work on th is 
project began in 1949 aw3 brought into operation in 1951 
3S 
which reduced the avemge trans i t of the Canal to 24 hcurs* 
'me sametioe* upon the reconsnendatic^ of International 
Consultative Comniasion* a tvio years prograrrsns to double 
tl.o capacity of Port Said*s basin %ras undertaken* By the 
end of 1954« ^ e Suez Canal was deepened to 14 meter and 
widened at bottom about 36 meter* The average speed of 
the ship was increased from 6*12 to 7.50 miles per hour* 
^** Ibld,r* 54,1 «.lso £.?« AEion isscord, iJew Delhi,Nov. 11-144.950,1 
5.3633. 
35* Hoskin« Halford L*, op* c i t * , P* 48f saionfield« op* 
c i t * , P* 130. 
* Intepmtional consultative Comrelasion %ias composed of 
c i v i l r^ngineers of ar i ta in . Prance, Sgypt, Holland and 
Belgiuroi Hoskin, Halford L*, op* c i t * , P* 48* 
36. UAR Year 3c ok 1960, P* 74* 
ao) 
iha ciglith piroject for the improvements of the Canal« 
know • • "The Neeeer Project*** was prepared in 1954 to widen 
and deepen the Canal* keeping in view the requirements of 
increasing traf f i c and increasing s i s e of tankers* After 
the nationalisation of 3\3mm Canal Ccmtpany in 1956« the 
Sues canal authority found shortcomings in the project* 
'H^erefcre^ the prt>j@ct %m» moAified to achieve better 
results* Ihe most inportant shortcoming was that the Canal* 
in^en iraprovedf «rould not meet with the developsient of 
navigation* the increase in t ra f f i c and indiniension and 
drau^t of mhlpBm ^ e authority drew up new plans ^i<di 
doubled the canal capacity* The main programnes of **llasser 
Project" were es follOMi i 
1* The deepening of the Canal to pass the ships and 
tankers drawing 37 f ee t (about 46*000 tons) instead 
of 36 f€»et with tonnage of 38*000 in fornier plant 
2* The widening of the Canal to pace with tlie increass of 
2 
the dlrmnsion of ships and tankers betiimen 1850 ra and 
1900 in? '"^  
The Sues canal company executed this project in 
stages in order to caake changes according to changing 
circumstances* The work on the project started in 19S8 
37* Ibid** P* 76* 
21) 
and th* f i r s t a t a ^ of project 's work wo« finltlied 
in 1961. Wi* C«nal w?»» iridttiied to take ship* of 37 f««t* 
Tho second stags of projsct vas finished in 1964 that 
vidansd and dsapsnsd tha Canal t o taka ships of 3© f a s t 
38 
drau«^t. 
In June 1975, The Canal w s reopenad after «»a 
Mrmb-laraali conf l i c t s of 1967 and 1973. -Tha inprovawa* 
and a}q>ansion of tiie canal had bean trade nore essent ia l 
because of the vast Increase in s i z e s of o i l tankers and 
ships since 1967» That tiras the Canal allowed the passage 
ot 70,000 or 200*000 draus^t ships in bal last* Henoa the 
COR^ny drawn out isiprovements prOQrsmras of the Canal* 
Tt»e proyrauines were con^rised of two partsi The f i r s t part 
provided 150*000 drau'S^t of tankers to pass fulXy l«den# aad 
second part permited to pass 260*000 drau^t of tankers pa« 
r t l y laden* The Sues canal Coii^ >any contracted witii the 
Penta v-^ cean Construction ccw^ny to work on the Canal* In 
1976 the Company also contracted with the Penta Cofflpany 
39 for tha expansion of Great a i t tar Lake* 
The f i r s t part of widening and deepening of the 
Canal prograitwe was cora^jleted in Decerjtoer* 1980 enabling 
the passage of ships of 150,000 tons fu l ly ladenf 200*000 
3«« f i f ,?«jfia» g^ft m N g m f#fAff> 1971-72* P* 54# Khatib* 
*.. Pathalla «X* ana Oho^shy* Oiaar 2** Tha Stiag Capal^  
Safe and Free passages. Arab Information Centre* (Information Paper Ho* 9) Mew York (I960)* P. Id* 
39. "me Middle ^ast And Korth A f r i ^ . 1981^2* P. 339* 
22) 
ton* partly ladtni and 370*000 tons tinXoaded and raisad 
tha RaxlBiam permlssibla dxBu^^t of S3 faat« After widaning 
operation* tha canal anblad to trans i t 90 ahipa par day 
instead of tha fonaar ouisber 65* Port Said by^-pass was 
openad oa Deceiftoer Ifitii* 1930 and other by»passas vara a lso 
conatructad a t Lake Timsah and Deversoir* In 1979 const-
ruction of tha Sulam Canal %ms insta l led to taXa waters 
from the ^ast Nile to Sinai* Futher development progracBina 
aims to build a canal paral le l to the exis t ing Suez Canal 
by 1995,*^ 
At pxvsent* the Sxtrnz Canal i s 195 km long* Xts 
niniiaum depth i s 33 fee t and roaxinuro depth i s 53 fee t and 
i s 193 maters-365 inetsrs wite* The average speed of tha 
navigation i s IS kis per hour since 1967* 
The construction of the Suez Canal oper^d a new 
v i s ta to %iorld cornmerce ai^ trade* The opening of the Sues 
Canal v ir tual ly neglected the old trade route* Cape of Good 
liooe around Africa* I t shorten the distance for n«vigati(»i 
from Europe to Asia* hence* the Canal becai^ principal 
channel of trade between East and west* Before the eonstru* 
c t i n of th i s waterway the overland route was convinient 
40* Ibid** PP* 137* 339* 
23} 
£or mall and passenger but not £or t 'G heavy nr^ xrchandiset 
particularly owing to the expensive transi^ts* The Sues 
Canal obviated this difficulty an& gave an overwhelming 
advantage for heavy merdiandlse as well as for mails and 
passengers* 
tnie Sues Canal* In conparlson to the Panama Canal 
and the Kile Canal * Is considered to be the most lncportant 
and significant* The Panama eanal vHnUAx connects the 
Atlantic Sea with the pacific oea« provide navigation 
between East and ;^st of two ^ merleast The Kile Canal 
also* that connects the North Sea with the Baltic 3ea# 
provides navigation between Western Europe and £;a9tem 
Australia* But the Sues Canal is used for navigation 
between the vihole t'^ st and thd entire ^ast* ilot only thls« 
physically the Sues Canal Is connecting two seas directly 
free from any obstacle ^lle the Panama and Kile Canals 
ont are provided with locks to overcome the differences 
In levels* 
Ihe economic significance of the Sues Canal can be 
easily ur^erstood* ihe economy in mileage realised varies 
between 47 and 59 percent by replacing old cape route* 
v^ilest the quantities of fuel saved varies between 50-70 
^^* ITAR Y««jr BM)k4 MO*!"* 71* 
24) 
42 
percent according to the tonnage and speed of the ships* 
•nie Increasing voXuraet of traffic through the Suez Canal 
Is also constituting good measures of %<)orld trade develi^ p* 
rmntt particularly In Hie li^ uropean Countries, The significance 
o£ the Sues Canal for the econongf of western nations Is 
also a considering factor* Its inportanee Increased constantly 
closely following the economic expansion of the ^^ uropeaii and 
/slan nations* Coupled with the Middle East oil« the Suss 
canal plays vital role In the western eccmomlo systea* 
Other routes were at disadvantage^ coEsparsd with the 
Suez passage being iruc^  longer* involving hl^er costs and 
more shipping space* The result was that i^ uropeaa nations 
becai^ more and more ^pendent on the Suez Canal for (AHsainlng 
raw nnaterlals necessary to their expending industries* A 
prolonged closing of t^e Canal Inevitably n^ eant damage in 
the econorrles of ^vestem European nations* difficult and 
costly adjustment with far reaching consequences* Xt can well 
be estimated that about 90 percent oil frosa Middle l^ ast is 
shipped througti the Canal to Europe and 'MBtevn Keinisphera* 
for instance, in 1966* 166*800*000 tons of oil* produced 
in the Hiddle ^ast and Far £ast* was shij^d.throu^ ttm 
m^-^mmmmmmtmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmummmmmmmmmmmmitmmmmmmmmmmMmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm« , 11 mimmmmmmmmmmmmmmmamm 
42* UAR Year Book* 1960* P* 71 
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Canai^ Out of 166*%0«000 tons o l l « 151« 100,000 tons was 
d e s t i n e d to Euxopei 10#700#000 tons to Western Hemisphere* 
4,000«000 tons t o Africa and l«000tf000 tons to tinsp«cl£led 
p laces* 
Vi y^»tt:>^ ?ijfe *Che Importance and s l g n l t l c a n c e of the 
Sue2J Canal for world economy could be r e a l i s e d i f one could 
r e c a l l the c r i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n preva i l ing during the Areib-
l a r a e l i Conf l i c t s OT£ 1956 and 1967 and the ouez Canal 
w.iS c losed for nav iga t ion . F i r s t l y , the canal was c losed In 
•October 1956 for a period of f i v e and ha l f months owing to 
triaggression-Israel i-Anglo«-Prench i n v a s i o n . I t had gr v 
conseciuences for Asia and Eu-^p^ as 50 mi l l i on t a i s of 
t r a f f i c were diver^-d froir» t h e i r normal c o u r s e s . The t r a f f i c 
could cmly reached through much lo'^^er and c o s t l y cape 
* 
route . 
The c losure of the Canal l ed to many far-eaching 
consequences. F i r s t l y , the Western nat ions were being 
deprived of a n o i l supply. This res i i l ted in one of the 
worst o i l c r i s i s in Western Europe t i l l April 1957, 
Secondly, shoirtage o f petroleum reserve in Western suropa 
as the r e s u l t o f which may important indus tr i e s were 
4 3 , Naidu A,G„ US Pol icy towards the _ 
C o n f l i c t s , Tuls i publishing House, India (1981) , P, l l l f 
a l s o see K i s s i n o ' s oententporarv Archives, London, Vol, 
16 (1967-68^, July 8-15, 1967, P, 22136, 
* See Appendix -
H, Table XI* 
M> 
severly •££cct@<Sl bacauMi of the lack of industrlAl ormtgfm 
Consequently prices of roost commodities went upi and 
thirdly great fall in the stocks exchange %ms recorded 
in all countries due to interruption of traffic in the 
Sues Canal* It was then realized that closure of the 
canal may have disastrous effect on ><estem industry 
and econoisy* 
The Sues Canal was reopened for navigation in i957» 
within the next ten yaars# the Sues Canal wss further 
closed from June 6« 1967 to 1975 and with all disastrous 
consequences* The r^gotiation for the opening of the Canal 
were dispearting because each side adopted an attitude of 
rigid intransigence* Israel refused to withdraw from 
occupied territories and the Canal sone until full navigs« 
tional rights to it are recognised and guaranteed* Foll<Min9 
the closure o£ the canals the old Cape route was revived* 
Conse uently transportation cost increased which reSuljfted 
in 40 percent incre^ 'se in transportation cost per trip* 
The western ^urope, the USA and Japan* who heavily 
depended upon west-Asian Oil* were worst sufferer* John 
Carr^ bell* f;anaging r:ditor of the foreign policy^ stated 
**• UAR Year 3oo^. 1060, P* 72 
27) 
that the closure of the Suez Canal m. had ccs t the US and 
vestam ^^ urope together $ 3.4 bl l ion a year. In supportlim 
hla argument, he quoted, the US government eatlmatea 
%fhich said that western Nations had incurred an additional 
expenditure of 4 b i l l i o n dollars a year on imports fro« th« 
Middle t:ast due to the closure of the Canal. Out of th i s 
one b i l l i o n dollars was borne by the US, 2,5 b i l l i o n 
dollars by 'estem J^ urope and the rest by the non-^corrsrunist 
45 s t a t e s . Supporting Campbell*^ stater?^nt> representative 
Saynor Halperon said that the clos'^re of the Sues Canal led 
to the suspension of the ^3editsrranean service by some of 
Arf«riv:an shipping Coiapanies l ike American Isbrandtsen of 
However, i t should be noted that teinporary lo s s of 
the Canal f a c i l i t i e s was not so sever to the Users* nation 
as i t was in 1956. In Cact, a t the tirr« of the Sues cr i se s , 
ship ;ing companies had nrade plans to turn tlieir ships 
throu^ Cape route. I t should be noted that many tankers 
then bu i l t «fere too huge in s ize and capacity for the Canal 
that major o i l interest found i t possible to get along 
without the Canal. Since then, the United States became l e s s 
45. :^aidu, A,G.,( op. o i t . , P. 112. 
46. Ibid . , PP. 112-113. 
28) 
dependant upon the Canal, 'Shm Usera* List of 1966 diacloaea 
a*4 percent o£ tota l t raf f i c by USA, Britain &nd France* 
alao other viestem :^uropean nations which tradit ional ly 
re l ied on the Canal for the ir in^>ort8 of o i l frcwa the 
liiddle East* had found al tenuit ive aourcea of supply in 
Libya and Algeria, Therefore* Britain's 60 percent o i l 
shipped throagh the Canal in 1956, now xeraained only 25 
percent by 1966, Prance to ta l traf f ic was a lso de«r**?9ed 
47 
to 37 percent only thro^ a^ ^ the Canal in 1966* 
On the other side* the Soviet Russia as also not 
deriving any advantage by the elosur* of the Sues Canal, 
During cold «s«ir. It beeams increasingly involved in Middle 
East Affairs, The short Sea route from Odessa to tha Red 
3aa* Persian GU1£, JTnclien Ocean and Far tiast was thin becaaei 
more important for her, 3y 1966* t^e Canal's traffic showed 
Russia as leading exporter of oil products Southbounds* 
totalling 5*618*000 tons* approximately 3*7 percent of the 
Canal traffic. 
As a sequel of the canal's blockade* f^ g^ypt was 
obvio'usly tlie ehief sufferer, ^ -yypt lost £ ;^  100 million 
annually frc»n the Canal revenues,**']^ e Nasser projects" 
47, Schonfiald* H,J,* The Suez Canal in Peace ar^ yar, 1869« 
1969* London tallentine* lUtcheXl & Co, Ltd, (1969) P, 172, 
48, Ibid,* PP, 171-172, 
29) 
was a lso at s tand-s i l l? about two third of her o i l producing 
capacity was l o s t i and bar touris t trada was s^verly 
curtailad* No doubt« tha Soviet Russia was helpldq Egypt 
to ovexcotna economic d i f f i cu l t ia s* Bgyi^t's losses arising 
from the war amounted to aCMna 500 million dollai's of idhidh 
310 tnlllion dol lars could b« attrifowtad to the closure of 
tha Canal* India and Pakistan ware a lso graataly suffered 
by the closure of th« Canal, A.ccording to a special is ts^ 
both countries inis>orts 400*000 and 500*000 tons of grain 
per month* Shipping rates a lso went up high from $ 8 to 
50 $ 18*50 a ton siiKse •titm Canal's closure* The closure of 
the canal had dislocated the Con^ny progransae of iR|>roven«nts 
in the Canal* 
Ihe Sues Canal* therefore* has plays a s ignif icant 
role in the Coc^ c^oarce and trade of the world* If again the 
Sues Canal i s closed* I ts disastrous e f fec t s w i l l be realized 
a l l over the %rorld* In addition to Petroleum and oi l* the 
essent ia l corrmodities are a l so transported through the 
Sues Canal* Seventy-five percent of to ta l o i l transportation 
takes place throu<g^ ^ i s route* Of course* passen^r traf f i c 
i s of no significarw3e as a i r t r a f f i c i s spee<3ter and cheaper* 
49. Ibid*, P. 171. 
50. Africa Diarv^ H^ w Delhi* 10-16 Deceirber 1967* P* 3703* 
CHAPTEIR : u 
FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION THROUGH 
THE SUEZ CANAL 
FR^EJDH OF N^AVICTIOM tHRQUGH TliS SU£^  C. IJAL 
in the era of rapid dev«lopnent o£ world trado and 
con«nerce« navigation through watezways ar« irost practicabl* 
meana £or travel and transportation* Ev«n in an ag^ of a ir 
navigation, their u t i l i t y for the tranaportation of hoavy 
and bulky coicn^scial goods mnained vnchallangod« Mhilo 
the speed, c»8t and distances make route through ocean 
by air sore preferable, eventhen, waterways neither can be 
ignored nor their importance be minimised* Therefors# 
navigation through waterways, tirhether man-caade or nature 
gi f ted, by reason of the ir purpose and character aro allowed 
to a l l ships* The waterways are not only economically 
s ignif icant for world transportation bat also the ir geograplw 
i c a l locations oiake them s tra t ig i ca l ly and consequently 
p o l i t i c a l l y very import;ant as the Sues canal* 
Canals are inland waterways and part of that respect!v« 
state through which territory these run* wh«n a canal i s 
bui l t within the terri tory of a state; and does not ^mnect 
two parts of open seas, i t i s known as the national or 
internal canal* The navigation through national canals 
«s» vEtdauf «iae escclusive jurisdict ion of t err i tor ia l 
1. Glajm, Gerhard Vbn. yof y^ q9nq Kal^i^ps, i^ in^rylygtiog 
to Public Intemationel law, (iind sd.K The Mac>Miii 
Companyt Col l ier (1971), P* 295* 
• 30 • 
ian 
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•ov4ftr«ignty of th« r«sp«etiv« statMi* Hezchant ships 
onjoy a right of passage in national canal OV«Q in th« 
abs«mc« of traatiea« but war ships may not be allowi^ to 
2 pass without special arrangemsnt or agnomsnt* for 
instancs Ipha Corolth Canal> 
On tho othor hand^ an intsznaticnal canal nay bs 
defined as an a r t i f i c i a l waterway ocmneeting two parts 
of the open seas« evin i f i t l i e s in the terr i tory of 
one or more than one state* and subject to an Intdsnatlonal 
regime whereby freedom of navigation i s guaranteed for 
3 
the ships o i a i l nations of the world« i3ie ^armanent Court 
of Justice paved the way to understand true nature of an 
Inteznational canal , Xhe Treaty of Versail les of 1919 had 
provided in i t s Article 380 that t 
"The Kiel Canal and i t s approaches shal l be maintained 
free and open to the vesse l s of comeerce and of war of a l l 
2 . Colombos, John C., International l ^ of the Sea (4th ed,) 
Lmigomans (1961)« P« 192| a lso see ingrld, Delupls* 
International Law i«d Independent states^. The university 
Press* Glosgov (1974)« P« 43y ienwicX* Charles G,* 
International Law* vakils* Feifer and c^inons Private Ltd** 
Bombay (1971)* P 472| Oupenheim* L«* International Law* 
Volume I* (8th ed«) English 130(^  >iKx:iety & Longomans* 
r . 480. 
* |he Goralth Canal, l i e s Whofcly within the Greek lorritory* 
free to the merchant ships of a l l nations even in the 
absence of an international agreement* 
3* Joseph* A«« Obleta* s*j* Ihe International Status of the 
Cana|r. tifie Haqumi Marltinus kljKofi ( l9 lo) t P» S / 
»a> 
iiatix>n« at p«ec« with Q«»iiaiiy on tanna of antixa^ •qpAlity*^ 
TUf '^ 4m *^<^ °° 9*P** i»Z3» — a raault o£ tha tazna of 
Articia 380# aa £ol2owa t 
" • • • • • •^e CanaX h< a caased to b« an intexnel &n<i 
notional n&vigable naterway, tha use of which by tiia 
ves^seia of stataa other than tha riparian st&t«« i s laft 
antiraiy to tha daacration of that atata« and that i t has 
bacoma mn intttzaational tfatanray intandad to provido vndar 
traaty guarwitaa aaaiar aceasa to tha Baltic for tha 
braafit of a l l nations Itha world*"' 
Tharafora, a diatinction can ba »ada batwaaa a 
national and an international canal not by any gaoyrafihieal 
factor inherent in i t but by the regiiM of navigation 
prevailing in i t . Zf navigation ia l e f t antiraiy to tha 
territorial atatat tha canal i s a national canal« if , oa 
the other hand, tharo i s freodoK of navigation intemationally 
4. Manca Oabom. latamatibnai Trananortatian And 
Oxford university 
• ^ TSTiim? rni'^Jf.rvU? f^ riD «»TvTrf rr 
Press (1^46), v. Ud« 
5* Jbsoph, A« obiata, s»j«, op« cit«« p* 23| also •tm orfiald, 
Larter a. and _«• ^ • « * D, Re., 9>«fff .<tt^  t^1tfil5M<a . 
the aobbs iiarxill Coapany, ZMC (19S0) pp. 370^2881 jifYtY 9f tffi|fpfU9fffX-^^fH»» ®f!!^!5. 
inaUtuta o i XatezBation i^^fairs. 1920«*23, PP« 233«234| 
corbAtt, p.E, frw Aft4 ^gjrtY Ift M f t t f M 9l ffHIfP* 
Harcottrt Brace & Coftpany, ii«w lfi»ck« (1951)« P« 14S« 
lor the intact of tha «fiiabled(m case on the statas of 
interaaUonal canals seeJanne, Avraim ^ f frWl¥^t9y,9| tft9 
snes* canal status r -^^ . X8»9 to I95»i A ^iUstorie»JUrldieai 
study,Libraia E. Dxes, Genova(1958),PP. 58.60• 
33) 
guarant«Md tot a l l the aaticm of the world l«e« an Inter-
n itio:ial rejlcio i s est^bliahed, tho corxal i s cal led sn 
international canal, Tha crltorlon* t\ixia, est^^blished i a 
not geogr:^'phical but a laQol OXIG. I t implios tha exiatonce 
of an international refine guaranteeing freadrntt o£ navigation 
for t i l notioTis of the viorlcL« Xhe aaiae notion 4f inter* 
national Canal was aascrted by the Geriaan supr®tne court 
in The Kiel C^al c o l l i s i o n Caae (1950) that the "true chara-
c ter of an i n t m a t i o n a l waterway i s freedom of navigation* "* 
The Sues/the Panama and the Kiel Canals are international 
canals* 
international regim of a canal may be established 
only by consent of t e rr i tor ia l sovereignty* Ttm canal 
through which territory i t rune^ forms part of t:nm 
territory of that s tate and according to the accep^Md 
principle of "Territorial sovereignty"t nothing wmf be 
done within the boundaries of a s tate without the consent 
of i t s sovereign* Therefore* i t follows that the canal* 
V7ay being an a r t i f i c a l l y constructed water/requires e s s « t t i a l l y 
the consMit of i t s sovereign state* Further* the canal 
Riust be governed under an international regime consented 
by the t err i tor ia l sovereign* Unless the double consent 
6* Ibid** P* 26| also see Lauterpatfat^ International Law 
fieport* 1950* Butter worths* London* P« 134* 
34) 
( f i r s t l y to oonntiruction and secondly to the establishmflnt 
of inteznatlonal reglMi)* flt canal can not be cal led an 
Inteznational canal« The sovereign s tate have complete 
discretion to decide for the ir own puirpos** p o l i t i c a l , 
economical or atrategical , to open tha canal for the 
navigation of other nations upon the payment of t o i l s * 
The sovereign state nay also xwcotnMnd such other Condi* 
t ions as the sowixeign find I t necessary for the guidance 
and maintenance of free navigation thxo9gh canal, to 
protect against destruction and daeiages* In the case# i f 
the eanal has been bui l t but has not been subjected to 
an international regiae^ i t w i l l not be ca l led an interna, 
t ional Canal, Wot example, the Kiel Canal having been 
constn^ted by Germany wholly within i t s territory connects 
two op«Q sea»»the Baltic and the i^rth bea«was unti l 
1919« an internal waterway holciing both bank and controlling 
the Canal navigation completely* But by the Treaty of 
Versai l les (<^rticles 380»3a6} which was rat i f ied by 
aezmany, the iUel Canal h<^ Ceased to be an internal 
or national waterway and has became an international 
waterway,' The Comith Canal, which connects the Gulf of 
AeqiP* v i th Gulf of Comith. Greek exclusively controlling 
?• ror provision of a r t i c l e s 300*386, Treaty of Versail les 
see Kaace# Osbem, op, cit*# PP* l6a»169« 
n) 
i t s n«Tig«tioi)« hmaem i t i s an internal canal in th« 
absanca o£ an intexnatlonal ragiiM and at tha consant 
a 
o£ sovaraign stata* 
Tha intaznatiiHial ragina may ba astablishad oa tha 
canal ba cons4Kit->a]9rass or tacit« Tha axpra&s eonaant* 
which may ba eithor through a siultildtaral traaty or 
through aa uaivarsal daclaration, would ba in tha natura 
of a promisa to allow £readoQi of navigation :thrQfOG^  tha 
can&l to all nationf a prcMiisa which ramwunca its ^vax^ 
« 
aignty ovar ttw canal, Zt i s , in fact« auto^limitations 
allowing othar nation to usa tha canal for navigation* 
t h i s has also to ba accaptad hy tha international copimttitya 
Tha nwra uaa of tha canal by ships of other naticMos would 
ba eonsidarad as t a c i t indication of tha wish of that 
nation to aceapt tha intamatlcmal xagina, 
ZntematiOGal ragisMB aiay also ba astablishad by a 
milt i latari i l traaty st ipulating for fraodosi of navigation 
for a l l thm natioas of tha worlds signed by a i l s tates 
or by sona s tates substantial number of s tates and accaptad 
to a l l non<-si9iatorlas* in the case when the treaty has 
bean o>ncluded among some states* the non-signatories has 
8* Panwidlc# cdsarlas* op* cit*« P* 472* 
9« Joses^* A* obieta* ^•^•0 op* cit*« P* 29 
96} 
r i ^ t to ua« thft canal ac<;:ordln9 to the pjcovlsioo of 
international r«gln aither by thair axprass or t a c i t consant* 
or in soma casaa by cuatona davaloped in dua tlioa* 
Tha :3uaB Canal ia tha scat liqportant intercontinantal 
Canal batw««n tha Eaat and Mast* connecting tha <%dltarr«-
&nea s^a with tha Rad saa» I t waa constructed by Ferdinand 
De les^aepa under a ooneaaaion granted by said Paaha 
in 1654 which was replaced by the Conceaaion of 1856 and 
was approved by the Ottmnan Sultan in 1866* The Sues CMfial 
was opanad for navigation in 1869* 
The Conceaaion of 1854 and 18S6« and the Ottoncoi 
Fizatan of 1866« did net s e t up proper rules of freo 
navigation through l^e Canal* However# Article 14 of the 
18S6 CmicesaitfB provided as follows t 
*The Grand Haritine Canal f roit Sues to Pelusiua and 
the Ports Sj^pertaining thereto* shall always renain 
op«ai as a ne^stral passage to every merchant ahip crossing 
from Oils sea to another^ without any distinction* exclus* 
ion* or preferance of persons or nat ional i t ies* on payoMntofthe 
dues and observance oC the regulationa establiahed by 
the Utaiverssl C^^pany l e s see for the use of the said 
ie« Ibid** PP, 34«as* 
37) 
canal and i t » dapendencies*" 
Further Artlcla 15 axpraasaly £oxt>ade ttva Company 
to discrlminata in favour or against of any 8hips« mxnpany 
or party. 
Th« Concassion of ia56# tharafora* did not prpvida 
rulas and obligation for warahipa of balligarent stataa 
during wartimaa* In tha laaginningt dua to absanca of any 
rule* tha warshipa of balligarant stataa used tha Canal 
fraaly* in 1870*71* £ ranch and Gaman warships passed 
through the Canal without hindarances* The Declctrcttion 
of Porte of 1673 declared the Canal open to the passage 
of warships of different s tates even in time of h o s t i l i t i e s * 
But, Egypt being under the suserainty of Turkey* the 
ausso«»Tuxkish war« 1877* prodtaced a very c r i t i c a l situation* 
The sueK Canal passes through Egyptian territory and 
conaeqiuently under the circunstances was related in TUdcey 
being bel l igerent would log i ca l ly not pennit free to 
passage to the enesiy ships* The blockade was ininin«3t end 
natural* Thov^ ;;h Tuxkey was at the tiioe the only legal 
^sovereign of £gypt but the British govemraent* in 1877* 
announced that any attenpt to blockade or interfere with 
11* See Appendix • a* 
12* Cetonbos* op* cit**P* 178* 
12 
38) 
th« CaDttX or i t s approaches would tm regarded by Her 
Majeatcy*a Govemnent as a sMnsce and a grave Injury 
to the coK»erce of world* Zt %«ould also be inc^Rpitable 
13 
with the maintenance of neutral pol icy . As the result 
of British decree, no h o s t i l i t y did take place within 
the Canal« Meenwhile Britain had become heavily dep«fkd«Eit 
on the canal . The control of can&l« by th«n, had become 
s trateg ica l ly and connercially very important fron the 
ar i t i sh point of view, in 1875« British govexximent pureh. 
ased Egypti^sn shares of the Company. Hence* i t controlled 
the Cofiq;>aQy*s operation and establishiMl a strong positi<m 
to defened the canal in the absence of any intf^mational 
or national arrangement. In 1882, revolt broke out in 
Egypt which endangered the free navigation thxough the 
Canal THUBH the viceroy of Egypt authorised the British 
foreces to occupy a l l places of the Canal that were nece* 
ssary to safegvard the Canal. Britain wholly occupied 
the Egypt as a vailed protectorate unt i l 1914. 
13. Zbid, P. 173| Hoskin, Halford. I.., op. c i t . , P. 60. 
Also see Hortcin, Halford L., "The wues Canal as an 
international Waterway." Vol. 37 (1943), P. 37S| 
Joseph A. Otaleta, s , j . , op. c i t . , P. 9 | Benno, Avram., 
op. e i t * , nf>. 29-30. 
14. schonfield, op. c i t . P. 50f Joseph A Obieta, 5 .J . , op . 
c i t . f PP. 9«»10* Fioskin, Halferd. L. op. c i t . , P. 60. 
Also see ^elak, Charles B., The sues Caaal Base 
Aqrewaent of 19S4,r I t s back Qcound and Implications, 
AiMriean iXraznal of International Law^  \iol. 49C19SSJ/ 
P. 480* Vot the i'Citish Occupation And Iha <£Oteetorate 
o f Egypt See Marlowe, op. c i t . , (Chapters V, X), PP.lis 
and 2 i2 -e tSe9 . 
39) 
As haa btt«Q said, no hos t i l e act was «>n«nltt«d 
within th« su«B Canal though xomainod fre« to warships 
of iDoth b«l l lgsrsnt s ta tes during the ^sso-TujddLsh war* 
Bat the situation led to provide an agreement to safeguard 
the canal from h o s t i l i t i e s * damage or interruption to 
navigation by bel l igorent states* Thus, after the occupa. 
tion of Egypt, in 1882, Britain pressurised other powers 
to enter into an agreement to presezrve and guarantee the 
freedcm of navigation to a l l shijMi through the Canal, in 
fact , Britain wanted to preserve her right to defsned the 
Canal from an act of aggression against Egypt in any 
clrcisBStances so Ixmq her occupation of Egypt continued* 
therefore, in 1883, the then British foreign secretary. 
Lord Granville, issued a Circular Note to the powers, 
proposing the desirabity and necessi ty of ccmclusion of 
an international agreement for regularizing the x use of 
the Sues Canal during peace and war* He stated that * we 
wish 1x> suggest thet free passage through the 6uez Canal 
in time of peace and war be secured to a l l 5ea.£<irlng 
15 
nations under an international guarantee of the Powers*** 
Zt should be noted that the proposed terms in Circular 
Note made i t c lear that any suggestion for neutralisation: 
15* i^skin, Hal^rd L*, the ouez Canal as an International 
Wa^ erway^  A*j*z*L*, vol* 37 (1943) PP* 37S»376* For 
de ta i l of Circular Mote of Lord Granville^ January 3 , 
1883 see Httrawitse. J«C. Dinlomacv in the Kear And 
ijlfd^fi East, vol* I D, van Nostrand dompany. Wc. 
40) 
would not be acceptable* He said " we can nevmr agree 
to the Suez canal being neutralised*" In sulMitance* 
i t did not propose to regularise i t s use in tiine of peace 
and war just Uy declaring the Canal to be free for the 
passage of a l l ships in any circusistances* and forbidding 
I w s t i l i t i e s within i t s boundaries* 
Ke^t iat ion continued unt i l 1888* In 1885« the 
seven Powers .ambassadorial Conference held at Paris also 
discussed the international regine of the Sues Canal, 
At the Frwnch in i t ia t ive* a provision for an Internationa^ 
Canal CoaaAasion was incorporated in ^ e dxraft treaty 
of the Cmiference* But t^e Conference «nded without any 
17 conclusion* 
In 1867, Anglo-Ottoman negotiation further took 
place to:£ frane an agre«nent* I t provided that "this 
maritime Canal shall always be free and op«m, both in t i a e 
of peace and war for the passage of warship and merchant 
ships without dist inct ion of the flags cm payment of the 
dues and in confirmity with the regulations actiially in 
force or with those which may hereafter by promulgated 
18 
***•" This Convention was ratified by Britain but the 
16* Ibid,, p* 376* 
17* Ibid*, p* 376| Joseph A, Obieta, s,j,« op* cit*,P* 11* 
18, Hurewitze, J,C,, op* cit*. Vol* I*, P* 201* 
41) 
Stibliros Poxtm did not ratiflAd i t oimlng to th« opposition 
of Franco and Ruaaia* In £aot« thay ware not agreed* by 
19 tha proviaion of Artlcla 5 of thia eonvention. Finally 
in 1688* a draft convantion was praparod by tha British 
foreign office. It had been accepted by all the powers 
ccncemed and ca October 29« 1888* a convention %>as signed 
at Conatrantinople* lanown as The Convention of Constantinople 
Qg 1888 or The Sues Canal Convention of 1888. It was signed 
by the representatives of nine powers* namely* Great 
aritain^ France* Germany* Auatria-Mungary* Italy* ^asia* 
Spain* Turkey and the Netherland* The freedoro of na^ifation 
throu^ the Sues Canal* thus* were regulated by the 
Cnstantinople Ccmventicm of 1888* According to its 
Preapble* the Convention established a definite systwn 
19* Article 5 of the Convention of 1887 pjTOvided thatt 
"At the expiration of three years frcan the date of the 
pr'sent convention* Her Britannic f^jestry's Goveznmeat 
will withdraw its troops from Sgypt* If at that period 
the appearance of danger* in the interior or from 
without* should render necessary 1;he adjournment of 
the evacaation* the British troops will withdraw fr<^ . 
Egypt irradiately after the disappeai^nce of this 
danger." Nevertheless* "The Covemr-ent of Her Britannic 
liajestry is auth rised by this ccnvmnticm to send* if 
there are reasons to fear an invasion frc^ without* 
or if order and security in the interior wers disturbed* 
troc^s into Egypt* which will taXe the measures 
necessary to remove these dangers* In taking these 
measures* the ocmmanders of these troops will act with 
all the regard due to the right of the Sovereign 
Powers*" Ibid** P* 202* 
* See Appendix <• C« 
42y 
"diatined to guarante* at all tlraea for alX powars tha 
20 
£vaa uaa o£ tha suas riaritima canal ft"*^ 
Undar Artiola 1 of the convantion* tha canal ia t o 
ba fraad and c^ panad both during tiis» of peaca and war to 
a vary ship of corrsMrca and vrav without diatinctioa of fl«9* 
Tha canal can not ba blookadad and the contracting partiaa 
pladgad not to violata tha provision or to interfarait in 
tha fraa uaa of tiia Canal« Tha Convention of 1388« nautra«> 
lisGd tha Canal. According to Article 4 no right <aE %mr# 
no act of hc«t i l i ty« nor any act intended to obatruet l^e 
free navigation Is to b« eorrr.itted in the Canal* in i t s 
iorta of access within three see ni lea form these portSt 
even i f Turkey i s one cf the bel l igerent states* 
During wartin«« Art ic le 4 aays« the Sues Canal 
i s t o be opwned for the bel l igerent warships in aocordanc* 
to the laBrr!« of Article 1# and subject to the saiae res* 
tr i e t ions in order to avert h o s t i l i t i e s in the canal watejEw* 
Belligerent warships mast pass throu^ the Canal without 
any delay except in case o£ distress* In case of distress 
i t would not stay there more than twenty four hours* 
20* For Preaiable of the Convention see The Sues Canal 
Selection of Docuni©nts# November 30, Ift54-July 26, 
1956« the Society of Comparative Legislation And 
Xntamational Law# Stevens & Sens Ltd* London (1956)« 
P* 43* 
43) 
Article S provldtis that varshli« o£ bsXIigttnmt statMi 
^a lX not WEsibark or disembark e i ther troqps^ sounitioiui 
or materials in the Canal and in i t s ports o£ access 
except in case of accidental hindrances not exceeding 
1*000 inen«»Qf-»vi«r with a corresponding amount of war 
material* The Convention further provides undsr Article 
7 that power are not allowed to ksep any warship in the 
waters o£ the Canal nev-rtheless , they may station only 
two warships in the ports of access of Port Said and Sues 
b-at th i s rlq^t shall not be esmrcised by bell igerents* 
"Ehe Conventicm reserved " the aovereign rights* 
of the Turkish Sultani i t a lso reserved the riglits and 
iraaunities of the Khedive of tlgypt* The Convention «utho» 
rised the Sultan and l^edive to take measures necessary for 
^ e defence of Egypt and the siaintenance of "public order"# 
but provided that such itieasures "shall not interfere with 
the free use of the canal." * Sgyptiaaj and Turkii^ govern-
ment were required to take necessary nwasures for insuring 
the e::Qee.?tion of tiie said Convention and agents of 
signatories powars in Bgypt shal l be charged to watch over 
i t s ex3e.ition undteir Azrticle 8* Zn emse of any event 
22* See A r t i c l e IQ, and l l of t h e Convention of 1888, 
Appendix - C, 
44) 
l^xeatalng the sscurity or fre* passage* the agents of 
slgRStories poviers were to inform the Bg^ptian go^^mment 
the dancer la order that government may take proper 
steps to jUnsure the prx>teetiQn and free use of the Canal* 
In a sense* the Convention provided for an Jbitexnational 
supervision of the canal* They had power to dewend the 
msppression of any \H>tk or th© dispersion of any assendblage 
on e i ther bank of the Canal, tlie object or e f f ec t of Whidi 
m i ^ t to interfere with tlie l iberty and antire security 
22 
of the navic^tlon* Ttm Convention stated in Article 14* 
that ttie duraticm of th© ConventicHCJ w&s not lirftltetd by 
the duration of the acts of ttie Concession of t^le Universal 
Suez canal Conpan/* 
Subsequently* th i s Convention was rat i f i ed hf a l l 
contracting parties* However* Britain refused to accept 
the Intematlcnal supervision provided by Article 8 during 
tiie duration of i t s occupation of a i^gypt* Hontheless* 
i t preserved c»rtain reservation concerning her riglit 
to u t i l i s e the Canal for safeguarding her position 
in ^gypt* Britain declared that the* i f nsed* u9 In the 
interest of Britain* rni^t consider i t s e l f fr«e to dis» 
£«gard the term of the Convention of 1388* Consequently* 
22* See Article S* Appendix • C* 
45) 
Fcttnes Mfuscid to jpatlfy th« Convention and ttm Camyatlon 
did not ecmo into foree* I t cmsm Into foroi 4i£t*r the 
21 
AaalQ.gzwich Declagation of April 8, 1904 in Khiet) 
e'ranoe acocipted Britifih reservation* 
I t i s then orretel c l ear t}iat Convention* nsore or 
l e s s provided for netitrelieation of the Canal and Canal 
aeonee* i t however« should not be ecaaflned wlt^ nemtrality 
% i^ch ie en act of war* "Xn accordance to international 
law« neutral ity doea not allow the passage of bel l igerents 
forces screws the territory* consequently* bel l igensat 
^^raliip would have not been allowed to pass freely 
throui^ the canal* Howiver* i t established int«!mational 
regieie in tsie Canal for the purpose of safeguarding i t 
fron acts of h o s t i l i t i e s * darrecre or any a t t e e ^ to d o s e 
i t to the detriinents of world navigation* 
23* HosXin* rialford L. cp, c l t* P, 61* ?or detai l of the 
Anglo->Frend) Declaratioa* April 8* 1904 see* Huxewitse* 
J*C* Vol, I , c^, cit** PP« 263-2651 Tlie Sues oanal* 
JoumaX of International lav , Supolc.'nentary* vol* 6 ( l t l 2 } * PP* 26.»29* ' 
* In i t s popular terns*'Neutrality' denotes t^e att i tude 
of a 3ti:ite vjSiic^ i s not at war wil^ bel l igerents and 
does not participate in tiie h o s t i l i t i e s * In i t s 
teGlmical »sn9; however* i t i s m re tiimi an attitudto* 
and denotesa legal s tatus cf a special ziatuxe* involving 
a ec»nplex r i^. ts* d^Jties and priviledgea at intema>« 
ti««ial Law* whia& mi»t be respected by beXlignrents 
and notitral alike* aee starTce* J»G** op, cit**P.511| 
Oppenheim* Vol.^ IX, op* c i t»* P* 6S3* 
46) 
Sines 1888« ^9 Canal «fas froely used by tha 
e^rrsnarolalshipsas wall aa warsahlps of ball lgerent atataa* 
During tha A ^ r i e a n ^ o a n i ^ vmr(ia98), MsStSsiSSSSmA 
war (1904-5) Tur1co»Italian war (1911-12) tha war^ipa 
of iMlligeranta passed throtrgli tha canal fraaly* During 
Russo-7apanasa vair# Bussian v)arshl|« anrouta to tha pacif ic 
vera allowad to usa the Canal* despite of the fact that 
24 
Japan was an ally of Britain* Britain* being "de-facto 
s vaxeign" control Egypt and reserved its ri^it to take 
steps* if needed* in its dafenoe to justify that it M m 
neutralised* At the outset of wolrd war X* Britain assuxnsd 
de-facto responsibility for defence* enforcement and control 
of international arrangement governing navigation of the 
Canal* The entry of Turkey into %«ar on side of Germftny 
and against Britain a strange situation arose-both froia 
legal and politicMil point of views* Sgypt* who nominally 
under Turkish Sueserainty was still under occupati<»i of 
Britain* Britain* now* declared Egypt as its "Protectorate** 
Halford L. "?^f fi®li£fgf3L ^ t ^ D .iRjfmUftRf^L 
waterwey"* A.J.I.L** vol* 37 (1943)* PP* 377-378| also 
we* op* cit*« P* 80* 
24* Tloskins* 
•rway ^  ..«.«—wv* wov »» 
iMarlowe* op* cit** P* 80* 
'Protactorate* or a 'protected state* arises in Practice 
%i^ en a state puts itself by treaty under the protection 
of a strong and powerful state* so that the conduct of 
its most Important international business and deeision 
on high policy are left to the protecting state* See 
Starke* J*G** op* cit* (6th Sd*) P* 130* 
47) 
in 1914 and as the £«sult of lAildi bacAraa m p c n s l b l * 
25 tot i t s d«fanc* and for*ign a££alrs* M l Egyptian poxrta« 
haneOf bacama balllgarant porta and SrltiSh trcopa vtm 
atatidnad a t a l l atratagic ax«aa along tha Canal* 
Tii9t Canalf during tivat world -taar 1^ was open to a l l 
the a l l i e d and naut i l i povMrs* Froro 1914«1913» the navigation 
throu^ tha canal ccmtinuad on tha principle of "business 
as usual** with minor interruption owing to tha Garraem 
26 
Sulamarinaa a c t i v i t i e s in tha i^aditarranaan* I t was 
apparent that in the event of a war involving the Power 
"de-facto" in control of the Canal« tiMi responsibi l i ty 
for the defence ^ tiie canal m i ^ t baootaa inccn^itable 
with tdie duty o£ saoiring free navigation for ships of 
a l l nations* ^«VBfora« tha defwice o£ the Cimal was 
obviously incORtpitable with the admission of eneny i^inpiag 
to i t * Britain tjasatad the sues canal in the sarne rmumars 
as i t treated othemateruKays tmc'ar har control* Eneny 
shipa were subjected to the same restr ict ion as were 
irnposed in British t err i tor ia l s waters* 
A£ter the end of world war I, the Peace treat ies 
2S« HeskiAs* Halford L*90p* cit*# P* 61 and in A*j*l*l.*« 
opm eit*« P* 378| aenno* Avram* qp* cit*« PP* 63«64* 
26, Schonfield« op* cit*« P* 72| ColOi^ >os# opm cit*« 
P* 175| Berjno, Avrara, op* e i t * , P* 82-8S, 
48) 
ta\« ygeaty of v«raallle» (Articl« 152) « Th« Treaty of 
Trianon (Articla 91)* and tha Tgaaty of st« Gaaaaia 
(Articla 107) • tha aignatori«a oftheaa traatiaa conaaisad 
to tranafar all powara confarrad on tha Turklah aultan by 
tha ccmvontion of 1386 xalatiag to tha txwt navigation of 
tha Su«a canal to Britain* Thazafore* tha Convantion of 
1888 waa raviaad* and Turlcay rmiouncad all har ri^ta and 
27 titla ovar Sgypt b/ the Traaty of Lauaanna in 1923* 
Heanwhila* in 1922* Britain daclarsd Egypt aa an indapan* 
dent 8tata« as tha result o£ which tha Canal becama a part 
of Egyptian territorial watar* Howevar* tha <!teolaration of 
* Articla 1S2 of the Traaty of varaaiXlaa providtdi 
"Oarmany eona«nta# ao far aa aha i s concerned* to ttia 
tran8£ar to His Britannic Majasty's Govaxnmant of tlia 
pouara conferred on His f^inparlal Majestry tha SuXtttb 
by tha Convention signed at Conatantinopla <m odkdbar 
29* 1888* relating to tha free navigation of tha 
Sues Canal." 
** Article 91 of the Traaty of Triantm providadi "Hungary 
eonaanta* ao far aa aha i s concerned* to the transfer 
to his Britannic I'^Jasty's Government of the powers 
conferred en Hia Xn^rial mjaaty Tha Sultan by the 
convention aigned at Constantinople cm October 29* 18i^* 
relating to the free navigation o£ the Sues Canal*" 
*** Article 107 of the Treaty of st* Germain providedt 
"Austria consent* so far aa i^e i s ocmcemed* to the 
transfer to His Britannic Majeaty'a Govemnant of th« 
Powers conferred on His Iicperial mjaaty the Sulteoi by 
the ConVMition aigned at ccnstantipole on Oetc^ Mir 29* 
1888* relating to the free navigation c^ the Sties 
Canal*" See Cppenheim* L** qp* cit* Vol* X* PP* 481«482f 
he Sues Cy»gl*>A selection of documents* op* cit** P* 
>6| achonfield* op* cit** PP* 73-74* % 
27* Ibid** P* 74f Benno* Avram* op** cit** PP* 66* 
49) 
Ia<tependttnc4i contained provision c£ retmrv&tionB 
Cttgarding tho c«nal for Britain vhidti Britain had baan 
eontinuousXy praaarving imdar tha Convantion of 1808« 
Britain took tha sola raaponaibility of tha aacurity of 
tha Canal and dafanca of Egypt against diract or indixaet 
aggrasaion^ aha dsclared with other rasarvad point* of 
4 is— navigation in canai;'' B f ^ngl9*^WgU^ ^fflfffWat 
of 1936 furthar at faetad tha intamatiooal status of tha 
canal* Tha StHts Canal tma racogniaad as" an intagral part 
of Egypt** Tha agraament aelcnowladgad special r i ^ t a of 
Britiah regarding tha dafanca of tl>a Canal* Article 8 pro» 
vidad that "Until such time as tha H i ^ Contracting Fartiaa 
agree that the i^gyptian Arn^ f i s in a position to anaura 
by i t s o%m resources tha l iberty and entire security of 
navigaticn of tha Ca&al« aut orias his mjas try the King 
and Eraparor tuo stat ion forces in li^gyptian territory i s 
the v i c in i ty of the canal**••••* witl% a view to ensuring 
in co<K^peration with the igyptian forces the defence of 
29 
the Canal*" 'She Agreement also authorised Britain to 
use ^ gyptian ports and other laeans of coinaunicatiQa* 
Therefore* special i>oaition occupied by ^ itain in 
28* Schon£ield« up, cit*« F« 76| rarlowe« op* eit** P*81t 
Hoskins* Halford L*« op* cit*» P* 62| Lencaomikl* 
3eorge# op* cit* F?* 477'»473« 
29* See Appendix •- D* 
SO) 
c«lati«n to the canal r»i!»ijri«4 unaffeet«4 hf th* ina«pen-> 
^imaem o£ Egypt* 
Daring vorXd war IX« Britain adoptad a savar attitoda 
towarda th« dafanca of tha canal* Sha daeidad to parfoxn 
its lagal raaponaiULity mora vigrously aa it %iaa naeaaaaxy 
fron tha atratagie point of viaws in tiia aittaation eraatad 
by war* Enany aarial and aubiaarina activity is tdi* canal 
dangaroua for tha allied naviaa* Italy* aa Axia po«Mira« 
triad to Miise tha canal but Britain ia conjunction with 
Egypt took praomtionacy maaauraa to guard a^inat atiddan 
saiaura of tha Canal by Italy* Hoifav«r« tha t^vmrn Canal waa 
30 bloelcad for aavanty aix daya daring tha war* 
TtM» axpariancaa of w>rld war II lay out tha attitudaa 
of Graat rottfara towards tha Canal* Tha canal bacaroa tha 
point of atruggla for powara and tha S\sas Canal ConvmtiQii 
of 1333 was ra£aain<»d uaalaaa during the hoatilitiea* The 
entire attitude of tha belligeranta had beeoraa abnomal* 
Thoref ora« tlia queatiem of raapaeting ita integi^ty aa an 
international viatsruay did not arise* It ia axpriMMMily 
laid down in Article IV of the Convention of 1988 that 
the Canal shall remain pan in titna of war aa a free 
paaaage« even to the warahipa of belligerent according 
to tha tenna of article X of the convantiim* The contraeting 
30* schonfialdt M*jr*, op* Git*« P* llOf Benno*Avram* 
op* Cit*# PP* 3&->91* 
51) 
agreed that any act of hoatillty, right o£ war, or any 
act obatruetlng the navigatioo o£ t^a Canal shall not be 
consrdttea in the Canal and its porta of access irithln three 
sea«<nlles from those ports* But, both Italy and Oesmany, 
bonlued and miae>d the Canal and Car«& xones as long as 
they had ascendary in tJtm air ^  do it in <3te£iance of 
Article W of the convention of 1B68* £ven neutral ships 
using the Canal had not escaped the attack of Axis powers* 
It is to be not®d that during both vorld wars, Britain 
had not completely complied with thet provisions of free 
passage and non*bloc)cade of the Canal* Britain stopped, 
captured and searched neutral ships in the canal suspctctiitg 
32 
to be involved in carrying contra bend cargo. I t should 
be reiMtefsbered that Britain, I taly and Cersoany were par t ies 
to the Convention of 1338, 
33 
After thm Sues canal Base Agreoinsnt of 19S4, 
which secured total e\meuation of British forces from 
Egypt, the sole responsibility for the maintenance of the 
Sues Canal was transfered to Egypt, except in the evwrtt 
of an armed attacH on any country which is a party to the 
31* See Article IV, Api^ ndlac •• C, 
32. schonfield, M,ir«« op, oit«, s^ P* lio-lll* i^mcsowski, 
cseorge op* eit*, FP« 614»61S« 
33* 7or text of the Suez Canal Base Agreement SMi A^ p^«ndix->B « 
52) 
tz«aty of Joint>»Ds£enc« betv«en Arab Leagua atata or 
Tuxkoy* Uoth parties expraaa*ad aatanaination to uphoXd tha 
34 
CcRivontion of 1308. In 19S&* cgyptlati govammsnt proela* 
Lxtd tha nationaliaation of tha SUMS Canal Company^ hanoa* 
all funds rights and obliyations of tha Canal aampan^ r 
vevs transferad to i:gypt* Tha nationalisatio!! constitutad 
great controversy and cm October 29« 1956* Israel invaded 
Egyptian territory* Later cm« Britain and France took 
military action against Higysxt in order to safeguard the 
use of Canal* Ihey (Britain & France) daolared that they 
axe in ti^ Canal acmes to secure the free navigation and 
in self<«KSefence« 
After the end of hostilities^ • fgyptian govammant> 
madte a declaration« on April 1957* on tdie Suez Canal 
regarding arrangements for its operations^ tolls« managesaMit 
and the Canal coda etc*« in accordanca with the C<matanti» 
nople Convention of 1888 and the United nations OMrter* 
Egyptian govemiaant declared that i 
"It renalns the unaltered policy and firm ^rpose of 
the Govetninent of H^ gypt to respect the teriss and spirit of 
34» £"'©« article 1V# Ibid> 
35. See Appendix «G. 
54) 
Xsraal in February 1949« th« h o s t i l i t i e s came t o an 
end but Egypt maintain a blockade against I s r a e l , Ihe 
r e s t r i c t i o n s were consolidated by the king iozouk 
by 'a decree of 1950* llie decree provided t h a t " cm the 
procedure of shi£^ and a i r planes searches and seizure 
of contraband gpods in connection with the Pales t ine 
war," r r t i c l e I I provided for inspection of the ships 
psHifest and Cargo "so as t o ensure t ha t i t contain no 
arms munitions^ war mater ia l s o r o ther a r t i c l e s considered 
as contraband and shijj^ped d i r e c t l y to i n s t i t u t i o n o r 
person on Pales t in ian t e r r i t o r y . . . • • • • • " ^ However, 2gypt 
l imi ted the l i s t of contraband goods des t ined for I s r a e l 
and l i a b l e to se izure , l i k e , arms and war ma te r i a l s , 
fuel o r o i l of a l l k inds , a i rp lanes and Prize goods e t c . 
The decree under Ar t i c l e IVallowed to use force against 
ships attempting to avoide search, and ships found not 
involved in carrying contrabands were to be allowed to 
continue t h e i r voyage. Consequently, a l l sh ips , regardlass 
of t h e i r f lags were subjected to the confiscat ion of 
forbidden good, more p a r t i c u l a r l y crude «aid reflnd o i l , 
passing through the Canal evon whdti t h e i r des t ina t ion 
were op^nely not I s r a e l . 
38. I b i d , , p , 533| also see I'enczowski, George, op, c i t , , 
P, 616, 
55) 
Th« United s t a t e s , Bri tain end o ther Karltirae 
Users of the Canal lodged p ro t e s t against Egypt!^ai 
govemm«:it, Ihe blockade o t the Canal a i fected i n t e r e s t s 
o£ $ ma^ar powers, in July 1951, I s r a e l brough the 
question in the UN .ecur i ty Council and complained t h a t 
Egypt had v io la ted i 
F i r s t l y , ln temaJ; ional law by exescis ing the r i gh t of 
bel l igerency In peacetimei 
Secondly « ihe Armistice i^greement of February 1949| 
Thirdly^ Ihe Suez Canal Convention of 1888. * 
In the ensuing debates, repxescoitatives of Br i ta in , 
United s t : i tes , and i rance , supported I s r a e l , ihey also 
submitted a resolut ion condensing Egypt for he r r e s t r i c -
t ions iniposed on I s r a e l i shipping. I^m resolut ion s t a t ed 
t h a t the imposition of these r e s t r i c t i o n s ra ised l ega l 
question of freedom of navigation through the ouez Canal 
4fl 
and contr ibuted toward the tension in the Idddle £a s t . 
I t a lso affected the shipping i n t e r e s t s of dther maritime 
powers, p a r t i c u l a r l y t ranspor ta t ion of o i l to the 
Haifa :vefinary. 
39. I b i d , , PP. 616-617| Benno. --vrum, op . c i t . , PP. 119-120. 
In 1950 I s r a e l also complained against Egyptian action 
against i t s shipping in the secur i ty Council, see 
United ^iations year aook« bepartmeait of iub i ic Information 
United Nations, New York, 1950. P. 317. 
40 . Lencsowski, George, op. c i t , P. 618, also see the Jo in t 
Draft Resolution s/1899, united l^ations ve^ir 3ook^ 1950 
PP. 316-319. 
S6) 
On September 1# 1951, the r«solut lon was pfut to 
vo te and acoptod which u n j u s t i f i e d .':gypti**n p r a c t i c e . 
I t c a l l e d upon Egypt "to tenainata tiie retftrict iona on tii« 
passage o f in ternat iona l comroercial shipping and gooas 
through th<9 buaa canal li^eroever bound, and to ceas« 
a i l in ter ference with such shipping beyrand that e s s e n t i a l 
to the s a f e t y o f shipping i o the Canal i t s e l f and the 
41 
otoaervance of the i n t e i n e t i o n a l convent ion." 
^nevertheless* £<gypt continued blockade against 
I s r a e l i shipping desp i t e the Counci l ' s i n j u n c t i o a . In 
1953, Scjypt again ext.enaed the l i s t of contraband t» 
cover food s t u f f and other conroodities and blockaded 
I s r a e l i port-Klath-tn the Culf of 'X^aba. I s rae l , ( Jms , 
42 
a^ain complained against Egypt on January 1954. I t s 
repreaemtative sa id that a l l these acta c o n s t i t u t e d e 
v i o l a t i o n not only of the cons tun t i n o p l e conv«nti<m but 
a l s o o f the 3acuri ty covmci l 'a resolut ion of 19S1* On 
iiiirch 1954, iviewsealand sulxnittad a draft reso lut ion 
by which the .security Coxincll reca l l ed i t s resolut ion 
of -^ept^nber 1951, and c a l l e d upon i:;gypt to comply 
41* I b i d . , P. 618. ^ee the l« so lu t ion b/2322, Iflnlted 
Nations year Sook^ 1951, P. 299. Middle Eastern 
Affairs^ -^ Haqust » septecaber, 1951, S«mno, ^vram, 
op . c i t . , PP. 128-129f the .^ u^ez Canal-.;:>electlc»a 
o f M3curoents op . c i t . , PP. 67-68 . 
4 2 , Hhited Hatloas year Dook* 1954, iPi>m 62*63 | a l so see 
i iecurity Council O f f i c i a l i^ecorda (^upr>le.) Jan-March 
1954, P. 3 , 
* Ihe i^so lut ion of 1951 v»«.s adopted by £;4f({jht votes in 
favour (Braz i l , Eocador, ixdnce, Ihe Netherlands,Turkey, 
the United s t a t e s , Britain tmd Yugoslavia) and Ihree 
absents (China,u£sSr and I n d i a ) . 
57) 
with that reaolution in accordanc« to o b l i g a t i o n of 
the United i^ationa Chorter. Ttiia resolut ion was iK)t 
43 
adopted as the Soviet aass ia vetoed i t * 
Louring tti® ^)Ocurity Counci l ' s detKitsc, the 
renreS'Sfitative of Egypt oKplaincid h i s govomn^ent policy* 
He m.^lntalned that a s t a t e o f weir hcd e jds tcd and 
continued to e x i s t between Sgypt arad I s r a e l in Cfeptcity 
o f remfoers o f the ^»rab League and a l l y of metabBta o f 
the league s i n c e I94e« Iherefoie^ sijch s i t u a t i o n gave 
belligereritfls r i g h t s , p a r t i c u l a r l y the inc<»itestable 
r ight to v i s i t , s€»arch and se i zure of ships in t h e i r 
t e r r i t o r i a l waters* lie contendcKJl that i t s act ion n e i t h e r 
v i o l a t e s in t ernat iona l lew, nor the Constantinople 
Convention o f 1888, nor the >->rfnistice i^reemont of 1949 
o r the UN Charter* I t had never decreed a blockade nor 
i t had abused i t s r ights* AS regards the Armistice 
Agreecoent, the representat ive held that i t stopped 
Ihe a c t i v e raijiitary h o s t i l i t i e s but not b e l l i g e r e n t 
r ight s as no peace treaty had been concluded between 
both s t a t e s * He clairned that I s r a e l had v io la t ed the 
^irmistice ^^gr^imm&at by e x p e l l i n g peaceful Arab population 
43* Ibid*, P* 64* 
58) 
across the Egyptian bord«r# oy raiding ce r t a in l o c a l i t i e s 
in the n e u t r a l f ron t i e r sone, and toy i l l e g a l l y at tacking 
::'ji'ptien t e r r i t o r y * In h l» opinion, the ejclstlng -iralj-
I s r a e l i r e l a t i o n s could hardly permit to be considered 
as o peace* He asser ted t h a t the Convention o£ 1888 
spec i f i ca l l y allowed iigypt to take se l f -p ro t ec t ive measures 
in the Canal zones, and t h a t desp i te these r e c t r l c t l o n s 
on I s r a e l i shipping, freedom of navigation through the 
C'jr.al rMncdned unimpaired* Efjyptlan (apvemKient did not dmy 
tvQvy. tlie r e s t r i c t Ions, isnd decl-arod t h a t u n t i l peace 
w a tjstauli&hfed iirid so Lgypt 's very eXLst*^ce ^'iB tl i.eat<r»n«jd 
by <ig<^re5sion# h i s country haa to exerciao i t s oovoreign 
44 
r i h t s of 3elf-d«s:.«ics vind -iQlf i^ros^^rv t i o n . 
However, the leg^^lity of Zgyptian act ions d^nss^ds 
ui3cu33ion* ^ince, the r i gh t of v i s i t , search and capture 
consr i tut«*« r i g h t of ^e r and an ac t of h o s t i l i t y , ' which 
were prohiui tad by the Constantinople Convention of 1888 
(' r t i c l e 4 ) , these measures cons t i tu ted an in ter ference with 
the free and open use o£ the Canal in t in^ of peace as well 
as war* Therefore, the question whether and t o what extent 
th?j Const-uitinoyle Couvc-ntion respfiCting th« free n«.vigation 
44, United l-<atA.ons year jJook, 1954, P?* G3-64. 
39) 
of the -uex canaX d«zog<^te<i frosn the unaajk r a l e s o£ vlsi.t# 
;icaxch cinu &al;i^ ui:9« defr.<ind aij&lysla, l40 t^ubft, the legal 
posi t ion w-^ a a©i>atabl«, Egypt Jusstitied I t s c<»itinued 
jdts action-tTi© sso ca i l ea ioreach or one par t of the Conven-
tion i»«« Uio ri'iUt o i innee navigat ion . Syypt sirgueu t.iu.t 
X . - r . 
•a; '-ci^tiun I s r e l - t i ^ to the uei«ice oi ttie Canal 
\ ich i t ti.c ra-poniiixyility of r-gypt. itie problem had 
j'L'-n cccicQC by the £-ri%e cour t o t '^exandxia more extwi-
t l ve ly in the case« of the Flying Trader (L>ec«nber 2, 
1S3C) >^nu f i . l d . ?r i»e cour t in te rp re ted the expression 
* the defence of 2.gypt and the maintenance of Public 
order" a s i tua t ion Which * involves the non-applicution 
of '» r t l c le 4 of the Convention." 
The cour t ct^utca ths-t c-gypt w<.s t r ue ly a be l l ige ren t 
st i- te po^sesaing the r i g h t of any capture ' j u r e b e l l i ' « 
hence* i^yypt has the r i g h t to take any nece»«ary me&suzes 
lo r i t s defence, '-article 10 pxoviaes th«it /^ixrticlee 4*5, 
£ind 7 sha l l not i n t e r f e r e with the roeasurea which the 
~ult6n of rurJtey and Kheaive of Egypt might find i t 
necessary to take for securing the defence of Esypt, In 
45» Leo c-roas. "passage through the ouea C&n&l of I s r a e l 
^und GarviQ ^yd I s r a e l i i h i o e . " QD> c i t . . ^^. S3S>536f 
For case of the f lying Trader i.e« Lautepacht, In te rna-
t i ona l Law .Report, 19So# P» 440, *^laq see the Case of 
*I-a^alA'. Intexniitionel L^ -^w I^oort^ 1957. Pt« 992-9931 
L '^rno# -vram, o p . , c i t , , PE • 114-115 xia 123-127. 
46 . ^ee ' '^rtlcle lo of the Convention of 1836, ^^pp«idix - C« 
•o) 
t n l 8 way the pxovialons o£ »rtjbcl«9 4#S and 7 do not 
controdictwpy to a r t i c l e 10 of th« constur^tlnoplc Conventioi)* 
Every arsieci conlXic t o r h o s t i l i t i e s to which iigypt i s a 
party, p a r t i c u l a r l y with i t s neighiJour« r a i s e s inevita^ay 
the CiU«»tion ox. the ae ienc« of l t d t e r r i t o r y , xl^craiore, 
/v^ticl© 11, wiiich piovicSe* th^t lae-osuras tak<ja lay iigypt 
au- Ux^cey ui-uer .vrt ic ies 9 *md 10 naust not "interturo 
With the frfiis u£« o f the conul", can not oe constrvctod 
as a r e s t r i c t i o n s upon the r i g h t s of £.gypt« % • ^>urt 
he ld thut In e^^fect. " the p£ovis ion of a r t i c l e 11 could be 
r e s t r i c t e d the natural r i g h t s o f & s t a t e to preserve i t s 
QVTk e x i s t e n c e , a r ight which cttn not be subjected evsD 
AS 
of express rsnunciat ion. ** 
/v8 regards 'Article Z regarding the free paaaage 
through the Canal in time o f "peace and war", the court 
s t a t e d that such r e s t r i c t i o n s t«3JceQ ii^ y ^ y p t did not 
i n t e r f e r e with fxeedon of navigat ion* 
I t should be noted t h a t Br i ta in , even any other 
rri-iritiine power, did not r a i s e any l e g a l o r o t h e r obj action 
47* iTor pix>visions of - - r t i c l e s 4 ,5 ,7 ,9and 11, see 
«.ppendlx «• <3* 
48« Gross, Leo, "Passage through the ouea G^nal of I s r a e l 
r'' ^ i . J . I .L . , yfoU S l U w ) , :.5iyEf53£r>'»B?]r aowd Cayq<^  ^_ 
t . 535 | Colombo*, J<awi C,7 op . c i t . , P. 178. 
« « 
against Egyptian restzict lon in 1948, whoj both Britain 
and Egypt wore responsible for the defeiic© of the Canal, 
under the 1936 Agreeroent Britain was also a co-guarentor, 
with Egypt, for the right of teem navigation throuc^ 
the canal. Therefore, i t was probable that Britain might 
^iply pressure en £gypt to compel to restore the right 
ot free navigation ao long as Britain was a Co->guarantor 
of the security of the sues canal. 
The question of free passage of I srae l i shii>s 
through the Canal once again arose after the nationalisation 
of the Suez Canal Conpany, I t was considered at London 
Conference (August X6«23« 1956} • The representatives of 
Israel and ottier governments pointed out tnat Egypt had 
defied the security Council ^s resolution of 1951 which 
reaffireoed in 1954« «Dd that under the t e m s of the 
Convsntion of 188e« Israe l i ships was ent i t l ed to go 
through the Canals and that £gypt was not ent i t l ed to bar 
i t as i t was doing,^' Military action taken by Israel 
in 1956, I s rae l i govemswoits cliamed, was due to Egyptian 
restrict ion against i t s d i p p i n g , 
During 1957*1967, freedom of navigation was not 
very satis iactory* Various question regarding the regias 
49. GsoBB, Leo, *?ftt*W teWMStl H t §}m G ^ f l ft i f t f t i 
Bound Cargo and I srae l i ships*" A . J , I , L . , WO1« 51 
(1957). P.530. 
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o£ the su<^ canal and th« y«axs old ,disput«a of Zsra«li 
shipping remain In dispute* Two months after the Declaration 
of 1957, Egyptian authority further Imposed res tr ie tix>ns 
and detained ships cm charter to Israel through the Sues 
C^al* Not only I srae l i ships and goods but also foreign 
ships carrying goods bound for or coning fxon Israel 
refused passage through the Canal ,^ 
Israeli^ govecnai«Bit protested against Egyptian 
interference ui%h pe^^ceful t ra f f i c through the canal* Israel 
rliaised doubt alaout the wil l ingness of Egyptian govesmsot 
to comply with i t s international obligation i , e » the 
Constantinople CnventiLon of 188df the security Council** 
resolution of septenber 19S1 and of October 13# 1956^ and 
SI 
the Declaration of 19S7 of Egyptian government* However* 
Egypt had been oontinuofusly imposed restr ict ion against 
I srae l i shipping. In 1960« Nasser had restated h is policy 
with regard to the passage of I srae l i ship through tine 
Canal, He declared that I srae l i Cargoes w i l l never be allowed to 
transi t through the Canal so long i t zemained t ide up with * 
po l i t i ca l problem of the Area^i' In fact , passage through 
the Canal was subjiK:ted to the changing po l i t i ca l demands 
So* Joseph A, otdeta, s^j*, ep« c i t « , p« 113« See Case o^ 
inoe Ibft of 1959* Ib id , , P, 114, LenosowAki, aeorgST 
op« c i t , , PP, 630««31« 
51* Ib id , , PP, 631-632, 
S2, Joseph A, obieta, S , j , , op, c i t « , P, 118, 
63) 
of Egyptian foroign policy, irX>r instance, inspi te of IsraaXi 
shipping, in 1961, seypti«n govocnmesit tBtu&wi <ill teclinical 
aid in the canal zone to the 3hip» of Tuxkey and Iran beciuse 
thmy refused to recognise the Syrian impai>licf also in 1961, 
during Goa c r i s i s , Egyptian goveilniBent reiulied to pass 
Portugese ship Carrying troops and enunitimi thcough the Canal 
because Egypt intended to foster independ<mce of a colonial 
S i 
terri tory, hence, both were p o l i t i c a l matter* 
Xn 1967, situation in the Hiddle £ast tooX a tum* 
In Kay 1967 United Nations emergency forces withdrew from 
Egyptian terri tory oa d«ntand of Egyptian govemm^it* On 
May 23, 1967, Egypt closed s t r a i t of Tirao and uulf of ^ « b s 
to Israe l i shipping* Consequently on June 5, 1967, Xsrctoli 
forces attacked on Egypt and several other Arab countries* 
On June 6,1967, Nasser closed the Sues: Cannl by reason of 
I srae l i attack against ship that were found in i t and tMo 
days la ter the canal was de f in i t ive ly closed to navigation* 
T^ e^ host i l i i t l es cane to end by June 10, 1967 when a l l parties 
accepted eeaae«fire order in compliance of the Security 
54 
Council"s resolution* 
Itie oues canal, however, roBaained closed t i l l 197S* 
the closing of the Canal, though important in i t s e l f as a 
S3* Ib id , , P* 130* 
54* aindra, / . .P.o*, op* c i t * , ir* 7C*7S| UBited Nations Year 
Book, 1967, PP, 174-.189* ' 
«4) 
principle sjcxd atfecting coceroescial interaat o£ the Worldi^  
was also « contributory cause to the pzoblen concerning the 
whole Miadle East situation* various attempts had £>een 
made on several occasion for the clearance and opening o l the 
caneli Curing the sessicm of the -ecurity council ana l l l t h 
emergency session of the Goaeral t^asmmbly^ in 1967# mmiijmc 
st:^tes of the United Nations had submitted several resolutions 
and a l l resolutions contempleted the question of freedom 
of navigation through the Canal and other waterways in the 
ss 
area in accordance to international law« " isat a l l attempts 
failed* Egyptian government had repeatedly voiced i t s 
determination not to opot and c lear the strained ships in the 
canal so long Israel was ready to evacuate territory 
occupied by her during the 1967 war» 
Between 1967«*1973« there was it no peace and the 
Canal remained closed* Both parties determined the state o£ 
War* Consequently^ oa October 6« 1973« Egyptian forces crossed 
the Suez Canal and attacked on Israel* Egypt occupied some 
part of territory in the Suez canal area* cm October 23« Isoth 
56 Israel and Egypt accepted the cease»fire* I t i s apparent 
53* See the resolutions introcuced by repres^aitatives of the 
United btates« Albania* Yugoslavia^ Trinidad and Ibbago 
co«sponsored by TWsnty Latin '^merlean s tates at the General 
Assembly ^essioni and the resolution introduced by the 
representatives of India, Mali and Nigeria, Hie ^^vlet 
Russia and the United Kingdom (which was adopted) at the 
security council session. United Bations ^me^r Book^  1967, 
PP, 194.209* 245.256* 
S6* Narayan, Col, B.K>>Lesson and Consequences of October Wa^ , 
Vlkas PublicaUon, I4ew Delhi (19'^^), PP. 16-12, Sl-Mf 
UN Monthly Chronical, Vbl* X, (}o* 10« 1973, P* 3 e t seq* 
es) 
that th« years long staftemate between Egypt and Israel come 
to en^ after the 1973 war* Megotlation continued between both 
parties for a permanmtt peace* Zn 1975« Egypt opiBied the Sues 
Canal for navigation* In 1975 Egypt and Israel signed the 
Intrelm Dlsenaaae^^at ^uaraement ty which both parties agreed. 
57 to resolve a l l disputes lay peaceful means* And Oa March 26« 
1979 2gypt and Israel signed a peace txeaty, kDo%m as Cmap 
CO David Agreement* The otc^te of w^r terminated between both 
stotefi* Israel agreed to return occupied territory and withdraw al 
I t s aiosmd forces behind the azmlatlce l i n e . On the other haad« 
Egypt recognised that ships of Israel end cargoes destined 
to or from Israel shal l engoy the right of free passage 
through the Sues Canal and i t s approaches to the o a f of 
bues and the ^'i^Llterrenean oea on the basis of the Constantino* 
pie Convention of 1888 without d l scr la lnat lon*^ Therefore* 
problen regarding freedMi of aavigatlOQ between Egypt and 
I srae l i through the canal set t led* 
To sun up* I t Rust be observed that the froedon o£ 
navigation through the oues Canal was too nuch subjected to 
the changing p o l i t i c a l clrcunstances of Egypt a»d demands 
57* ydddle £a«t /.nd liorth i^frlce^ 1979.00, P* 74* 
58* Ibid** 1981^2* PP* 80«>82* 
59* 5ee Article V of the Cagip David Agreewmt* Ibid** P* 81* 
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of i t s foreign pol icy , particularly in cas* of Ar«b»Zsra#i 
c o n f l i c t s . Ih« Canal was «n imt^rtant instzunant in ths 
hands of forsign pow«r# before nationalisation of th« 
Company* and thsn in t ^ hands of Egyptian govarosisnt* 
a t i l i s a d whanavar i t wes fiound convniant in order to foster 
the aiiAS of the ir foreign pol icy , the canal i s too naeih a 
part of £^gypt and i t s levexege value in international po l i t i e s 
has been actually so increased that i t w i n always be 
very d i r f i c o l t for Egypt to refrain fron using i t for i t s 
own purpose* 
CH^PTER•. I I I 
NATIONALISATION OF THE SUEZ CANAL 
COMPANY : POLITICAL ASPECTS 
NatLlonaligation of the Sue« Canal conmnvt 
P o l i t i c a l Aspecta 
On tha f i f t h anniversaxry of the Egyptian Revolution* 
addressing the nation* the t^en Egyptian ?re»ident|Cainal 
Abdul Nasser ,decareled n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of the Suez canal 
ccnspany* He in fomed t o nat ion that the incc^ne from Canal 
now onwards w i l l be used for bui ld ing Aswan High ENHD* A 
Decree under Law No, 285, concerning n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n was 
i ssued on 26th July 1956 which provided t 
"The Universal Cc»npany of the Suez Maritime canal 
{EgyptiAn Jo int -Stock Carrpany) i s hereby n a t i o n a l i s e d . Al l 
i t s a s s e t s * r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s are tranafered t o the 
nation and a l l t'.e Organisations and Committees tha t now 
operate i t s manag«nent are hereby d i s s o l v e d , * 
Consequently* Coitqpany's shares in i^gypt were frosen* 
-gypt ian govemnent s e i zed a l l i t s a s se t s* r i g h t s and obll*-
gatioroi in £-gypt. I t s managing a u t h o r i t i e s were d i s so lved 
and an i:gyptian author i ty w^s e s t a b l i s h e d t o operate and 
raanage the Canal, The o f f i c i a l s * employees and work n«n of 
the Cwrpany were ordered t o continue t o work under the 
condi t ions of iitiprisionment* ordered not t o leave t h e i r post 
without permission of new e s t a b l i s h e d bodv,^ 
1, See Appendix ^ 
2, see Articles 4 and 5 of the Decree* Ibid, 
• 67 • 
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Ihe national Isation i:>ecr«e promised that stockholders 
and holders o£ the foundation bond shall be c<»i^ )en8ated for 
their shares and bonds they posseas# in accordance to the 
value estliiiate ^ at the closing rate of tiie Paris Stock 
Exchange on the day precaeding the enforcement of the lew* 
Hhe conipensation was to be paid when ^ gifpt had received ell 
the assets and property of the conpany irxsluding those 
located aboard* However^ lesser paid condensation on the 
basis of average price of shares for the proceeding six 
m^ snths* 
The nationalisation of the sues Canal Company ^^s not 
a hast^ act done to defy w'estem Po^ ^^ rs* There were various 
factors corw:0mlng iigyptian interests vis-a-vis vJestem 
interests which intaractsd and produced a tangle web of 
tension and disagreements* The important factors were Arab-
Israel hostility, Egyptian nationalism, quest for anas and 
Soviet intrigues and the Soviet patronage to i^ gypt. 
Sgypt iinposed restrictions on Israeli shipping bound 
to or from Israel, and Arab gurrilla used i:gypt as a base 
to raid Israel* Israel exasrperatad and in retaliation 
made a massive, counter raids into Gaza strip on February 
28, 1955* Hi is reprisals raid once again assumed 
3* See Article 2, Ibid* 
i* laioroas, Hugh*, The Suez Affairs, Penguin Book (1967),P* 20* 
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international status and was considered an acute danger 
to international peace and security, Nasser had adopted 
a stronger attitude towards Israel and tried to obtain 
Western arroament* to match the Israeli strength. He requested 
the United states for armaments but inapite of considerable 
discussicm received nothing, llie United states department 
knowing that Nasser had no money and aakad for payment in 
cash* The United states did not want payiront in Egyptian 
cotton and Sgypt had no dollars to spare* Eisenhower in 
hia raentolra has disclosed that he su gested that "this 
financial agreement wei<#ied as madtx with as his obligation 
7 
to maintain the balance between Israel and l i e s nei^bours** 
Nasser could not get arma free umler the Itatual 
Security Act because he had not accepted the st ipulations 
of that act and had already rejected a military advisor 
group* 
At the sarre time^ France secretly supplied arms to 
Israel as 'quid pro cjuo* for gyptlan aid to Ai^r ian rebels* 
In fact« France and Xarael had a l o t in contnon in facing 
5* Zbid*^ P* 21, 
6. I-lonroe, sliaabeth.By^tiiq'ff f-oment in 1?^ f ^^}Mf gftffe 
1914*1956^ Chatto & wlndus Ltd*, London (1963)« P* 186* 
7* Thonas« Hu^ op* c i t * , F* 21* 
/ u / 
th« Araba« Neverthdleas* thtt Thro* Powers (United States^ 
Gr^at Britain and France) *^»ich continuoualy refused to 
sale the inost needed artnas^nts to ^gypt* at the same time 
they supplied arms and armaments to their clientf»l8rasl«as 
a gi f t .Nasser's protest* against the increasing supplies of 
sophisticated and modem arraaments to Israel« was rsjeetsd 
by the 'iThree Powers* Hence* the s i tuation becans tense* In 
fact* Britain* United s tates and France* as self-appointed 
guardian of ;)eace in Middle £.ast* had monopolised tlie sale 
and distribution o£ armairant, "Hieir policy aimed at starving 
8 
the Arabs and tncjre particularly Nasser revolution, 3y 
adopting this policy* they contradicted their own Tripartite 
Dedarmtion of 195Q becatise it was incompitable with the 
western scheme for the Middle Kastem i3efence« 
After the western powers refusal to supply arms to 
igypt and at the sarne time arming Israel pushed icypt to 
look towards the M Gov let Russia. In flay* Nasser made a 
8« Karanjia* R,K, How^^sser Di^ i,t« Jaico Publishing House* 
Sontoay (1964)* P, 52« 
* In Mey 25* 1950* the Govemrents of United states* Great 
Britain and France signed a Tripartite Declaration in 
which they recognised that the Arab states and Israel all 
need to maintain a certain level of armfid forces for the 
purpose of assximingv "their internal security and toeir 
legitimate self defence* All applications for arms or war 
toatdrlal for there couiitries will be considered in the 
lic^t of these principles* They declared their opposition 
to the development of an arms race between Arab and Israel* 
and would try and balance inflow of atr« to two sides* See 
Nutting* Anthony ?^o end of A lessioni The Story of Gueg 
Constable* London (1967)*PP, 178-179. For detail of Tripartita 
Declaration se J.C. Htirewitze* op* cit** Vol* II* PP* 
309-309* 
U) 
fiaftl appesl to th« Unlt«d states and thrvataned to turn 
to Russia if Egypt vas th%Mrtad« consequantly* nsgotiatioa 
began with tha Soviat Busftia and oontinuad till Juna* On 
Sapteni^ er 27« i95S ^ aaer announced tha conclusion o£ 
an agraamsnt with CzachoslovaXia to puxchasa subatantiaX 
9 
quantitiaa of arms in asKshanga of Egyptian cottcm and rloi* 
i«&s8ar*a action envoked protest and warmings from SritAin 
and tha Unitad States* The United states administration 
dispatched a Middle East -i:xpert» George V* Allen* to try 
10 
and prevent the Czech-arms agreement but failed* Nasser 
claimed that arms required are for the self-defence and 
survival of Egyptian integrity and sovereignity* He 
argued that ^ gypt w^ is an independent country* thus* entitled 
to ^ t arms for %<h@riaever and t^atever it wished* Kgn?t 
could not be blamad for turning to another source to get 
arnm* The anns agrsenient was purely a corrsnercial trans-
action* * the Egyptian Pre*ident declared* 
Another factor was the tension between -gyptian 
nationalise and western influence in ^ gypt* particularly 
9* IhOTMs* H u ^ *pp* cit** P* 32| Sindra A«P*S. op* cit** 
p« 23# vmiiams* Ann* irtato.^iy^, ^yftOT.}iii UtiJ-^jMit 
East And North A^ripa. 1914-1967^ MseMillian* London 
(1963), P* 1201 Finer* Herman* Dulles over Sues^Ihs 
F S S T ^P^ Pyactice of His Diplonacv. Heinemsnn. London 
« 
10* Ibid** P* 22* 
11* ^^ooroe* sl isabeth* qp* cit** P* 186* 
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to Britlah influence• British interest had deep root* in 
Egypt since 1875* In 1956 Egypt had unilaterally abrogeted 
the Anglo»Sgyptian treaty of 1936 and had rejected a '.^ e^eteni 
plan for a Middle East Defence organisation. A^in in 
1955 western powers imposed the Ba^^dad Pact oh the Arab 
v^ nsrld Which aimssd at containing ttie Soviet ^nion pf'netretion 
into Middle 2ast« The Arab and the Egyptian leadere rejected 
th«» pact, Jlassor Oi^ posicd tbe pact and underlook to expose 
the military and aggressive nature of ^ e Beghdtd Pact* 
ii© denounced it as a neo*<ioic»sisl threat to Arab independeaoi* 
For him« an integrated defence force or « joint cor?eMiiid «iould 
only perpetuate -.astern dcwHlnance. To counterit^ £gypt 
12 
signed a i^ltual pact with Saudi Arabia and Yemen* TheiM 
states offered Jordon to replace the British subsidy, but 
King iiussain of Jordan refused to accept the of far* However, 
lesser successfully pursuad@d in his stru gl« to keep Jordftn 
from joining the Ba^ i^ h^ d Pact* Kot <»ily this, Hasser estoreeed 
"active neutrelian** starting with the Afro-Asian Conferenoe 
* The Baghdad l^ct was signed by Turkey and Iraq in 1955 
which %ms later joined by Britain on April 4* 1955* 
Pakistan joiiM»d it in Septentier 1955 and Iran in Kov* 
1955* The United states representatives becatiie raesbers 
of the economic and militairy cocnraittees al^ou^ the 
USA did not join the Pact* 
Iraq ceased to take part in arrangeinents relating to the 
S'act in 1958 and withdraw in ^%rch 1959* On Augusli 1959 
t>^>e organisetlon %ms renamed The Central Treaty Organ!* 
sation, see Little* Ton* op* cit., PP, 260«2d2* 
12* Ibid** P* 263* mttdng, Anthony* op* cit** P* 40* 
W) 
at Bandung in 1955 and cal led for a %*ar of liberatlcm 
against the colonian dcnniin in the Arab world* He 
cultivated relat ions with Tito , Sukarno and i*ehru. 
Therefore, li&sser's policy of Arab neutralism resulted 
in a struggle between Britain and Bgypt in several 
countries <^ Middle East* 
Nasser's policy and actions h i t American and 
British interests in i^gypt and in entire Arab world* 
After the "Ca^ech-arra deal", Britain and the United States 
became worried about l e t t i n g the Soviet Russia into th« 
I-Uddle :^ast and thence into Africa* For Western interest , 
i t %ms vestem t h l ^ i n g , that i f -gypt became habitual 
Soviet customer i t would be disastrous* Tlierefore, they 
followed a policy of conci l iat ion towards Nasser* They 
agreed to s e l l arms and began to consider lending iTX>ney 
to s tart itfozic on the Aswan High Dam* On December 16, 1955, 
Britain sisnd the United States agreed to finance Egypt 
to construct the As%#an Dam*Miritain had doubted about 
the economic value of t^.is project and knew that i t would 
cause di f f icul tdes with the Sudan* Even then Britain 
and the United s tates agreed to support i t in order to 
keep the Soviet Russia out of Africa and thereby wanted 
13* Biom<i8, Hugh, op* c i t * , P* 24| i.<enczow3ki, George, 
op* c i t * , P« 512* 
74) 
to lirait the sove i t arms deal . International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (world Bank) a l so 
agreed in as s i s t ing £'gypt to construct the Aswan Dam* 
Ilie woxk on the Aswan Dam requizvd ten to f i f t een years 
for coiBpletion, Tho total estimated cost for the 
constraction of f i r s t s t a ^ of the i^ am was estiisated to$70 
million* Out of %A)ich the United states* Britain anid 
world Bank agreed to contribute respectively 56 inilli<»i 
dollars* 14 million dollars and 200 million dollars* 
I t i s interesting to note that in Odbober 1955* 
the Soviet Russia agreed to provide aid for Egypt for 
building the Aswan Dam on more favourable and l iberal 
15 tent« independently* But Hasser refused to accept aid* 
In neutralism to counter balance arms from Eastern powers 
ousting of British troops* Nasser decided for the loan 
offer for the Dam in preference to the Soviet Russia 
oifer* He refused probably owing to h i s firm be l ie f 
in the principle of Non-alignment of which he* with Pt* 
ttehru and !^ lkrouma* was architect and vmich w«»s the only 
14. Ksonroe, Elisabeth, op. c i t . * PP. 186-187| Fin«r* 
Heman* op, c i t . * PP. 37«38f Thomas* Hugh qp. eit** 
PP. 24-25y Bowie* Robert R.* Suez 1956-lnternational 
c r i s i s and the Role of Law^  Oxford University Press 
^l^'^t^' ? • . " ' Rondont* Pierre, Hie c^anaina Pattern 
of the Middle -ast^ Chatto & Indus* London (1961}* 
PP. 154-155. 
15. Ibid.* P. 155f a l so see Finer* Herraan* op. c i t . * P.39. 
T5) 
inathod to prevent cold war. However, tt»e As%mn offer 
did not change Nasser attitude* The .."eatem power* could 
not prevent the arrns agreement, nor had stopped liaaser** 
anti-western can^paign* Nasser also continued to attacX 
the Bagdad Pact* 
The dismissal of General John Bagot Gliibb frora 
Jordan irr i ta ted British because th i s shettered British 
position in the Arab %rorld« The "Suea Group" in BritiiAi 
Parlianient pressurised Eden; the then Prime Minister 
of Britain, to renounce a l l money lending for the Oam* 
2den W3S c r i t i c i s e d as having "backed the wrong horse 
when he had put faith in Uasser as future guardian of 
the Suez Canal.^ Like Britain the United States was a lso 
suspicious of p o l i t i c a l disadvantage of being a creditor 
of Egypt* The United States sericnisly doxjbted po l ic ies 
followed by H:gypt and was considered as a def inite t i l t ; 
tov/ards the Soviet Russia* In may 1956, Sgypt recognised 
the Peoples Rejpublic of Chinai and in June 1956, Russian 
Foreign Minister, Dimitri Shepiloy, v i s i t ed Cairo* During 
h i s v i s i t arms supplied from conirnanist countries were 
displayed* I t was also rumoured that the Russian Foreign 
'dnister had offered an interest free loan of 50 million 
16* Monroe, i::li2abeth, op* c i t * , P* 190* 
76) 
dollars,^ Nasser, in f ..ct, v/as as has already been 
followed policy of nont-allgnnetit which seeined Egyptian 
national Interesta and which wa« never liked to the 
western statenen and diplomates* so bitter %fas the 
United states that George Hun^ery, Secretary of the 
United States Treasury, criticesed Egypt as followst 
"Egypt was holding an option on the Western offer whila 
18 
shooping zround for a better offer frc»n Russia." 
llasser and his financial adviser also desliked 
the the v^estem budsgetary control •» the conditions 
attached to tl e loan by the United states and world Bank* 
The us states Dcpartinent laid down that all contracts 
rrust be on a coaftpetitive basisy and Egyptian internal 
econony must be managed and supervised by the United 
states to avoid inflation* The world 3ank supported this 
condition, and further added that it would review the 
investment prograrrroe and proposed to adjust total public 
19 
expenditure to Egyptian financial resources* Thus, 
Nasser claimed that the western lenders of the loan 
wanted the financial control* The real interest of %fastem 
creditors, Kasser claimed, was to establish dominanos over 
17* Ibid*, P* 190y a l s o see Williams, Ann* op* c i t * , P* 121 | 
IhcMnaSfHu^* op*, c i t * , P* 31* 
18 . I b i d . , P* 31* 
19* Finer, Herman, c^* cit*, P* 39y Rondont, Pierre* op* 
cit*, P* 155* 
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Egypt* Nasser utterances apparently pro-Soviet p o l i c i e s , 
consequently Irritated the United s tates and Britain* 
The American Congress too became hos t i l e a ^ l n s t the 
loan* The Egyptian arms <teal with the Soviet Csech# ttim 
United s tates and British dlplomates thought would lead 
to the reduction of domestic capacity of s^gypt to conplete 
the Dam as a substantial domestic resources w i l l have to 
be Invested for arms purchase, and consequently rei>ayinsnt 
of the loan would not possible for Egypt* O^erefors, the 
co?m;ltrnent to finance Egypt for construction of the Dcun 
20 
was considered as worthless* Britain persuaded the 
United States to withdraw the offer for loan* Nasser 
X>olley# on the other hand, had been widely appreciated 
at home and he becama the hero of Egyptian nation* 
In the end of June, The United States f inaneiaX 
year ended without making any f lx« commitments regarding 
the loan* The Senate Appropriation Coranittee announced 
that funds previously granted for the Aswan Dam vroild be 
21 
a ^ i n consulted* riasser real ised the intention of 
westezn Powers that they were not interested in going 
ahead with their proposal for the Dam* Dr* Ahmad fiussain, 
the then Egyptian Antoassador to the United States , was 
20* Tliomaa, Hu^* op* c i t * , P* 31* 
21. ^ 
ib id , P. 33 . 
7«) 
instructed t o a s c e r t a i n the r e a l i t i e s and i£ p o s s i b l e , 
f i n a l i s e the Western proposal for the l oan . On July 19, 
1956, the United s t a t e s d e c i s i o n , that the Anierlcan o f f er 
regarding the f inances for Dam had been withdrawn, was 
convoyed to the Egyptian '"^rnbassador by John Foster Dul l e s , 
the then US secretary of s t a t e s * In a press corrminique 
Dul les announced that "recent developn»nt had not been 
favourable t o the success of the projec t and the US government 
had concluded t h a t i t i s not f e a s i b l e in the present 
circumstances t o p a r t i c i p a t e in the p r o j e c t . Agroemont 
by the r ipar ian s t a t e s had been achieved and the a b i l i t y 
of b:gypt t o devote adequate resources t o assure the 
p r o j e c t ' s success had becotne more uncertain than a t the 
22 
time the o f f e r was made," On July 20, 1956, Br i ta in 
withdrew i t s o f f e r on the same ground* T^ere upon the 
world B«nik*s contr ibut ion was considered t o have been 
aut(»aatical ly withdrawn as i t was dependent upon the 
23 
Anglo-American loan* The withdrawl n e w was broken t o 
nasser a t a time when he was at tending a conference 
22* Ibid*, F* 3 3 | Finer, Herman, op* c i t * , FP. 45 , 48 -49 | 
Zindani, Abdul Wahid Axis* , ^X9h P o l i t i c s in the UH^  
Sana» A Univers i ty Publ icat ion , Y.A.R* ^1977) , PP. 117-118| 
LencsowsXi, George, o p . c i t * , P* 513* Also the Explanatory 
L^SdoT^^Jul^ ^^^^P^*;^|*^»g^"?W 90«^RPQg»gv Archives. 
23* Ihotftia, H u ^ , op* c i t * , p . 3 3 , 
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in Yugoslavia in Nehru and Tito presanea. itesaar irr i tatad 
at tha tnannar of tha withdrawl of tha loan« and ra£uta4 
tha ^arga that Egyptian economy VJ«S not able to sustain 
i t s local share. I t was a breach of faith end an insult 
to Egypt's dignityi rmsser declared* i t was v^astarn 
conspiracy to push Egypt back into conditions of poverty 
and fadualisffi* Russian Foreign f!inistar« Shepilova*s 
denial to make any firm offer to construct tha Dam at 
th i s Juncture further frustated and hurt nasser* I t 
was apparent that there was no insaadiate ai^ for tha 
Aswan Dam frora any side though the Soviet Russia 9xpfm»9d. 
24 to help other Egyptian industrial projects* • Thus tt\9 
Aswan 0am whi<^ vias enormously and prosperiottsly important 
for i t s agriculture power and ii^tustry i#as shattered by 
tha action of the United s ta tes and Britain* ami by 
Russian betrayal* 
Xiamsdiately, Nasser decided to nationalise the 
3\Mz Canal con^ny in re ta l ia t ion of wastem reftosal of 
Hio loan for the Aswan Dam. On July 26* 19 56* he anaottaoadi 
the nationalisation of the SUMS Canal Cos i^any* In h is 
speech* ha Vehacaently c r i t i c i s e d Vtestem policy of 
xJ l fec jBaOCaaO&OCWMoSQdESf i l fe i rs A MH i n n n n r v w w y T q , y j m K J m 
2i« Ibid** P* 35; Rondont* Pierre^ op^ eit** P* 156* 
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* Colonialisms • Irt^jerialisra* * domination*, and *®xpliotation*« 
Ha declared "a batt le egalnat inqperialiaBi, and iBothods and 
tac t i c s of iinperialism which was creat«^^ by iinpariallJini 
in an offar to annihil iata our nationalism in the saiaa 
25 
way as i t annihil iata Palestina*** Hassar declared "If 
rumor in wairiiington t i e s t o make oxit that Egyptian ©conowjf 
i s not strong enou^ to warr^^nt American a id , I reply 
chocke with rage, but you wi l l never succeed in ordering 
us about or in exercising your tyranny over us , because 
we know our path, the path of freedom, honour and digni ty . • • 
We Egyptian wi l l not allow any coloniser or desiKSt to 
doniinate us p o l i t i c a l l y , economically or mil i tary. >^ e 
shall y ie ld neither to force not to the dollar*** He fxxrther 
declared that " m shall build th0 High Dare on the skulls 
of 120,000 Egyptian.wor"km5n who died in building the Sties 
Canal• I'm shall industriallaeKgypt and compote with the 
'.•test • • • • with the revenue from the (Sues Canal) Conpany* 
we shall not look t Britain and the USA for the ir 
$ 70,000,000 grants • • • •* Egypt wi l l build the Aswan Dam 
without pressure from any nation," He said that there had 
been a "Conspiracy* between the world Bank, Britain and 
the USA to "trick" sgypt into building the dam and then 
to inpos^ conditions on Egypt affecting her independence 
25, 'jv'illiaTyv '^nn. op, c i t , , P, 123, 
il) 
26 
and integrity." 
I^8sar*8 act o£ nationalisation meant to aeiva 
t%iro baaie p irpoae«*f irstly* removal o£ limitation on 
Egyptian Soveriagnity owing to the Canal COTpany and 
secondly* to minimise the influence o£ viestem powers 
in ^ gypt and ^ e Middle East as a whole* There is no 
doubt that« in taking over the Canal Company* Nasser 
wished to get two national interests served-retaliiatbn 
for the refusal of loan and provision of an alternative 
national source to finance the Dam* 
The Sues canal* which belongs to Hgypt* had became 
an instrument of exploitation and domination by Big 
Powers rather to benefit the Egypt* in 1875* the Khedive 
Ismail of ^ gypt had sold its shares of the Conpany* and 
27 
in 1880 right to 15 percent of its profit* Even after 
tve independence of ^gypt* foreign character and foreign 
Interest of the Company with its monopolltics to control 
the Canal made it appear in the eyes of Egyptians an 
"another relic of the colonial era" and " a stat» witiiin 
a state*" For many years* Egypt drew no direct Inccxns 
26* See the speeches of lesser on July 24 and 26* 1956* 
Kesfina*s Contemporary Archives. July 21-28* July 
28 and August 4* 1956* PP* 14991 and 15001* For Speech 
of Hssser also see Suez Canal Problem* op* cit** 
PP* 25«30* 
27* Schonfield* H.J* op* cit** P* 47| Hurewitse* J*C*« 
op* cit** Vol* I* PP* 177-179* Farlowe* John* op* 
cit** PP. 72-74* 
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Hohamoud Youne* effectively carried the operation and 
nanagQrT«nt of the Canal without any hinderence, hencet 
the belief of western power* that Sgypt could not run 
the Canal satisfactorily and efficiently, was proved 
wrong* But none of the earlier events gave Nasser an 
opportunity for nationalisation of the Company. Now, 
^sser took offence at the manner of the withdrawl, needed 
a bold gesture to rebuff the West* Britishers had alreadf 
been driven out of the Sues Base in Fay 1956 in accordanee 
with the 1954 Agreement* 
the nationalisation of the C<»n^ >any affected 
every Canal user«, but the worst affectad were Britain 
and France* Since tiie opening of the Canal, it was 
managed and operated by France and British %fho had 
dominating position in the administration and operation 
of the Canal and the company* Tt\e Canal *s takeover 
Jeopardized substentialy econo ic interests of France 
and Britain* Traffic through the Canal was iinportant 
for Britain and France* About 40 percent of the French 
oil supply passed throu^ the Canal, thou<^ less than 
Britain* For Britain, the Canal had become as an ii!f>ortaQt 
net work of corrmunication since 1875| its ships %fere 
tne largest users of the Canal, carrying both inports 
and exports in large volurasf and from 60 to 70 percent 
of the oil required for British economy passed throucfh 
84) 
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the Canal from the Middle £a»t . lfterefoPB# I t pMed 
the gravoet threat to ^ngio-Frendh Interest . The dr i t l ih 
8tateKt»n affrald of the Canal*a mianama^nRent by 
Sgyptlan appxrehented more loea . Therefore* they considered 
the nationalisation of the Canal CcHif>any not only as aa 
act of provocation but a l so as a blow to the ir eeonoBBy* 
On the other hand* the United States took a di f f -
erent stand* I t vas con^parat4:tely leas in^ortant for US 
as for Britain and France* The United s tates shipping 
%ia8 a large Canal user and the US business had o i l 
concession but neithsr was crucial for the US econoniy* 
Its financial stake in the operation of the Canal was 
ni l* The containinenl^ policy had undoubtedly iixsreased 
the Canal's i^ E^>ortance for the United States for dealing 
with the world co.'r^unism* The Px^sidantial e lect ion diMi 
has a lso in the eyes of the Us imblic opinion increased 
the ia^ortance and significance of the Canal* Consequently 
the Presidential candidate has taken together th i s in 
dealing the SMBZ Canal question* The United s ta tes 
statesnen made legal approach to the qxiestion of Canal* 
Dulles said that in law* Egypt had as a sovereign power 
the rig^t to annual the concession operating in her 
31 territory on the payment of cosrtpensation which prondsed* 
30* Ibid** FP* 2St William* Ann* c^* cit** P* 123* 
31* Kxnmt* R*C. op. cit** P*2S2f 
niomas* Hu^* op* cit** Pt>. 59-50. 
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fhe British govermwnt consulted the United s tates 
and French govomnents. sdon# said that "The Unilateral 
decision of the Egyptian govemraant to expropriate the 
Swe» Canal Cotspany without notice and in breach of the 
concession of 1356^ e f f ec t the right and interests of 
32 
nations* and thus created a serious situation*" Later 
on economic sanction i#are applied by the United States* 
Britain and Frencii govemnents against Egypti and all 
assets of Egyptain goverr-sent and the Company aboard were 
frosen* Britain ordered ban on the exports of war materiafts 
to Egypt* Military action ims also considered* Britain 
and France planed to use force with an object to seise 
the Canal* 3ut the plan was abondoned because their armed 
fozres needed tinn to prepare for the attack* Another reason 
for not using force iirsnediately was that the United States 
was not supporting their aggression policy as the use was 
convinced that nothing has been done against international 
law unless Egypt violated it* Therefore, Dulles 
puriiaadsd British and French Priine Ministers to settle 
the Sues Canal question throu^ peaceful negotiation* 
32* Kesaina'a Contemporary Archives. July 28Wiugust 4, 
195e« P* 15001* Sues Canal-tlationalisation And After* 
Lok Sabha Seczetariate* ^ w Delhi* 1956* P* 5* 
33* Kowat* R,c** op* cit* PP* 25C«252, 
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On JuXy 29t 1956, Three Powers* -the United Gtotea, 
Britain^ and Franco met a t Lond<Mi to discuss tha quastion* 
on August 2« 1956, they Issued a Joint corjainlqua which 
condanmed " the arbitarary and Unilateral seizure q* by 
one nation of an International agency whicai has the 
responsibi l i ty to nmintain and to qparata the S\»% Canal 
so that a l l the signatories and benefic iaries of the 
Treaty of 1880 can e f f ec t ive ly enjoy the use of an inter-
national watomoy upiwi vftilch the economy, cCBrenerce and 
security of much of the world depends." This s i tuation 
i s moz» serious, they claiiaed, in i t s c<»3f}lications 
because the Sgyptian govemn«tnt nationalise the Canal 
Conpany to serve purely i t s own interest rather than 
international interest* They agreed to c a l l a Conference 
of the SicpMtories of the 1883 Convention and other roari-
t ine nations. The aim of the Conference was ** to establiiH^ 
an arrangennent under intezmational system designed to 
assure tiie continuity of the operation of the Canal as 
guaranteed by tha Convention of 1888 consistently with 
legitimate Egyptian interest* M35 111 i s conference was held 
34* Finer, Herman, op* c i t » , P* 100; For detai l text o£ 
the Joint CORvniniqua* See Kissing*s conteimpogary 
Archives, July 2B • August 4 , 19d6, P* 15069* 
•Svmz Canal* - A docuraentarv istudv .Part i l , Lok Sabha 
Secretariate, Hew Delhi 1956, PP, 31*32| Sues Canal 
Prdbleau q?* c i t « , PP. 34-35i The Sues Canal Cqa^ pany 
and Decision taken by the Sgyptian Government on 
23th July 1956* (26th July to 15 Septenfoer^ 1956), 
PP. 69-70* 
35* Finer, Herman, op» c i t * , P« 149* 
87) 
at London from i%ugu8t 16 to 23« 1956 known «»*the Flr»t 
London Confcrance*** i t %^ 8 attandcd by 22 nations out of 
24 Invited nations* Egypt and Greaee raftiaed to attand 
the '^onforenca. During the discussion in tha Con£aranoa# 
x^llos proposed to const i tuts an Xntomational Boards 
known as tha Sues Canal Board» vested with the rights of 
the uaritime powers as stated in tha Convention of 1888• 
This Boardt responsible to tha United t^tions« was to 
operate* maintain* develop and enlarge tha canal* h 
machinery of govammants for these purpose was to be sat 
t^ between "-^ gypt and other siaritinv nations to safeguard 
their respective interest in i t . £gypt*s soveraignty* tha 
pxoposal nadai Utxlear* to ba raspaetadi and *tha c^paratioa 
ol tha cenal woul^ be insulated fxon tha influaoca of tha 
p o l i t i c s o£ any natiwts*** sanctions would be applied for 
&ny violatlcm of tha cc^vaotion by any party to i t or bqr 
«Ay nation* in accordance with tha principles of tha Utaitad 
Nations* This psoposal was supported by 18 nations* India* 
tha Soviet i^assia* Ceylon and indonasia m did not support 
i t because* in the ir opinion*" any inteznatlooal oontJBDl 
' would l i .p l»9. t h . a o » i . l « » t y of Egypt. •"• 
36* Finer Herman* op* c i t * P* 149* 'i>lso BB9 I^^ M*"-*^  ^'^*'f7^ 
Year Boolu 1956* P* 19y Suois Canal Omctpany and Decision 
taken t^ tha Egyptian govemiMnt* op* oit*« PP* 72«»73f 
sues canal Ptobjesu op* eit**pp* 289«-290iPearson* L*B* 
tha c r i s i s in tha Middle East^ Octobar-Dacaaddar 1956«* 
Edsnnd Clotttier* Ottawa (1957) pp« 3«4* 
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.'in aitaxnattt pzoposai nada by Xndia, tmeomaeD&md 
thtt operetlon o£ the CanaX tay Egypft* How«v«r» Egypt* th« 
pxoposal made cl@ar« wi l l b« ass is ted Iqr «n Intenaatiooa^ 
dviaorv Body o£ the Canal usees In opeiration of the Canal* i\\ 
The psopoMpl MSM syppocted by the Soviet Fussia^ Ceylon 
and Znclcmesie but i t was rejected by 18 naticms. 
Consequentlyt "th« l i l i e s pxoposal" Vcs adopted and 
• "Hission* under tdie leadership of "^uttrelian Friaas 
Hinister# Robert li«isies« was sent on September 3« 1956 to 
present the pxopoaal to Egypti«D govermaent* M«izies tr ied 
pursuade ^tus^mr to accept the pxoposai. Ho argued th£ t a 
grave international s i tuation had been created ay the 
38 
natlcmalisatimi of t^e Canal Coiapany* Kasser rejectee 
the proposal, Nasser* in retuza* argued thet thie proposal 
challenged the r i ^ t of Sgypt and sought to reimpose foreign 
dMdnatlon over Egypt* sgypt had a legal right to nationali^M 
the SMit» Canal QompemYp he claiinQd«and i t was the 'threat* 
37* Schonfield* m0bi op* c i t * , ?* 151| Bindra, ^ .P . s . op« 
fgt4U<ral„ j M mBWitf r'MXXi* Oxford university Press* 
London (1938)* P* 205f «3ohnson* Paul^ Ihe sues War> Qreenberg* New Yotk (1957) PP* 6US2» sues canaT^utiaam 
alisatloD And ^fter* op» eit»* PP . 73-74I Suea Canal 
PiohleM* op« cit*^ PP> 28e*>289* Janies Eayrs* P f 
Coiifflonuyeelth^^d 6ue»wv iJocumantary Survey, Oxi^rd 
university Press* London (1564)*PP. 148-151. 
* 3he MssicK) consisted of Five nations -Austntl ia, The 
u n i t ^ states* Ethiopia* Persia and i;>wedfln» 
38, united Nations year aooic 1956, p« 19f also see Johnson* 
Paul* op* cit«* PP« i2««3« 
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of Britain and Fraac* which had cz«^.ted tha grava aituaticn* 
iJothiDQ would indijca him to consider any sattlamant v^loh 
daroQ&ted sgypt iron har right to run th« C^iai as an 
Egyptian national undertaking* ' Nasser* however, agreed 
£or negotiation and to toxm a body £or reviewing the Convao. 
ticKri o£ 1@3S to enjiiure freedom of navigationi to plan 
iUiprovements in the Ganalf and to f ix equitable to l l s* 
Kasser proposal was accepted by 21 nations for considera. 
tion at the second London conference. 
in the s<K;ond London confar«aice» convened on i>« 
I9t 195(# Dulles proposed the creatio:- of an autonoiacms body* 
known as 'The Suez Ceaial User's A&aoclation (^UA) • ihe 
Usoj:*8 Association wi l l be the orged:)isati<»a of shipowners 
rather than nations that would c o l l e c t the to l l s* esqploying 
i t s own p i lo t s and other o f f i c i a l s to secure pioper passage 
through the canal* I t was to co«ordlnate traf f ic «md act 
generally on b«half of the Users of tJie csmal* <::gypt« the 
Dulles plan proposed* would be p£dd shcLres txxm ti^e canal 
incotee* But the idea of ou«t& Canal User's ^ ssociatKw tailed* 
Kasser dendunced i t as " an atpociation for waging war* and 
unjust i f iable a t t e n d to Egypt's sovereign rights*"^ Za 
39* Nutting* ^thony , op* cit«* P* S4* 
40« Utoited Nationa Ye«ir x^ took. 1956* PP* 19-20* Suez Canal 
Proalaw* QP* Cit** PP , 327*»33QI Bowie* Hobert B** op*eit** 
?• 42* 
41, Finer* Heman* op* cit** w, 207»208| aohnson* Paul* Op* 
eit** PP* 6e»70| onited Nations year Cook* 1956* P*20* 
Sues canal Problewt. op, cit«* PP, 3«5«e6| Ihe c r i s i s la 
the Middle East* op* cit** pp* 4-5* 
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addition to i t* loajor differences asoMi betweon tho 
United s tates and Britain on the User's ^association 
function* Britain did not agreed for <^y paymont tD Egypt 
and desired that a l i income from the Cdnal has to be peid 
to i t by Users directly* OulXes argued that sv^h British 
d^iiaX would be tantamount to provocatic»3 and w i l l not be 
accepted by Nasser* He ins i s ted on his proposal payioent 
42 
of shares to Sgypt* 'Ihe nogotiation failed* 
Thorcfore* srltain and franco requested the Security 
Covtncil to ccn aider the eituation created by * Egyptian 
action* ** 2gypt« too« recjuested £or an urgent n»eting of the 
security Covincll to consider the action taken against i t by 
some powers* peirticulQrly by Britain and irrance# Egypt 
pointed that ^^glo*!;ranch action violated the W Charter 
and was source of danger to international peace and security* 
un ^epttaober 26* 1956* the ^iecurity Council ploccd both 
itects in i t s agenda ^nd gave preference to the '«glo«French 
itmz* ihe question was d i s c u s s ^ at several formal and 
informal meetings of the Council* Ihe m&eCings of the Cotmcil 
were also attended h^ the representative of Egypt* The 
representatives of iiiritain and France subedtted a draft 
resolution (S/3671) on October 13* 19S6* consist ing of two 
42* Nutting* ^^thony* op* cit** P* 64* 
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parts, ihe f i r s t part o£ th« resolution consisted s ix 
principles i 
1, Fred otnd open trans i t through the Canalf 
2« i^si:«ct lor ^sovereignty o£ f^yptf 
3* Operations of the Canal without any po l i t i ca l intev* 
ferencesy 
4« Fixation of t o l l s and chart;»e& tnrough an agreen«it 
tMtween Egypt and Usersf 
5* ^^ llotBMHat of a portion of the canal incoine to proceed 
the developcMVtt of the canal; and 
€0 £3ecision of a dispute between the Comp«aiy and 
43 
Egyptian govemi»Bnt through arbitration. 
The second part of the resolution psovlded to i n t e r -
national ise the canal 'Authority on the basis of the*^8 
Nations pxopos&l "(alre&dy discu£»sed) and to recognise the 
Suae Canal User's /^i&ociation which would woxk in oo-oper«» 
tlon with Egyptian's authority, 
the resolution wss put to vote on the semse dcy, Ttio 
f i r s t part of t^e resolution Wes vsianimously adopted^ wheireas 
the second part of the resolution was vetoed by t^« Soviet 
43, Xbid«« P« 72 | a lso see ^honfield« H«J« op, c i t « , P, 155| 
fhOBias Hugh« op« c i t , « P« 106| Bollard* s i r deader,* 
op« eit»« Pp« 206»2o7| <'indani« bdul v«ilUd mtiz^ op, 
?^^f' ?? ^23| Mahgoub, Mahamed Ahsiad, i^eaiocracv on Trial-
i ch . 
44, United nations Year Boole, op, c i t , « P, 23« 
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45 Russia hence^ was not ctdopted* Egypt op osed the second 
p; jrt of the resolut ion by saying t h a t " i t would make 
46 
the canal a prey of the p o l i t i c s of many n a t i o n s , " 
Ho-ever Nasser w^s under pressure froin co—leaders of 
Kon-alignment movesnents by i^ehru, cmd from -'rab world, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y by ^au(Bi - r a b i a , to adopt a f l ex ib le a t t i tude^ 
consecuently, Nasser ' s a t t i t u d e so i t en . The econonic pressure 
imposed by the '>estexn Powers w^s also unbearable. He agreed 
to negot ia te and Dr* Fawzi and -.elwyn Loyed, the ioreign 
Minister of li^gypt and loreign -secretary of Bri tain respect ively 
s t a t ed negot ia t ion on October 13, 1956 which continued t i l l 
October 19# 1956 under the Chairmanship of UN secre tary 
General, Dag iiammarskjeold. Dr. iawzi put forworded the 
following three pr inc ip les to be the bas i s of nego t ia t ion , 
j r i r s t ly , the establishment of a system of co-operation 
between Egypt ond the Canal users within the framework of 
Egyptian sovereignty and use r i n t e r e s t ; oecondly, adoption 
of a system of t o l l s and charges free from ex l o i t a t i o n and 
guaranteeing f a i r t reatment; and t h i rd ly , the al locat ion of 
a reasonable par t of the Canal revenues for i t s development 
47 
f.nd improvements. The Lgyptian Foreign Minister v/as ready 
to consider any suggestion for an org^iniaed co-oper . t ion 
45. ~ee L r a l t Resolution of '^nglo-French -^/3675, I b i d . , 
Documentor/ Kelerences, P. 25. 
46. I b i d . , P. 23. 
47. Nutt ing, '^ thony. Op. c i t . , P. 73; Hahgoub, Mohamed 
/iJimed, op* c i t . , P. 84. 
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b«twttfln S^yptlan authority and th« Canal users without 
prsjudics to Egyptian's right o£ ownership. Ha made it 
clear that Egypt could not accept any kind of intemati(»)al 
body to control the Canal* He agreed to establish the 
necessary procedures for the settlement of disputesi to 
negotiate on rasthods of fixing tolls and charges between 
Egypt and Usersi and to confirm' Higypt's acceptance of all 
obligations arising from the Constantinople Convention 
and rules and regulations hitherto govering the Canal 
administration* He, hcwever# made it clear that the every 
thing should be settled within tiie framework of Egyptian 
sovereignty* Dr* Fawzi accepted the six principles formtala 
SelwytiLloyed 
prc^posed by Selwyn Lloyed*|[ Seemingly showed enthusiaoM 
to Dr* Fawsi*s proposal and they decided-to meet again at 
48 Gei^va on October 29* 1956* 
By tiiat time, Anglo-French military plan to attack 
Egypt was prepared* Britain and France %iere contenqplating 
to use force since the beginning of the dispute. Eden had 
already instructed 'tiie Chief of s taff to prepare a plan 
to occupy and secure the Canal* On August 2« 1956, Eden 
announced that certain precautionary measures of military 
nature were being taksn by the Britirii government^ and 
48* Ibid*, P* 77 
94) 
Roservists had bean called up and units of axinsr« navy and 
49 
airfozce« transfered to the Eastern Mediterranaan* 
Similar measures were taKen hf Prance* In £act# since the 
nationalls4tion o£ the Cofnpany* the Briti^ and the Frencdi 
gowmmentchad decided that ITasser must not be allowed 
to get away with the seizure of the Canal. The object Most 
be to *undo* Nasser's action and put the Canal firmly in 
international control* In addition to put the canal under 
intematio al control, they also wanted to teach HSsser a 
lesson* The international control of the Canal was into 
Anglo-French eyes meant to leaser's humiliation* 
The intended Anglo-French militftry plan alarmed 
Eisenhower at»i Dulles and they tried to persuade Britain 
and Franc« to restrain their acticm only to the extent 
to get the normal functioning of the Canal and to refrain 
to resort force* Any attenpt to try and get Nasser deposed* 
the US considered unadvisable* Dulles made it clear that 
the US "was witli Britain on every point except the use of 
50 force*" There were many reasons for opposing the forcei 
49* Schonf ield« K.X*^  op* cit*# P* 151| Bowie, Rcdaert R*, 
qp* eit*# P* 22| Finer, HertMin* op* cit*, P* 63* 
50* Ibid*, P* 93 Mionroe, Elisabeth*; c^* cit*, P* 196| 
Bowie, Robert R*, op* cit*, P* 32* 
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Piratly* fai lure to esdiaust peaceful means in conflrmlty 
with the UN c .arter would outrage public opinion in the 
United States and else^^ere* Secondly, i t would faciliifcate 
the Soviet penetration in the Middle '^ast a« a supporter 
of Arab indepeiKlence* And Final ly , i t would revive raenioriea 
of "iR^jerialiain'* and "ColonlaliaiB", offending many Afro-
Asian nations, ar^ would drive even the Arab hos t i l e to 
msser , to unite behind him* 
Israel v^ich was already kept infor^Qd by Britain 
and France about their intended plan, was signalled to 
attack Sgypt f i r s t* Consequently Israel planed for a 
military operation against sgypt in order to brtsak the 
blockade of Fort of i^liat to I srae l i shipping, and to 
eliminate ttie Fedayeen bases in Gaza s tr ip and Siruil 
desert . France, the c loses t a l l y of Israel since 1954, 
was able to conclude an agreement on October 10, 1956 to 
51 
attack ligypt. The inner s tor ies goes on that f i r s t 
Israel and France prepared tlie military plan and la ter , 
Frendi Foreign Minister, Christian Pineau^successfully 
pursuaded i^ den to colloborate witii Israel* Britain too 
51* Ibid . , P. a24f Also see Dyan, Moahe, piarv of the 
Sinai Conpaiqn* Harper & Row, l^w York (1966} PP. 
20-22. 
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ims thinking in tarm ^  military solution but military 
involvenent, Britain desired should not jeopardize Jordan 
with i^ich Britain had a i>Bfensive Treaty, .mereas Israel's 
intention %fas that the "mil^ itary plan" should also include 
occupation of Jordon. France advised Britain to migotiate 
52 
with Israel in this regard to evolve a comraon strategy« 
Israel was also eager to seek British help to use its 
canberras based in Cyprus to control Egyptian airfields* 
On October 16« 19S6« negotiation took place in 
strict privacy without any advisers present* A plan for 
attack on Sgypt was decided* The second meeting held on 
Oet^aer 33« 1956 and was attended by Ben Ourion# Peres 
and Mo«he Dyan of Israel* Mollet and Pineau of France* 
and Selwyn Lloyed and Sir Patrick Dean of Britain* A 
53 treaty was dra%m up and signed by three states* It 
was part of the Treaty tiiat first Israel will attack 
and then a warning will by Britain and Prance to Kgypt 
and Israel in order to seek a pretext to intervention* 
52* williaiB Ann* <^* cit*« PP* 127>12d| Nutting* Anthony* 
op* cit** P* 110* 
53* Ibid** P* 127| also see Schonfield* M*jr* qp* cit** 
P* 155; Bindra* A*P*3* op* cit** PP* 4142f Mowat* 
R*C*» op* cit** PP* 255>256| Calvocorreci* Peter* 
Suez-Ten years After^ Pantheon* New York* (1967) Pr» 
99-100* 
For aetail of the•collision plan' of three powers-
Israel* Britain & France see Finer ^ ienmn* op* cit** 
(Chapter - XIII)* pp* 324 etseq*; Nutting* Anthoiy* 
op* cit** PP* 90 et seq* 
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Consequently* on Oet<^3«r 29« 1956« Israttll fiorees 
attaclOMSl '^QVP^ * "^^ •'^'^ day according t o plan« an uXtl* 
raatura v/as presented to the Egyptian and I srae l i Arrbassadors 
in London by the British and French govemniants* "Xhe 
ultixnatuR) announced that ** cnitbrealc of h o s t i l i t i e s between 
^OTpt and Israel threatsns to disrupt the freedom of iMvi» 
gation throuc^ the Sues Canal upon which the economic l i f e 
of n«ny nations depended.* Therefore, "Government of 
United Kingdom and France are resolved to a l l in the ir 
pov.'«r to bring about the cessation of h o s t i l i t i e s * and t o 
safegttsrd the free passage of the Canal* The ultimatum 
requested the Ooverrunent of ligypti 
" to cease a l l warlike action on land* sea and a i r forth-
vithi 
" to withdraw a l l Egyptian forces to a distance of ten miles 
from the Canali at^ 
** in order to guarantee freedonn of transit through the Canal 
and in order to separate tlie be l l igerents , t o accept the 
tenporary occupation by Anglo-?rench forces of key pos i -
t ion a t Port said* Xstnailia snd Suez." 
The ultimatum a l so iiamed that if a t the esipiry 
of that period '*one or both Oovermnents have not undeirtaken 
to corrply with our requirements* the United Kingd<XR and 
French forces w i l l intervene in ^ a t e v e r strength may be 
98) 
54 DAcessary to securo cornpllaiu^*" 
Egypt Tsmfumtid to accept tha ultlinBtuni and on 
Octobar 31« 1956 on tha axplry of tha tisia of ultimatum^ 
tha British and f^ ranch foxcaa intervanad and attackad 
on Egyptian airf ialda. By Kovanbar 2, 1956« Xaraal had 
eaptuxad Gasa atrip and aorosaed tha Sinai Panisula* 
Egyptian foxcaa had ratraat and Israali forces had 
thrust deep into Egyptian territory* 
Tha Tri«aggra88ion (Anglo-4'ranch«israai} against 
cgypt was vahemently criticised by many nations of tha 
world* On October 29« 1956« tha United statea brouglit 
to tha attention of tha sacurity Council against Israel 
annad attaoX on £gyption territory in violation of tha 
Armlst 16# Agraewnt of 1949* ATA requested to etmsidar 
SS 
steps for tha iinmadiate cassation of h o s t i l i t i e s * Tha 
security Council considered the matter on Octc^>ar 30« 
1956* The United States requested the Council t o act 
proTTptly to determine that " a bxreach of peace has occurad*** 
Tha United s ta tes submitted a draft reioluti<»i Whichi 
" Calls upon Israel invnediately to withdraw i t s armed 
forces behind the armistice l ines i 
54* 7iner« Hanisn« ^ * eit«# PP* 362«363| Ma^oub« Mdlias»d 
Ahraad* op* cit*# P* 85 | Nutting« Anthony* op* cit«« 
PP* 193.194* 
SS* Unitad Kations y<a«r 5ook» 1956* P* 25* 
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" Calls upon all rnent>ers to re£rain £rom the use o£ 
force or threat of force in the area in any manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the UN« to assit the 
UH in ensuring the integrity of the Armistice Agreetnent, 
and to refrain from giving any military economic assistaiKMi 
to Israel until it has not complied with the resolution* 
A paragraph prc^ perly was added in the US Resolution 
by whidik theSeeurity Council cell upon Israel mnd H.gypt 
56 
for infsiMadiate cease - f i re . The Soviet Itussia tob submitted a 
draft resolution demanding invnediate withdjmwl of I srae l i 
forces behind the armistice l i iws* China added a paxagraph 
in i t %«hich c a l l xxpoa Isxwel and Egypt for immediate 
57 
ceaMN>fire» Both resolutions %fexe vetoed by negative 
vote of Britain and France* The representatives of Britain 
and.France claimed that the US resolution affirmad Egyptian 
policy of annihilation of Israel« expansion of Egyptian 
imperialism« open intervention in French internal affairs* 
direct material assistance to robi l l ions and Egypt's 
i l l e g a l seisture of an international waterway* Both repres* 
entativea were atten^tting to atop any action of the 
56* See Draft Resolution S/37iO« lbid*« PP* 26«27f a l so 
Finer* Herman* qp* cit** P* 377* 
57* Ibid** P* 27* 
100^ 
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sacuzity Council* 
The Council's meotinga w«r« alao att«ad«d by th« 
r0pr«8«ntative8 of Egypt and Xara«l« Egyptian reprasentatlvo 
said th it Xsraal had coanittiKl goost serioua act of armed 
aggression since the conclusion of Armistice ^^reement between 
£gypt and Israel* He ciaisned that armed and unprovoked attack 
on Egypt constituted an act of war and dmostr ted beyond any 
doubt the aggressive and expansionist aims of I s rae l ' s 
policy* He demanded that Council should declare Israel as 
an aggressor to be expelled from the 18) and to apply on her 
the measures under Chapter Vll of the w Charter* In response 
of Egyptian's charges Israe l i representative argued that 
f edayeen raid frosi Egypt had created a breach of peace by 
invading the territory of Israel* Israel had takoa security 
measures which i t s force have f e l t bound to take in the 
exercise of " our's country inherent right to selfi-defence**^ 
He rejected ch<j^ rges of a jgresaion* 
On October 30* 19S6« Egyptian representative in 
the Security Council said« regarding the ultimatum of 
Britain and France* that the Sueas Canal area and the Canal 
i t s e l f Were an integral part of Egypt* Egypt had been the 
58* zindani* Abdul >^ ahid Azix^ 4p*cit*, P* 125* 
59* Ibid*« P* 125| iiner« Herman op* cit*« PP* 376«»377| 
United Nations year Book 1956* PP* 35.26* 
60* Ibid*^ P* 26* 
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victims 6£ IsrMiI aggression %^idi invaded i t s territory 
and i t had been c^Xiged to us* force* Therefors unilatsral 
attempt of Britain and Franca to s e t t l e a queaticm« already 
before the Security council , was an ent ire ly unjustif iable 
violat ion of the UK Charter* Thereupon* British and Frenei) 
representatives asserted t'^at military action taken by 
tiiem Mas to restore peace and safeguard the Canal* 
All the resolutioiui pat before the Security Council 
vetoed by Britain and France* Hence# Y\igosl«via proposed 
to ttcmvene a special Emergency session of the General 
A8S«rt>ly under ' S B ^ U M ^9i f^fff ^po},^Vm {lWl» '^^ 
resolution \mB put to vote and adopted by seven nations 
in favour to two against (Britain and France) and two 
abstained (Australia and Belgiuxa)* the f i r s t Emergency 
session of General Aseentoly \ras held on November 1« 19S6* 
At the session the United s ta tes su!»iltted a draft resolu* 
t ion ^ i c h ur<;^ d upon a l l thm parties involved in h o s t i l i -
t i e s in the area agree to an inmediate cease f ire« and 
as part thereof ha l t the n^ven^nt of niilitar'/ forces and 
arms into the area* Urges the parties to the armistice 
agreements pron^tly to withdraw a l l forces behind the arm-
i s t i c e lines« to des i s t from raids across the armistice l ines 
61* Finer* Herman op* eit*« P* 3 9 1 I a lso see United lot ions 
Year Book. 1956, P. 28* 
102) 
into neicWbourlng territoryj Rmco^m»n&m that a l l mswb^t 
s ta tes m£rain from introducing military goods in tha aroii 
of hoat i l i t i aa and in ganeral refrain fron any acts ^idh 
would delay or prevent the iiiplindentation of the present 
resoltttloni Urges that* upon the CNwae f i re being effeetive* 
steps lie taloen to reopen the S\MZ canal and restore seourti 
freedcM^ of navigationi Bequests the Seexetary General to 
observe and report proir^tly on the compliance with the 
piwsent resolution to the Security council and to the 
General Assentoly for sud!) £\urther action as they may d@em 
appropriate in accordance with the charter* i t ftOks put 
to vote and adopted* on Nove»i>er 2# 19S6# by 64 votes in 
favour to 5 negative (Britain* France* Israel* Australia 
and ^iewitealand) with 6 abstention* 
On l^nrep|»er 3* 1956* the United s tates sv^Naitted 
t%io othe draft resolutionsi f i r s t resolution MIS com^vned 
with the settlement of rrajor proialem between Arabs ar^ 
Israeli Second aiiw&d at finding a solution for the Sues 
63 Canal question* Ihe s&me day* India* Jointly with 18 
otiher Arab* African MA Asian states* subirdtted a draft 
fii* ^ e 13ie draft Ile8olution^997 ( s s - i ) Ibid.* P* 53l | a lso 
see United ijations year Book* 196©* P» year Book* 19S6* P* 28# G?VOR* Annexes 
1«>10* Hoventoer 1956* Ager«5a item 5* PV'* 2-3 quoted in 
Zii^eni* Abdul waiid Azia* op, c i t . * PP* l27-»i28* 
63* Draft Resolutions A/1272 and A/3273* Ibid.* P. 128| 
United Hationa yaar B<x>k ,1956* P. 29. 
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n s o l u t i o n * I t reaffirmed t^m us r«i8oluti<xi and authori»«d 
the Secretary General of Ull t o arran e with the p a r t i e s 
concerned for the Implensentatlon f c e a s e - f i r e and h a l t i n g 
railitary forces behind the armis t i ce l inea» Canada 
a l s o submitt®d a reso lu t ion ^idti requested the Secretary 
General t o submit within twenty four hours a plan for the 
e s t a b l i s h i n g up of an emergency in ternat iona l United force 
t o secure and supervise the cassa t ion of h o s t i l i t i e s in 
accordance with tlie terras of the Resolution 997(ES-1) , 
Both r e s o l u t i o n s were adopted on November A, 1956» 
On November 4 , 1956, Egypt accepted c e a s e - f i r e 
resol - i t lon of Uoveniber 4# 1956* I s r a e l ceased h o s t i l i t i e s 
on Noveniber 5, 1956. s incethen , Br i t i sh and -rench f rces 
occupied Port Said and proceeded al<»ig the Canal. On 
November 5« 1956^ tixm 3ecretaryi>General addressed a "aide* 
fnemoire" t o the Br i t i sh and French governments t o cease 
f i r e - They r e p l i e d that they WD Id agree t o s top further 
mi l i tary operation I f t^ »e Secretaj^-General would confirm 
that I s rae l and i^vypt had accepted an uncondit ional cease-fixe 
i n t e m a t l L n a l forces t o h^ e s e t up and wo Id be conipetent t o 
secure the US Resolution o b j e c t i v e s (997 ( £ 3 - 1 ) ) . 
6 4 . Draft Resolution A / 3 2 7 5 . Ib id* , P. 128; UIi year Book, 
1956, P. 2 9 . 
6 5 . Draft Resolution A/3276, I b i d . , P. 128 | un year Book, 
1956, P. 29 . 
66 . United Katlo s year Sook, 1956,P. 3 1 . 
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After conlixsbetioQ# British ^aix i reach ^v«xnis«23t 
ftccaptttd c«&e«*fir« on Mov«u3;>er 7« 1956« li/ that tlattfi ths i r 
£orc«fi hi«d occupi^ 40rt ^alC cn4 ioud* /^ft&r the ce<i^ £« ^ir«# 
£S¥pt.i&n gcv«X3im«it cl«me>n(;tt<i lR4{r.«idi&ttt wlti-jcLra^ i'I oi: <U.l 
£oi«ign £orc«s iro» i t s territory &t ths A i^aiaijsly BiA«ting. 
QQ ^ov6iabt>r 7« 1956« thtt A«««B4]Ciiy adopted 1$ lowers 
piopo»&l cal l ing upon Ifir&el*6 in4»eaio.t6 ».'ithdr«wl t^hindl th« 
a m i s t i c e l ines and withdrawl o£ British and fr«DC« £orc«s« 
Th« resolution w s adopted by 65 votes to ono ( israsl) with 
10 a]:«tention« ThersforSt British and French forces 
withdraw completely t i l l December 22« 19S6» But Israel did 
not comply with the rasolution* I srae l i government wanted 
to withdraw from £gyptian territory <mly af ter the oooclusioa 
of an agr««rieot through the UK* She demanclod that £gypt 
should rortounce the jitate o£ wur with Israels abandoned her 
policy of boycott and blockade against Israel i and enter 
into direct peace nec^^tiation with Israel* However* a l l 
I srae l i forces withdrew from Egyptian territory t i l l March 8« 
1956 and the United Nations Energency forces were established 
there* Egyptian sovereignty over the Canal was established* 
67* < i^ndani« Abdul Wahid /^ziz« op* c i t * P* 13o* Also see* 
G/uDl^  First Emergency special session* So* 7« 1956* P* 9S« 
Resolution V3309* 
68* Ibid* p* 130* See the l e t t e r of I s rae l i Foreign Minister* 
Mrs* Golda Keir to UN c^ecretary General^ A/3320* Finer* 
Herman* op* cit*^ P* 466* 
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NATIONAUSATION OF THE S U E Z CANAL 
CotnpANY : Lg&AL A S P E C T S 
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t^ationalisstion of th« 3u«« Canal Company i Legal Aspect* 
Trm natlonalisatlcm of the Suez canal coirpany 
and the 3uea war must be placed among the most fiitlle 
diplomatic and military episodes in the history of the 
rdddle £ast« There arose a number o£ legal questlcms 
concerning the act of natlcmallsatloni I«caol*8 Invasion 
upon Egyptian terrltoryi and the Anglo-French military 
action against Egypt* 
As zregards the act of nationalisation* the Suez 
Canal was an Integral part of Egyptian territory and was 
under control of Egyptian territory* It* therefore* entitled 
Sgypt to nationalise the Company as a legitimate exercise 
of the powers of sovereignty* The expropriaticm of the 
Company was also a matter falling within^ Egypt's domastla 
jurlsdlctl(m* The nationalisation was both legally and 
morally justified un<tor International law for a public 
parpoae provided adequate compensation was paid to 
shar^olters for the unexpired period of Concession* 
1* Menkln* Louis* How Nations 3ehave-Law And Foreign Policy* 
Colombian Press* New York (1979)* PP. 251-252| PiUai* 
R* vasudev* The Sues Crisis and Its Lasting Juridical 
Implication^ Klshanvas f^ iblieatlon, Hyderabad^ (19S7}^ 
PP. 5-9/ Hung, T*F.* "Some Legal And International 
t*S*1^ Q^ ^ ^ S^*' Canal." A*J.I.L. Vol, 51(19S7) PP. 
Also see ^ '«morandum of 7th August 1956 sent by the 
Company to the British and French Foreign Mlnisterles 
regarding The Compensation* The Sue« Canal Companv and 
Q*cifl^^^gP ^ *^ Sovptian Government OP* cit>. 
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7h« Nationalisation Deczva provided for paymsnt* tha 
paymant was siada afterward* Howavar objections %iere raised 
by the Three Powers Britain* Prance and the United states 
against the lawfulness of the act of nationalisation on 
the following groundst 
!• "•••• intematic«al character of the Company in terras 
of its shareholcters, directors and operating personnel•** 
2« "The arbitary and \znilateral seizure by one nation 
of an Intomational Agency which has the responsibility 
to maintain and operate the Canal*" 
3* "The actioi taken by Hgypt« having regard to all the 
attendent circunuitances threatens the freedc«n and 
security of the Canal guaranteeing by the Constantinople 
2 
Convention of 1888*" 
The legality of the nationalisation depended upon 
the status of the Coiapany whether it was an Egyptian or 
French company or was an international agency entitled to 
* On April 29« 1958 an agreesnent was reached and signed 
on July 13« 1958 on matter of ooi^pensatio) between Hgypt 
and Sues stockholders a thereby Egyptian GovemRient 
undertook to pay £ z 23«3O0«000 to the shareholders over 
a period of five year in full settlement of all clains* 
see United Naticms year Book. 1958, P* 66 at Seqi Lauter-
pacttf The Suea Canal Settlement. Stevens & Sons Ltd* 
London (1960) PP* 3, 6-33* 
2* The Tripartite statement of August 2, 1956, Iftissinc's 
contetnporarv Archives. Jlily 28 « August 4« 1956, P* 15003| 
The Sueg Canal oroblem 1956 op* cit* pp* 34->35* 
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special treatment* "Ilia Universal Caa^ny of th« MarltJjse 
Canal of the STiese" was o f f i c i a l l y ©atablishad by the 
Concesalaa of January 5^  1856 which replaced the Concession 
of 1854* But the Concession of 1856 did not c learly drew 
up the status of the Company. Article 73 of t l ^ statute 
of the c<anpany under the Concessioii of 1856 provided that 
" the CoBipany being organised, with the appro^ml of 
Egyptian Govem.nwnt, as a Joint stock COR^ny by analogy 
to the joint-stock companies authorised by the French 
Govemrnent« i s governed by ttw principles of these l a t t er 
coEspanies." I t further provided that " Althcu^ having 
i t s coB^any s@at at Alexandria, the Ccanpany e l ec t s le^al 
domicile and assignreient of jurisdicticm at i t s administzmtivs 
dcMnicile in Paris where a l l writs mist ]:« served*" 
The Concession of 1856 was rat i f ied by Ottoman 
Sultan known as the Firman of Sultan# on February 22# 1866* 
Article 16 of the Firtaan o£ 1866 c learly stated that "the 
Universal Sues Canal Ctsmpmnyt being Egyptian, i s governed 
by the laws and eustoras of the country/ hc^wever, with 
respect to i t s status as a company and relations bet%«een 
3 . See 'Kie Sxxmx, Canal » A selecti<m of i^ocuments, op*eit«« 
P. 31* 
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it» •har«holder», it !•# by special agrwment^ governed 
by the laws which* in l^ 'rance* govern Jolnt-etock eoo^ pahles* 
It is agreed that nil disputes of this nature vill be 
Judge in France by arbitrators subject to appeal, as 
over*arbitrator» to the Jiaperial Court in Paris*" 
It is also agreed that "Dispvites in Egypt between 
the Company and individuals of any naticmality shall be 
judge by local courts according to the procedures establst^ ed 
by the laws and eustoins o£ the country and by treaties#" 
and " Disputes which arise between the Egyptian GovemxxMmt 
and the Con^ pany will also be placed before local courts 
4 
and decided according to the laws of the country#* Article 
9 of the Firman of 1966 also provided that "the ?laritine 
canal and all its appurtenances shall retnain the juris-
diction of Egyptian police who shall operate freely as 
any other point of territory* so as to assure good order* 
imblie safety and observance of the laws and ragulaticms 
of the country*' 
«5 
Analytically the applicable law could be Egyptian* 
French and extraterritorial law under the capitulatory 
4* Zbid«* Vt 40| also see Hhite Paper on the nationalisation 
of the Sues «tai»ej| i^ aritiraa canal Company* op* cit** P«33« 
5« Ibid** P* 32* For legal aspects of the Act* of Concessi<»8 
of 1354* 1856 and Firman of 1366 see Benno* ^vram op* 
cit*« PP* 23-27* 
l o ^ 
system* Bat thm Inl^rpz^tations of thm tMXim of the 
Concassion of 1856 «sid ^ •snan o£ 1366 clearly established 
jurisdiction of tlia Egyptian court and laws* Havart^ielass 
the referred Concession and Firman of ^Itan makes it 
clear that i^ gyptian sovereignty over the Canal has al«mys 
rMoaisMtd unimpaired* The Cf)neeasions(1854 and 1656} ware 
an act of internal law and were grants by whic^ a right 
w as given to a private cc^pany to construct the Canal* 
By granting Concession* £gfptian sovereignty was not altered; 
nor any part of it was transferred to the Company* However 
Egyptian sovereignty over the Canel and ^gypt as a iiri^cle 
had been divided since 1841 between Egypt and Turkish 
Sultan* The Viceroy of Egypt had legal capacity to grant 
concessions f,r construction of the Canal* But the 
Concessions «fere expressely subjected to the >3ultan*s 
ratificaticm in ccv^liance with the formalities of Turkish 
law* Undoubtedly the Concession of 1856* confirmed by the 
Sultan in i866« was set of internal goveminent which fell 
outside the ran^ of activity of int@maticmal law* 
Fur^er* in 1382« Britain became "de-facto** 
sovereign of Sgypt as well as the Canal* agypt, thou^ 
declared independent in 1922« did not legally obtain 
6* Joseph* A, obieta, s*j*f op* elt*# FF» 48^ 60«6i« For 
Seq, 
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«ovttx«ign right oveir th« Canal until 1936* nta Anglo« 
Egyptian '^ greeiaant of 1936 had recognised the Sues Canal 
7 
as" an integral part of the Egypt*** Honfever* during its 
occupation the Blritish govenurant had recognised" the 
B Egyptian character of the Sties Canal Conpany* And finally 
after the evacuation of all the British troops from the 
Canal sones# Egyptian sovereignty was f^lly established 
over the Canal as well as over the %Aole country* 
Another legal factor connected witdi the sovereignty 
of Egypt is that the Canal «ms Egyptian property temporarily 
operated by the C(M<^ >any yhich could never have the ri^ i^ t 
to dispose it* The terms of the Conqpany's existence was 
9 fixed for 99 years since the opening of the Canal* 
7* See Article 8 Appendix • 0« 
0* The British government had recognised the Egyptian 
naticsnal character of the conqpany and its submission 
to Egyptian law many times specif icNilly in 1925« 1939 
and 1942* Zn the Gold Currency ease of i939«(The outline 
of case was not stated) British Agent stated! it (The 
3uez Canal Coirpany) is Egyptian because it is granted 
a Concession which has for its object Egyptian public 
assets »^xdj^ y?^ jijet i ^ principal c«atra is in 
Egypt." «0H5v*^i?9*^RWv^^'2W v/hite i^ aper cm 
Nationalisation of* the Suez i^aritlrae Canal cog^ny* 
op* cit** PP* 59«>6i* 
9* See Article 3 of the Concession of 18S4# Appendix«A| 
Article 16 of the Concession cf lg56# Appandix»B* 
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According to Article 10 of the Concession of 1854 and 
Article 16 of Concession of 185^' after th« expiration 
of the ^ onceesion* the Egyptian government will take plaoa 
of the Cofn^ a^ny, and enjoy all Ita righte withcwt 
reservation«r and will also enter into full posseasion o£ 
the Canal with all the establishment thereof upon payiaBnt 
of indeminity to the COR^ pany agreed by amicable agreenwnt 
or by arbitration* 
The argument related to the act of nationalisation 
was the administration of the Canals different from 
sovereignty and property* Administration implied laain-
tainenoa and operaticm of thm undertaking* ^ e Egyptian 
govemment^as a territorial sovereign* ndght Of^rate tlM 
Canal itself or with the aid of intermediaries* Instead 
it «H chose a different method i*e* through a Concessioniary 
Ccmipany* Both Concessions were expressely provided that 
grant was made to construct the Canal and* then* later 
to operate the Canal for 99 years* Article 17 of the 
ConcessicHP of 1856 stipulated thati 
" to indermify the Company for the expenses of 
constraction* maintenance and working* charged upon th««i 
fay these presents* we authorise t^e Company henceforth* 
1':. See Appendices A and ». 
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and during the whole term of their leas«# to levy and 
recseived for passage thro^ jgh and entrance into the Canals 
and Ports thereunto ap|:>ertaining« tolls and charges for 
navigation^ piolatge, towage or harbour dues««**« 
Therefore, ^ g^ypt put the CQp^ >any in charge of 
administration and later operation of the Canal* The 
Corapany* being i^icjyptian* was solely responsible to 
Egyptian govem'rsent and had neither ri^t m nor ^ligatiomi 
with regard to international conmiunity* In fact« it was 
in ccmtact with such a community in nK>re than one way« 
and had to act as an intermediary between it and Egyptian 
Government* The interests of the Canal coinpany lay in 
having the gre<^ te8t possible number of shipspass or navigate 
through the Canal as freely and as cheaply as possible* ^en^ 
it is definite that the Contractual right of the Company 
in respect to its function in ^ gypt was governed by 
Egyptian law not by international law* Undoubtedly, the 
Suez Canal Con^ pany has always an -unique, or one roust say 
Universal character by virtue of its capitals, board of 
directors and operating personnel which representated 
se^ /eral nationality, and peri or to all factors by virtue 
of its purpose and resp nsibility to assure effici«it 
11* See Arpendix •• B* 
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operation o£ ti)0 Canal to entirv world* But It db>es not 
moan that it %#as an international agency; the Company 
haa ccKQ into existence by a contract and the contractual 
aspect 8ho<}ld not ;:« ignored* Consequently^ Three Poiiers 
claiBi to the Company being an international agency has no 
validity* There is no provision to indicate that the Con^Any 
lias an international agency entitled to special status* 
nor such conception was ever conten^latad by those concerned 
in its formation* 
The last factor cc^cemed with the legality of 
nationalisaticv) was The Convention of Constantinople of 
1888* Three powers clairned that naticnalisaticn violated 
vested international rights-right of passa e enjc^ p^ d by 
all nation* But the Cct)\^ ntion of Constantinople of 1838* 
which guaranted freedom of navigation* tias in no %fay 
related to the ownership of the Canal Coiapany* The act ol 
nationalisation did not threaten the freedom of navigation 
and security of the Canal provided by the Conventi.n 
of laae* The Cvi^ nventic© of 1838 provided that its principles 
were to be apply regardless of the ownership and of ^ e 
operation *^^ Affppp^ i|^ «a %9. ^ yt^ y^ ff X4 9t Ui^ PoRVfO^ivn 
12* Lenczowski, George* op* cit** P* 627; Johnscm* ^aul** 
op* cit*« P* 45* I Pillai* ^* Vasudsv* op* cit** 
PP* 9 - 1 1 . 
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ofe 1888* * th« iiiifii C<:»)tractlng ^arti«» agx«tt that the 
Bngagtttsmntm resulting from the present Treaty shal l not 
be limited by the duration of tiie acts o£ Concession 
13 
of the Universal Suea canal Company•" 
Thereupon* the ><r@stem powers and a number of contmmm 
porary writer enqphaaiae cm the preamble of Convention of 
1838 Jjti which reference of the Firman of 1866 and the 
C<»icesaiop o£ 1856 %fere made* llie Preamble declared** to 
establish a definite system designed to guarantee at all 
tiraes« and for all powers* the free use of the ^vmz Haritirne 
Canal* and thus to complete the system under which the 
navigation of this Cwsal has been placed by the Firman 
of His In^ ;«rial tmajesty* the Sultan*•••« and s^ uictioning 
the Ccncession of His Highness* the Khedive*•••** Zt 
should be noted that the purpose of the Convention of 
1338 was not to accord international protection to tAe ri^t 
of navigation throu^ the Canal, T^ te purpoMi of the 
Convention was not only" to conf irw** the existing systera 
of freedom of navigation but was also intended* to complete** 
the systeci of free navigation. Because the Concession of 
1S56 drew rules and regulations of navigation for msrchast-
ships only, Hotiever* the Concession o£ 1856 established ± 
international ragin» that all nations of the world acquired 
13, See Appendix - C, 
14, Joseph, A, Obieta, S,J,* op, cit,* PP,1C0, 146 
and 149, 
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t h e r i g h t to send through the Canal t h e i r merchant vessels 
In time of peace (Art ic le 14), Therefore the Concession of 
1856 by /ar t ic le 14 was an o - fe r to the in te rna t iona l 
community of a perpetual r igh t of passage through the Canal 
without tr«ttJ»initting i t « leg til chcirecter. The Convention of 
1888 enlarged t h i s r i g h t t o include a l l kind o£ navigation 
15 in time of peace aa v e i l as in time of war* oay interpret* 
ta t ion of the ConceeslcMJ and iirroan to j u s t i f y the Company 
an in tHmation«l agency w i l l De misleeciing, -R impar t ia l 
interpretention would re^ch to tha conclusion tha t these 
never meant to recognize the Company us an in te rna t iona l 
agency. Therefore, the claim of Three Powers concerning the 
s t - t u s of the Company as an in t e rna t iona l ag«icy must tje 
r e j ec t ed . The ouez Canal Company, i n s p i t e of i t s name, i t « 
importcince and r .a t lonal i ty of i t s shareholders was an Egyptian 
Company. I t was suiaject in a l l resj^ect to the laws of ^gypt 
and to the J u r i s d i c t i o n of it:s l eg i t ima te government. Thus, 
Egyptian government na t iona l i sed i t as any o the r 
Egypticin e n t e r p r i s e , Ihe minimum standard re<iuired by 
15, Josefh, ^^ , Obieta, S ,J , , op , c i t , , PP, 96-97, and 99-102, 
. Iso see Hung, T,F»,''Some Legal -^^ d In te rna t iona l Aspects 
of the Canal ," ' V , J , I , L , . Vol, 51 (1957), pp, l80-283f 
C\iincy Wright, '*lnterv^:ition-.l956^" Ib id , p , 273, 
Ihe representa t ive of Belgium sup ox ed the Egyptian 
pocition a t the -.ecurity Council by raying tho.t,*' Ihe 
word"to complete* rc te r red to in the preamble was 
designed to e s t ab l i sh a c lose and unquestionable 
connexion between the ac t of Concession es taol i sh ing 
the Company and the Convention aifirming a t the I n t e r -
nat ional l e v e l , the prlncif>al freedom of navigation 
with the inev i t ab le consequmices t h a t company and the 
system without v io la t ing the convention," See im 
secur i ty covincll oi t ic i<i l isecord, 11th year , 737th 
meeting, P, 25, 
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Intttmatlonal law for the protactlona of alines wa« fully 
provided by tha Nationalisation Dscjlfrea (Article 1« Fara, 
2 providino coinp«naation)» The nationalisation of the 3ue« 
Canal Company waa legal and valid* 
Israeli armed attack on Egyptian territory, \>^ ic^  vaa 
follovmd by ilnglo-i*r«Bidrt military attack, had created a 
grave intematicmal situation* It was iindoubtedly an aggre-
ssicm on the pretext of self-defence to protect their so 
called interest in the c«»ial and canal zone* H vias, in 
fact, a pre*planed conspiracy between Israel, Britain aiul 
France* It was tri-aggression In violation of intemationaX 
law; was a breach of purposes and principles of the United 
>^iations Charter, and it violated the Armistice Agreement 
of 1949 concluded between ^gypt and Israel, by crossing 
the armistieelines* This view shared by inajority of 
meiaberw»states of the UK and world public opinicm* m 
a speed) on Hovember 1, 19S6 Pt* l^ ehru, t||e thwi Prine 
Minister of India, declared t 
"llhe Anglo-f ranch acticwi in iigypt as " naked 
aggression" which would not be tolerated by the self* 
respecting and independent naticms c^ Asia and Africa*** 
tie went on to say that "there has been the sud<ten invasion 
* India, Pakistan, Ceylon and i5«ny Asian, African and Arab 
nations denounced t.ie actions of Israel, sritain and 
France and declared them "aggressor"* Australia and 
Ke%rsealand supported tiielr action* 
117) 
of ^gfpt by X S ^ M I in b:c«aGh of an axrrdsticMi and of tim 
\m charter. In thesa dlsputtts our syaipathifts hay ba«a 
for the Arab nation*• Thay have had a raw daal and this 
maat be remedied* But \m have no enmity toward leceel* 
X sm not thinking of Israel being wiped oat* The faet 
rsTFiains that it is a oaise of clear and naked aggrassion 
<m Egypt by Israel* Hvery raani>er of UN should try to sagi 
stc^ it and resist it* But Britain and France issued an 
ultimatuio to Egypt* Tl-m Sues Canal was functioning 
properly* If there i#as any danger to the catMl it was fron 
Israel^ %^ich advanced 90 miles inside ii^ gypt* Britain had 
been a force for peace in the past t»K> years and beceuse 
of this my sorrow and distress is all the greater for the 
amasing adventure % ^ i ^ Britain and France have entered 
ifi 
into*"" llehru was supported by m«B^ bers of the United 
Kations* 
The action of Israel had violatwl intecnational law 
by using force against Egypt* The United tiations Charter 
prohibit the use of force in international ralaticms G£ 
states* The Preamble of the Charter refer to acceptance 
of principle that "armed forces shall not be use« save 
16* Kessinc's Contemporary Archives. Noventoer i7*24« WS*,?. 
iS209| also see -^ 'ayrs* James^ op* cit*« PP* 249^501 
iehru's Speech®s# Delhi Publication Division 1949»1958« 
Vol* III« ?P* 321*324* 
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ia ttm eomaan intonst*** Th« Ch«rt«r proviass undMT 
ActleU 2 (3) that "aXX ^ imabaxs ah«U M t t U th«ir Intttien* 
atlonal disputas lay p«ao»fuI IM«II« in auc^ a ratnoar that 
international paaoa and saourity axa not andangasad*" 
ArtioXa 2(4) further providaa that "all ^ntera ahall 
rafraia in thair iataxaational ralatioo from tha thraat 
or uaa of f orea agalnat tha tarritorlal iatagrity or 
political indapandanca of any atata or in any othar oaaa 
1.8 
jUMSonsiatenoa with any purpoaa* 
Tha Chartar« thua« prohibit aggrasaiita var by« atata 
and in tha Chartar ita rtmaiomrm ranounoad tha rif^t ws^ 
only to raaort to war and maaauraa of f orea# ahort oi wajr« 
but aiao ^raata of warn and acta falling short of i t* A 
imnbar of tha Unitad Kationa can uaa f orG» only in •iolatiott 
of tha obligationa of Him Chartar aa Xaraal did* thara 
waa claarly uaa of f orea againat the tarrit«riaX intagr i^ 
and poXitical indap«adaaca of i^ gypt* Tha uaa of forea 
by a wmnieMr of tha Unitad i^ticma (laraaX) wia in vioXatioB 
of tha Unitad Hatiooa Chartar* Tha Charter ^^smrtB tha 
Fanwick, CharXaa op. c i t . . P. f^^^ Bto^-nlio, Ian, Baaic 
la J^ ggya»«>V i f Xatarnatjepa^ Law, Oxford cxarsndon PaSlm 
1X9) 
priiaary purpose o£ th« Unltod Natloofl " to tsAintaiii 
International paaca and saeurity^ and to that and to talet 
affacti'va eollactlve a»aauraa for the prtinintlcm and 
mioval of threats to the peace* and for the auppveaaion 
of acts of aggxaaalcn or other brea^vsa of the peace* and 
to bring about peaceful iae«ne and in ccnf icenity with 
the principles of justice and international law* adjustawnt 
or Mkttlement of international disputes or situation 
%^ieh might lead to a breach of tim peace*" (Article 1 
(2).^® 
Article 24 of the Charter confers upon the Security 
Council priznajey responsibility for the maintenance c^ pesos 
and security (Chapter VZ and VIZ) • The members oi ihm 
United nations seek a solution by various means of pacific 
settlemtnt of the disputes whiat ars likely to endanger 
international peace and secuti^* If they failed to settle 
the dispute* they ars bound to submit it to the Security 
Council under Article 37 and the security council will taloi 
26 proper action* In ease* the Security Council fails to 
settle the dispute by pacific raeans then the Security 
Council* according to Article 39* is authorised to determine 
the existmce <^ any threat to the peace* breach of peace 
or act of aggrsssion and malie rsecRiNsidtotion or dseids 
19« Ibid** P* 3| also see Granville* J*A«s* op* oit** P*246* 
20« For Pacific settleR«nt of disputes see Articles 33«>38 
(Chapter VZ) of the un Charter* Srownlie* Zan«*op* eit«* 
PP« i2«13i Granville* J*A*S,* op* cit** PP* 2S2»iS3* 
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what enfoccttcodnt neasure* ara to b« takan to naintaia 
or raatova peaoa and aaeurity* ( undar ArtioXaa 41«»S0« 
Chaptar VXZ) • Articla 41 provldaa that "tha Sacmrity 
Council eaay dacided i^at meaauraa not involving tha uaa o£ 
armad £orcaa ara to ba antpXoyad to giv« affaet to Its 
daeiaiona* and it m may oall upon tha MHnbars of tha 
Unitad Nationa to apply audi maaauvaa* Thaaa oay iaelutfa 
oomplata or partial intarruption o£ aeon^ nici mlatioM 
and oE raila« aaa^ air« peatal« talagraphio« radio* and 
othar faeana of cor.wnunicatlan and tha aaveranca of diplomatic 
ralaticma*** Articla 42 aaya "'Should tha Sacurity Counoil 
eonaidar that maaauraa providad for in Articla 41 wovild 
ba inadeguata or have proved to ba inadaquata* it stay 
taka auc^ action hy *ir* 'BMMI* or land f orcaa aa BNty ba 
nacaaaary to maintain or raatora intamational paaca and 
aaeurity* Such action may includa daiiianatrationa# bloekada* 
and othar ^ paraticma by air# i^mt or land f oroaa oi, Hmdaar 
of tha Unitad Hationa"*^^ By Articla 25 tha^'f^a^r of 
tha Unitad Kationa agraa to accapt and carry out tiM( 
daciaiona of tha Sacurity Council in accordanoa urith tha 
21* Zbid*» PP. 253^541 Brownli«« Zan* 09. cit«« Pp* iH4* 
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pxwwtnt caMirter*" 
The f requont inability o£ tlia S«eurity Council to 
S 
diij^hmsgm primary raspcsnsibility, assigned to i t bgr Chartar# 
has ehangad powom of the Security Ccxmcil and the Oeaexttl 
hMmmectolrm The inability of the Security Council to deeide 
nattase relating to intematicfial peace and security owiBg 
to the exceaaive uae o£ veto« the importance of the security 
Council had been lonfered in the^^ee o£ the natioaa at^ 
tt^ General Aaeend l^y becaine the only hope of maiatalniag 
vforld order* la the preaent case« the secutiry cooneilt aa 
in other caaea » vaa totally failed to solve the hoatilitiea 
betiieen Sgypt and larael endangering to peace and security 
o£ that region* Zarael had appealed many times to the Seoority 
Council againat ttvtt actiona of Egypt % i^eii had beoA eondueting 
by her# ainee 1949* but unable to take any firm action* Thou^ 
the Security Council adopted a seaolutioo in 1951 asounta to 
an international order but no atepa nhatever had been taloiB to 
implenMnt it* Ho one £olloi#ed up the security Council** 
reaolutioQ* The Soviet Ruaaia had indeed vetoed the second 
Security Council'a reaolutioo in 19 S4 in favour of ^ gypt* 
Therefore^ the General Aeeeinbly realiaed to prevent 
22* Ibid*, F* 10* 
* The Security Council tocX deciaioe only in caee <rf ytorea^  
1950t and created Unified C0Bw«ind in Korea* Xt naa 
posaible aolely because of the fartuitoua abaence of the 
Soviet repreaentative* 
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th« aatt«rs mXatiag to pe «• snd s«curity fron b«iag 
"frozan" on th« Seeurit? Council Agenda* i t should mBmam of 
the responsibility of the council* Conseqtuently* the Genexttl 
Assembly adopted *^ rfW tfmlr1rffl<i jfpg g^fflt g^ftVi^ UgOi" ^ 19S0« 
Zta intention nee to creat a nuoletui of collective security 
23 
outside ^le Security council. The Resolution providsst 
"If the Siicurity Council, because of the lack of 
unanindty of the pesnanent iqambers* fails to esnreise its 
priraary responsibility for the maintsa«BC» of international 
peace and security in any case where there appears to be a 
threat to the peace# breach of the peace or act of aQgrsssioa, 
the General Asseisbly will consider the matter immediately 
with a view to asking appropriate recomfaendations to 
meft^ jers for collective measures including in the case of a 
breach of peace or act of aggression^ the rise o£ armed foxoe# 
when necessary to laaintain or restc^ ce international peace and 
secutiry* If not in session at the tii»t the General Ass—tely 
may meet in an emergency special session within twenty four 
24 
hours o£ the request therefore ••*••• 
23» Ahinad,iixslshtaq« "The General Assembly of the United 
ilationst A study of changing structuc* of Power,* Indian 
Journal of Pol i t ics , XII, 1-2, Ar^rilw'tugust 1978,P* Sd« 
24« Ibid*, P« 58, Also see starto, J«0« op, cit* P* 500* l^ or 
QroanisatiM. the Ronald Press C0B%>any, Bew yosx* (19M} • Pp0 99-^7$ 447«>452| Oeoffrey Goodwinff "The Qayef 
Assentoly of ^ e tws" In l«iard, Svan,, _^ _^_„_ 
Thaines and fiudscn. 
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Ttm Ottncrttl AsMi^ly pl«yed an lin:>ortant rol«« ia 
•f£«c^ing the oMse^flr* and id.thdx«nr a l l fomign toxxmm 
from Egyptian territory* The action of the security Council 
had proved fa i l because of the ne^tive vote east by Britaia 
and France^ tlwn f irs t special session of the General ApMiRbly 
was convened on November I , 1956 under '^ Rlff mining t9S fmm> 
B—olution, . " 
Za no way« the acticm o£. Israel w s^ in persuanoe of 
Ignited Hations deeisiea# or on raeoaaendatiai of the security 
Council* Thersforsy Zsreal cotsreltted an "act oi aggression*" 
The only queslUon rssBAined was that whether the action of 
Isxael could be justified under Article SI necessary for 
individual or eollectiva self-defence* Article 51 of the 
Charter provides that "Nothlay in the present Charter 
lAiall inpair the inherent r i ^ t of individhaal or collJMstive 
self«dt»fenoe i f an armed attack occurs against a Hate^r 
of the United Rati«ma« until the security Council has taken 
the measures necessary to imintaia international peace mod 
security* Htasures taken by ilenftwrs ia tho exercise o€ this 
right of self-defence shall be iBs^sdiately reported to the 
Seeutiry council an^ shall not in any way affect t ^ authority 
wid respoAsibiXity of the SeoulEil:y Council under the present 
Charter to take at any such action as i t deerns necessary 
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la oraer to fuiintain or mtotm ln^ini«t;ional psae* ttnd 3«?o r^ t:? 
Moority*"^^ Thez«fo£«« ArtieXe 51 pttsmita to hmy fcoanm 
to arottd «ctlon la MIC dstttnctt wtiaa I t 1« Ita^If thtt ol>j«et 
of an ariMd attack and vfiaa aueh attack la dltvetad agalnat 
any atata or atataa irtioaa aa£ety« axlatanca and Indapacdane^ 
aro daaiaed In dangar* Zt la alao a practical caeo^lticn 
o£ tha £act that la tha abaanca of an affactlva tmciiitmrf 
o£ tha United Nationa for tha auFs^aaaiaa of tha act of 
aggrasaloa* a mambar can taka nacMwaxy action la aalf* 
defenca* Tha r l ^ t to ximm totem la aalf<-dafanca la pantlttad 
only ao long aa Tha sacurlty council haa not takan tha 
nac^aaary at*p to malataln IntenMStlcmal p«aca ai^ ^ e u r l ^ * 
From thla point ot viaw i t la an asxcaptloiyiX ri^ g t^* It 
ahould ba notad that HSM prbhibltloa of Artlcla 2(4) i s 
abaoXuta la eharaetar axeapt In purauanea of aaX€»dafanoa* 
Zasaal juatlf lad ita miXltacy oparatioa agalaat 
igypt on tha baala of ArtleXa 51« It aaaartad tSiat tha 
actlcm waa a i»K:aaaity la fl«Xf«*dafanea agalnat tha rapaatad 
E:gyptlaa "Fadayaan ralda" aeroaa tha armlatlea llnai agalaat 
25« BrownXla* Zan« op* elt»« P« 16f Tamrlok^ CharXaa# ap« 
elt«« P« 795* 
26, Oppanhalm* L«,C9« cit#« Vol* ZZ»« PP« 15S«iS6« Alao 
siisias; Tc^;!i^ i^?mn u^mLjs: 
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eontlnuAd bXoolAdB «f th« Su^s OmaX and the OilC of 
AqaiA to z«xtt«li Shipping* •nA against the conHiuad ths«at« 
implied by Egypt's assortation that i t i s at war %ritli th« 
objaet o£ allminating Zas»ai* Zasiai dsclarad that ni i i tasy 
oparation had baen nacasaiatad by continuous SgyptiMi «tta(^ 
on land i^ nd saa communication o£ israal, Zt aienad at etaamimig 
dastruotion and depriving the people of isrseX of the 
possibility of peaceful existamae* The*Ftd«yeen saids»* 
isrtteX elaifiied# fosraed part o£ Egyptian Amqr ^nd opersted 
tinder Egyptian ndXitacy since X948* UntiX 195S* Sgypt denied 
responsibility for **7edeyeen raids" but later on« she 
off ic ial ly racognisod the 'Fedayaon* aa national heores* 
Israel's frontiers vera quite indefensible against tiiis 
kind of iiafliteration* "The Object of military opemtion*'* 
thus* Israel Foreign Ministry daclared«"ifas the liquidation 
of Fedayaen basis in Sinai peninsula from iihic& the csraaando 
units of Egyptian asny had apread in Zsrael by act of 
indiscriminate surdsr* mining andsabotage** 
Zsrael justified i t s operation a^ ins t Bgypt on the 
ground that there uss danger to i t s existenee* Sinee i t s 
a7« Heiiri<iuss« lUNbert* ioo Hotire to gu^a • An Aeeoitnt of 
Israel's Cac^ign ui the Sinai E^niasula^ 3eekar ft 
Warburg* London* (1964)* PP* 38*3$. 
F* 15171* Also see ths statetsmit of *^* aben* Israeli 
rspresentativs of the UH, Ibid** P* ISIM* 
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eoming into existence* sh* w M being attaekad fcy the mii^im9 
of I«boii«n# Syria, Jordan, W«q «»d Sgypt* i»o«tiliti«« •nded 
by a soriaa of Antiiatiea Agrt^ eimnta that \ntm aignad in 
1949, with aach of thoaa atataa axcapt Irag^ . However, 
tha Arab atataa had continuoualy refuaed to tacogniaa its 
axiatanca* Egyptian govamnient insiat^d again and agAia 
^at Bgypt cc:^ aidered herself to be still at war with 
Zaraal* Conaequently Egypt justified its blockade of tha 
Sues Canal and Oulf of Aqaba to Zaraeli shipping. This 
blockade, Zaraal claimed, waa dearly in violation of tha 
Ccmvention of 1888, Asraiatica Agreeftient of 1949 and in 
violation of tha security Council'a reaolution of 19SI 
which called upon -gypt to atop the blockade forthwith, 
i3ut the blockade had continued ever aince, Israel aaid 
that EgyptU blockade against larael*a shipping were at 
great cost toft» economy becauaa all trade had stopped 
to and. from Zaraal. Not only thia, the member atataa of 
the Arab Leaque organiaed an active boycott againat 
Israel even %^en she waa an elected member <^ the United 
!^ationa. They alloued no trade or cocmunication <^ any 
aort between ita menbera and laraal. Several internatienaX 
agreemmta were cancelled by the member states of tha 
29. ^Wrlquea, Robert, op. fit., PP. 221-222. 
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League* Itwy also bOTCottad a l l international Conferences and 
meetings o£ the United Nations special ised Agencies in case an 
invitation to Israel* too# had been sent to attend these 
conferences and meetings*^ A H these measures had very grave 
consequences over Israel* Ihe lx>ycott of Israel by the Arab s ta tes 
seemed to be inconsistent with the purpose and principles of the 
U n i t ^ Nations Charters* which requires th^t *all Mesober have 
agreed to f u l f i l in ^^ x>d faith the obligations of the Charter* 
Art ic le 2(2}* and "to develop: fri^sidly relations anong natic»s 
based on respect for the principle of equal right and self* 
31 detenoinaticm*'* (Article 1(2} * Israel asserted* since 1948* 
s^ gypt continui^ to make war against Israel by a l l meax^ s at 
her disposal* Military deployment in sinai and massive bases 
which Egypt had bui l t up in the area of ^•l.^^rish could 
only be intended for forthcoming operation against Israel* Sh9 
said that Egyptian preparation for invasion were accelarated 
with the ^ v i e t Russia assistance and the Soviet arming of 
Egypt was a serious threat abd inaaediate danger to i t s security* 
i\>t Israel i t wis increasingly serious when Egypt 
nationalisctd the Suez Canal Company,•»••••••••••••••«••••• 
30* Ibid** PP*. 36-37 and 237«>239* Also see '^sari* Mohammed 
Iqbal, Ttim Arab League 1949-1955. Inst i tute of Islamic 
studies pubUcation XIV* A*K«U. Aligazh* PP* 71-74* 
31* Brownlie* lan* op* cit** P* 3* 
* Israel produced iJocuments captured at Gaza to prove that 
Egyptian plan to invade Israel being prepared* In a copy of 
"Most secret" Training directive* para, i^ s tates that Every 
o f f i c r must prepare himself and his subordinates for the 
Inevilable struggle with the object of realis ing our noble aim 
n^Etely the annihiliation of Israel and her destruction in 
the shortest possible tiine and in the most brutal and cxual 
battles*" Henriques* Kobert* op* o i t* PP* 40-41* 
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bocauM thia use o£ force« u««d in nationalisation of tha 
Company* in thao|>inion of Xaxaal was a triumph of ^ rab 
natiar>aliai»* Further* tha annouiK:en>Qnt of formation of a 
Joint i^ g^yptien * Jordanina«*Syrian Contaand* Xar««l thoo{j|it« 
«as directad against it* Xn aaditi<^* thera was doraastiea 
prajsura on Israali govammant to ft taka staps against 
Fadarean raids ^ ieh interruptad liwBS and lifa of Xsraai's 
citilians* Howavor* it was elaar to Xsraal that slw will 
not ba gatting support in tl» ^nitad l)ation» 
Ona nay agraa with Xsraal arguiaantii but avan than 
it «fas hard to raconcila with Xsraal*s resort to forca* 
Xsraal situation was undoubtady uniqiM and its argumants 
wara not inpUnxsibla but \mv mttmw^ to Justify har action 
in taxing portectiva measures against griavancas and fu^ra 
threat or danger of war from Egypt seenwd to be not vary 
imlid* Article 51 of the Charter confirms thm right oi. 
salf«*defence in case of *an armed attack occurs" as distin-
guished froia anticipated attack or from various forms of 
unfriendly conducts falling short of armed attack* ^  state 
nay use force only In "instant and overwhelming necessity 
f#r self dsflfenoe**' the use o£ force for the redress oC 
grievances or for the detenainaticm of future danger must 
not be justified* However* Quinoy wri^t points out the 
129) 
t«»a "Threat" in th« provl»loo» of Htm Unit«d *^tlcm« 
Charter la clearly Intend^* to re£«r to Immiiwnt aangtr 
of attack* creating tha Instant and overwhalralng nacasaity 
tor aelf^aefanca," that customary international lew has 
held jvatif dad atlitary self«*dafence« for aieanpla, la the 
Caroline esse (1838). But of such a threat^ he questioned 
constitutes an act of aggression* permit or does not permit 
indivi^ hsal or collective self-defence" under the Charter 
is not altogether clear because such a threat might be short 
of an armed attack* 
International law does not prc^ibit ner rather 
it permits as a function of a soverei^ state* however* 
only defensive war (Justui»»BelluBi) • But a state resort to 
war in violation of international law* it considered aggre-* 
ssive war (Unjustwe-Bellura) * ihe United Nations Charter had 
not defined clearly the term "aQgrsssicn** The provision 
of tim Charter refers" the armed attack" racogniaed in 
fcsur type of situati<»i •«<» the breach of peace* threat to 
peace* aituation endangering international peace 9nd 
security* and situation likely to impair friendly relations 
among nations* "Aggression" as a term of international law 
33• Wright* Ouincy«* Corrments on t^ ie Ooodhart* Proff • A.I.,, 
Some laoal Aspects of the Sues s^ t\^ atiQ»|* in Thayer* 
John HopkJUjs aaltlcRore (l958)i> 
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has hemn defined as "a reaort to armed forc«» by a stata 
v&mn such resort had been dully detemined« by a mean whi^ i»idi 
that state la bound to accept to conaitute a violation an 
obligation.^^ 
The Pact of Paris (1928) and the United iiatlona 
Charter too forbid the use o£ force* The legality to 
recourse to forc^ in self defence could not be Judged by 
Israel herself. The Intematlor al llilltarv tribunal set 
up at Nureitibery to try German war^ring leaders in its 
verdict* given in 1946# said that ••to initiate a war of 
aggression is not only an international criras« it is ttm 
superen« IntamatioMil criiee differing only froct other 
var crlitMis in that it contain within itself the accimulated 
34 
evils of the vrtiole." 
However^ only "Justum be Hum** is permlsslblei In 
case aggressioti is allowed* Sut it is too difficult to 
define an aggression. In 1974# Tim General Assttsbly adopted 
a Resolution on the Definition o£ Aggression. The United 
nations special Co'^ m^lttee^  after seven years oE labour 
33. Harvard Research in International law*" Riohta and 
^•Ufff 9f > ^ ^ r 4 B gfifff of, ^gm^fte'* ^^ ^^ ^^ P Jessup 
Reporter* A.J.X.L.(Supple.)Vol.33(1939)#P. 827. quoted 
by Guincy wrlcht, **Interventlon-1956»'* A»J.I,L.. 
Vol. 51 (1957) P. 267;; 
34. See the text provided by -ol. Lawrance D. Sgbortt 
n^d 3entence< A.j.i.L.* vol. 41 (1947) Py 172. Also 
ss»e Schick, P.3., "Tm ^vmn^ffq Ty|a; ^  j^f In^r* 
national Law of the ruture* Ji-bid«« PP. 770»794f Laute 
pacfafei International Law RJegtort. 1957,P. 942> United 
Nations Year Book, 1946..1947, PP. 254, 260-61. 
iUter-
nn 
could produce «n 8 Articles definition o£ '^ggrsssicn* 
but •xpressed it* inability to givm an •xhaustive definition* 
The Sp«ci«l Con%nitt<ie defined "aggressicm" as the usa of 
mrmd forces by e state against the territorial integri^ 
and political independence o£ another state or in any other 
nwans inc<maist«ntt with the Charter o£ the United Kations" 
Article 2 of tl^ e resolution says that '*rrie first use o£ 
errfled force by a state in contravention of the Charter shall 
constitute "Prima facie" evidence of an act of a;jgrsssiaci# 
altnough the Security Council may, in eonfirtnity with the 
Charter* concluded a determination tiist an act^  of ayyiMssioii 
has baen coii«nitted would not be justified in the Xi^t of 
other relevant circumstances^ including the fact tlte acts# 
conc«»med on their consequence are not of sufficient 
gravity.* TVierefore, one may reach to conclusion that 
Israel's action could not be justified legally* She %»as 
yuilty of aggression and had oarmitted an act of aggxessicm 
by violating Article 3 of the resoluti n of the General 
Assembly* Article 3 provides tliat military occupation* 
annexations, b<»idc>ardnient or use of any weapons by a state 
against another, blockade of ports or coast* attacks on 
land, sea* or airforce, and sending by air on behalf of • 
state of armed bands groups* irregulars and mercenaries* 
35* See the Resolution 3314 (XXIV) United Nations Year 
Book* 1974* PP* 847-848* 
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The documttits pleaded Inability to exhaust test and gave 
th« Security Council the right to determine what other 
acts constituted aggression* 
Israel assertati<m that blockade of the Canal was 
illegal but during >far# it nay be argued that ship* of 
opposing belligerents are not to be permitted to transit 
t^ irough the Canal. Xn both World wars« thus# ships o£ 
Axis i'owers were not pemitted to use either.the Panarra 
nc^ t'ne Suez Canal* Cf course* Egyptian blockade acpinst 
Israel is contrary to the Convention c£ 1388« Armistice 
A^ n^sranent and the security Council resolution* The Egyptian 
Contention to Justify its continuance of %#ar« had also be«ni 
not supported by many experts on the gound that United 
i^ ations Charter prohibits " a state of «AS** -initiate<S hf-mcd 
Mainber of the ^ ni^d Hations vtA is in contravention to 
Article 2(4) of the Charter* However^ the endeavour to 
justify Israel's invasion could not be considered to ereet 
such condition of necessity to Justify action in self-defence* 
Egypt had adopted this policy against Israel shipping 
since 1949 even t when the British troos« were in ocoiipaicm 
of the Canal and the canal operated by the Sues Canal 
Company* Its policy had b«Mm accepted by both-Britaia and 
the CGRipany* it should be argued that these measures 
Se* Ibid*« P* 847* Also see ^ tlll^ iHyt^ n '^ iiflli' ^^ Delhi* 
dated April 14* 1974* 
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did not di££«r from similar dieracs issued* with th« 
full approval of Egypt^British ally, batman 1939-1945« 
%<hich wara dasigned to control mmnit'i' and nautral shipping 
during tha v^ orld timr ZZ« Than# no protast vara raisad by 
laaritioMi powers* 
VAnf nations argued that Israel had violated tha 
Armistice Agreement of ^grpt and Israel by invading the 
Sgyption territory across the arnistica line* Article 1 
(2) of the agreement provided that "no aggressive action 
by the armed forces of either party shall be undartalcan 
Ifi 
against by the arniad or the armed forces of the other*** 
c^ the other side*. Israel contended that H:gypt had already 
violated the Armistice Agreement by making systematically 
armed raids into its territoiry* However, Israel had never 
recognised the continuance of a state of war and accordingly 
refuted Egyptian blockade and interference with its shilling* 
But it is doubtful whether in case oi violatic»i of the 
Ccnventicm and tha Armistice Agreement by one party confer 
any right upcn the other party to take forcible retaliatory 
action* vjhat action, if any, entitled Israel to takac. for 
these violation* International law dews not provide any 
39 
precise and satisfactory answer* Israe l ' s invasion could 
37* Bindra, A*F*S*, op* e i t * , PP* 123-124* 
38* Hurewitse, J*C*, op* e i t * , vol* II* , P* 300* 
39* *l#Qal Aspects of the Sues cris is". World Today, Vol* 
13, May 19S7, Sana^xiU9idaR]pc»fiyxiftliiiftl*Royal Instituta 
of International Affairs , Oxford University Press, 
London, PP* 193-194* 
134) 
not b« Ju#tl£i«d i£ it Is acceptsd that Egypt vlolatad 
tlM» ArTRiatics Agr^ eraeiat, TJndoubtadly ^rtlcla 40 of the 
Hagua Raqulatloo of 1907 psovidea that "a aarious violation 
of an armiatioa by ona party givaa tha other the rig^t to 
danounca it and in caae of urgency hoatilitiaa nay ba vaopaiMd 
40 
without foxnal danunciaticn*" But thia proviaion ia 
unaatiafactory* Bxporta agrea that tha ordninary action 
doea not ctxnf ar the right to denounce an armistice agxaeioent* 
Practically, the aggrieved party can only determine 
i^ Mithar the violation ia aerioua or not« and aimilarly tim 
guaation regarding the determination of urgency* tha 
aggrieved party will have to detenalne the action to be 
tat^ na* 
It ia concluded that naticmaliaaticn and tha 
denial to Xaraeli ahpplng doea not serve gound to juatify 
Xaraal*a legal poaiticn. Israel weakened its position 
by the collusion with Britain and France, Israel's case 
for self-4ielp or self<»defenoe was less clear. She had not 
0 
esdiauated efi^ rta for a peaceful aolution* In £act# laraal 
thought that Vtim Sinai Cainpaign success would put an end to 
border attacksi it could provide a buffer on Hgyptian 
territory againat further Egyptian attacksi Israel main 
40« Ibid,« P* 194fOppanheiin.L., op* cit«. Vol, II, PP. 
5S5-556. 
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aim was to •«la« control of th« Canal with Anglo-frencdi 
eowoperation Mhic^ %iould opan tha Canal and also Oul€ of 
Aqa!3a« to ^sriMll Shipping* Success may^ it vma preaervad 
will lead totiarda toppling Haasar and humailiation and 
deaioraliaatlon of 4raba« 
Like israal« An9J^ ,^^ |fBgt| '';to1rfry«n^ lt9n" ^ ^^JTPt 
waa too« an act of aggvaasion* Their action in the 3\iax 
Canal and canal aonea ware clearly a use of force againat 
thB territorial integrity and politioil indepen^nca« ttkvm» 
violated Article 2 (4) oit the Charter* International law 
forbid* intervention i^ich is mora than laera interfexenca 
and miKd) atronger then nadiation and diplonatie aug^Kstion* 
To fall within t^e tenui of prohibition* it imuat be dicta* 
torial interfe ence* in opp^iition to the will of the 
partic«ilar state affected and almoat alMiys serving by 
desifpAS or ainplieation to inqpair political independence 
of that state* 
Britain and France pretended in ttm lsrael«£gyptiaR 
conflict a threat to their vital intsreat* They argued 
several justifieationa for td^ eir intervention including 
the necessity to stop hostilities; necessity to defeiMd the 
Sues Canal from atoppaga of traffiei necessity to prevent 
41* Hyde* InfrriBfUfflli; jfiW* Vol. X (XZnd ed) 
Quoted in Staxloa* J*6** c^* eit** P* 94* 
lfl47*P* 24«* 
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nAtlooalisfttion of the Sues can«l cooqpany by ^gypt; and 
th« aM;«ssity to ostablish a rmgiam for the canal aaaurln? 
future fveedoia of navigation* Thoir uXtijnatum and the 
axgumente later saadB« in aupport of their so-called 
interventitm or aggzession aaaerted a right to aet ae a 
"voliuiteer policeman" to use force to separate Israel and 
Egypt in order to protect ttm Canal akin to the right in 
some municipal system for a private eitisen to intervene 
to put down a breach of peace if the police failed to do 
42 
so* During ^ e course of discussion in the General AaemAaly* 
the representatives of Britain and France reRtUided Japan's 
justification of her intervention in China as a "police 
action" during the l^-«agtte of Hations* Britain and France* 
therefore* had also labled their aggression in Egypt as a 
"Police action*" British representative* Sir S'iersoa Dixon* 
argxwd that" the action of France and the United Kingdom 
is not aggxession* What we have undertaken is a tenporary 
police action necessiated by the turn of events in the 
'^iddle East and occasioned fay the inoperative need not only 
to protect the vital interest of my own a^d r»ny other 
countries* but also to take innvBdiate measure for the 
43* Henkin* M Louis* op* eit** P* 262* Also see Goddhard* 
^•^* "^Qg.H°*^ Aspects of the Sues situation^ in 
Thayer* Fhilip w** op* eit** F* 253* 
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i«atoratloa o£ order*** Th«rttfor«# he claimed ^ e rl^^t 
to dsfened their vital interest* Seli«yn Lloyed« in coux«e 
of the commons debate* argued that the Char-ter permitted 
the use or threat o£ force Xatffully on the express 
authority of the United Hatlons or In self-^fence* H« 
argued that self-^tefence* "undoubtedly include a situation 
t^ iere the lives of the states national abroad are in 
irrminent danger." 
The preponderent reaction nes to condem their action 
as inter alia a breach of the United KaU.cms Charter 
('Article 2 (4)) I nor could that their action be Justified 
with the exceptional rif^t of collective self-defence 
within the meaning of Article 51* Ihe only dUiterest that 
have been considered under the Charter sufficiently vital 
to Justify ailitary self-defence were actual or perhaps 
immediately threatened attack on territory or armed forces 
of state* £:gypt had not been guilty of any armed attaeX 
against Britain and France* Acaei>ting the "bona-fides" of 
the Justification in the ultinataia« it ^ould be noted 
43* GAOR* first Emergency session* t^ lenary t^etinga* 1-10 
Novendaer 19S6* P* 7* 
44* Finer* ^rman* op* eit** P* 379« 
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that It IMS • narrow •xcoption to 'Article 2 tailored to 
olrcunctances not likely to raeura fraquantly* But it mxmt 
not b« subjactad to tha dangara of scma bor<!ter theory Mhich 
would have parmittad force at any tii^aa in support of vital 
interest as each nation saw them* Consequently* this t^ory 
was net accpatftd tay majority of natiooa* 
Tha United Nations Charter provides that it is a 
duty of state or states to do nothing until the security 
Council has determined on a course of action and only 
if tha Couxx:il call<9d on them to apply the nacossary Measures 
(under Articles 41« 42« 43 (Chjipter VII)} • It should be 
noised that tlrw enforcement action can only be taken 
in parsuance of a pronounoaoent envied gad in 'Article 39 
and determining the existence of a threa% to peace, a breach 
cf peace or an act of aggression* Thus« the stat» must 
subordinate tha exercise of any mudti exception ri^ts of 
intervention to their primary obligatl-on under the Charter* 
w!i«re the Charter permits* intervention or armed aetioa 
mu >t not be regarded as the threat or use of force ac ainst 
tha territorial integrity or political independent of 
any state* 
The le^l pretence of Sritain and France interfered 
with their objectives* The claim of se|H^ <^ ting the combs* 
tants rang false wnen israeli forces t#ere not clo~ae to 
4S« i^nkiOf tcuis# op* cit«t P* 2<2| Wright* Quincy*" 
*Iaterventlcn»1956^ A*J*I*L, Vol. 5 1 U957)* P P* 
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thtt CttiMX* In thoir intiaX announcetittnt of th* ultiiwttuw» 
Th9Y had clearly statad that our main purpoaa in intarvanlag 
was to stop war betwean ^gjfpt and ^sraal^ then %^y# ooa 
wonders* the British and Fren^ representatives vetoed the 
cease«»f ire order i^ich supported toy laajority o£ the Security 
Coineil*8 menter including all other Great lowers on 
^^ober 30# 19567 Xf the object was to st^ war between 
Israel and ^ gypt# one questio s» then why ^ glo-^rene^ 
forces continued to attack £gypt for twenty«*four hours 
even after acoeptenoe of cease«fire order by the parties 
conoemed 7 Besides* £den gave another explanation* ^ i^ said 
that "Our purpoMi in taking individual action was to put 
t»eth into the United Nations and force its member to 
creat an international force*" But they snade no atteapt 
to get such a force created until condenned by the 6eourity 
Council and the General Assembly* Creation of Emergency 
force proposed by csaneral J^namalaXy met i^ oposition from 
Britain and Fraotee* Ho«iever« later on* th9Y* as a face* 
savin 9 device» made t^eir withdrawl ccntditional the 
establishiaent o£ a peaee«>keeping force* Therefore* thm 
decision to draw up their intervention as a "peaceokeeping" 
47 
was undoubedly an atteinpt to provide" a dock of l e ^ l i t y * 
46* Johnson* Paul«<^* eit** P* 134f also see Wright*Qaincy* 
"Inteventl<>n»1956"* A*J*X*t« Vol* 51 (1957)» P* 273* 
47* Bowie* Robert R**op* cit** P. 108/ also see Hright* Otiincy*. 
»Intarifvention-19S6" A . J . I . L . * Vol. 51(1957} PP* 293*273* 
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I t tes t i£ l«d to barxlttr >^ich had been Isuilt up agaisat 
reaort to force on the baaia of the Canal dlapute* I t 
was also an act of deaparation* Since they o^uld not 
persuade Eiawihower to reaort to force* ^glo^f^rwich 
jus t i f i cat ion for taking the action was not only contradi-
ctory but also manifestly dishonest* n ie i r intervention was 
a disguised attempt to regain control of the Canal and was 
nx>tivated by a desire to topple Nasser* In addition^ i t was 
a detennination to prevent the soviet influence and ^ f i l t e * 
ration in the Kiddle East and to prevont a precedent 
saicouraging other Arab states to nationalise* In case of 
France^ determlnatdLon to prevent pxopoganda incting 
Algerian nationalism and aid to in surgent* 
v . ^ 
The British and Frsnch statiKtien and dii>lMMites 
contended that Nasser could not be trusted and expected to 
operate the Canal in accordance of the Convention of 1888 
tezms* Ihey could not place reliance in the promise of a 
man who had only a few month ago announced not to curtai l the 
Concession of the C<Hnpany* Ihey argued that iigypt« who had 
already defied the security Council and world opinion by 
continuing her blockade against -^srael* Iherefore* £9ypt 
could refuse our ships passage or i f allowed th«R to ccmtinue 
to use the canal, i t coiild be en her terms* Ihey also 
referred to the danger of "extortionate tolls** being charged 
and the Canal deteriorating because of mal-admlnistratian* 
46* Jbhnson« Paul* op* cit*# Pi* ll-14y schonfield, l|*ff« 
op*# cit*« P* 150y Bowie, ^ b e r t R*, op* cit*,P* 26* 
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But a l l thesa dangazs vte spaculatlva and noza diataat 
and could not ba pat forwaxd as a just i f icat ion for thair 
act ions . &inca nationalisation^ Kasaer assartad that tha 
Convantion of 1888 would raoain in e f fect and was binding 
upcm Egypt which would oonfom to i t s texns* Egypt would in 
no way interfere with tha navigation through tha Canal 
after the taka«ovar axeapt in case of Israel* and indeed would 
put thxough the Canal volume of traf f ic as greater as in 
past* On Jtily 28« 1956« Nasser himself pledged that Sgypt 
would not hasqper the traf f ic and he assured that t o l l s 
Would not be raised. On «3Uly 31, 1956# an Official i^rass 
hand out« attributed to Nasser* declared that nation<3lisation 
would in no way affect Egypt determination to meet i t 
49 internationel obl igat ion, Further ^'•asser statiKl Egyptian 
pol icy regarding the freedom of navigation in a l e t t e r to 
Hengies on ^ g u s t 12 and September 9* 1956, He expressed 
a desire to sponsor a Conter«mce of a l l users and ^ignatorias 
of the C 9 p v ^ ^ j ^ 9 | i^§g to review and reaffirm the 
Conv«ition of 1888 and to consider further agreenwrot to 
guaranteeing freedom of navigation through the Canal, 
Nasser also asserted that future of the canal dependad on 
the co-operation between the Users and Egypt of whicdi 
the canal i s an integral p a r t , ^ Not only this* at the 
49, Ibid,* P, 15, Sueg Canaj^MationalisaticMi & After(JUly 
19 to September td« 1956) Lok Sabha oec retariata* 
New Delhi* 1956* P, 4, 
SO* Ibid,* PP, 15 and 17| Mowat* :-:,C, op, c i t , * P« 206* 
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Unitwd Nati<H)s« Sgypt accepted the Six principles 
proposed Ysjf selwyn Lloyed and Sj^roved by the Security 
Council* Eyypt was also egreed for negotiation* Hence* 
Dr« FflSfSi proposed a more leberal Egyptian policy for 
negotiation during the private talks witdi Sei%ryn ZJoyed cm 
October n 7 1956,^^ 
Theretore« one can conclude* that Egypt never denied 
* 
international o}digations to observe under the Constantinople 
Convention* Bgypt had already observed duudng the period 
i t operated the couaal fiosi July to Kovoaaber* 1956* ia»til 
the C«nal was blocked upcm I srae l i invasion* I t adroinisteriMi 
the Canal e f f i c i e n t l y without raising t o l l s and without 
diacrimination esopept Israel* Thou<^out the period a l l the 
ships o£ a l l nations (except Israel}* includdlng o£ Britain 
and FraoKze* continued to pass without hinderance betwesn 
E=ort i^aid and sues* Egypt had not cosndtted any act that 
could jus t i fy use of force legal ly* Itedoubtedly* Egypt 
nationalised t^e Coaqpany but had not done any injvury to tiie 
British and French l i v e s &ad properties* I t did not stop 
the British and French shipping through the canal diMpite 
the refusal of ownejrs to pay dues to Egyptian Canal 
authority* Die p i lo t s had already been withdrawn* Kasser*s 
5i* Hutting* ^thony, op. c it** pp* 73-77* 
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d«clarati<MQ concexnlng th« c a n a l ' s /administration and 
52 i>iavlgation o f '^^pril 24, 1957 was implemented. Hence 
the i i r i t i sh and French assumption t^at Egypt could not 
be trusted t o observe o b l i g a t i o n of the Convention o f 
1888 proved wrong. In any case* in ternat iona l law does not 
Cfustify '^glo- franch m i l i t a r y ac t ions in Egypt. I t 
was a case of an aggress ion . 
52« se« Apprcndixi^.AiiK> sem Memorandum From the Egyptian 
Government, Dated March Idth, 1957, The jsues Canal 
o p , c i t „ P« 100* 
CHAPTER - . ^ 
CONCLUSION 
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C O B C L U S I O M 
Th« Saes Canal i s a most Inportant^an o ldes t intdxw 
contlnantal Canal, I t l i e s Wholly in the territory of Egypt 
and connects tif<o high seas dirsct ly* '^  ccmcessioo for 
constructicKi of the Canal was gra]i^t«d lay Moh<»niad 3aid Ps«^a 
in 1854* Ihe Concession of 1^4 was rsplaced by the ConcessioQ 
of 18S6« The new Concession was approved by the Tuidcish 
Sultan in 1066* Ttf construction «^xk of the C&xHtX Wis 
started in 1859 and completed in 1869, Ihe bues C^al was 
o f f i c i a l l y epaned for navigation on liovesiber 17^ 1869 in 
the pxresence of many crowned heads of the world* 
Znxaediataly^ the CUQZ canal became rooze practicable 
bi /ger and busier waterway for internati<:»al coRCMrce and 
trade* Traffic through ths Canal increased enormously* Ihe 
Sues canal ia economically^ s t ra t ig i ca l l y and mi l i tar i ly 
s ignif icant for the snt irs world* I t saves time and money 
by shortening the distances betwesn £a;it and •^ost* I t saves 
fudl* vmen th i s canal was closed from JVne 1967 to 1975 by 
i^ gypt# the world traders l o s t mil l ions of dollars* 
fhe ^uez Canal was free and open to the merchant 
ships of a l l nations without any discrimination* Ihe 
Concession of 1654. 1856 and the Firman of 1866 did not set 
up complex system of navigation in a l l times to a l l kinds 
of £ihip8* Of course^ international regime was established 
145) 
by Ar t i c l e 14 o£ tha Ckxacnasion of 1856* The in t e r e s t ed 
pe>v>fer8 f e l t the noces&lty of an agze^uent to safegu&rd the 
Canal from h o s t i l i t i e s * cUiiQages and interxuption of 
navigation by be l l i ge r en t s t a t e s in wartizne* 1!he ei£orts« 
therofoxe* were laade and on October 29« 1883 the Conv<a»tion 
o£ Constantinople was signed by nine major powers, Ihe 
Convention es tab l i shed &. coaaplete system of navigaticaa* I t 
provided th&t the wues Can ad should be free mxa open to 
every ship of cocraGaerce find war in ticcte of peace and war 
without d i s t i n c t i o n of £l<sg« Ihe C«t)al should n e i t h e r be 
blockaded, nor Ciny ac t of h o s t i l i t y o r war intcsoded to 
ob$t£UCt the n&vigatJxm in the canal should be comeitted 
in i t within three sea n i l e s l i iadts* ^ e Conv&ition plijced 
roiipDn&ibiXity for the defence of the ^«in^ upon Egypt 
end ^^ u^dcey without &ay i n te r rup t ion o r in te r ference in the 
f ree use of the C««ial« 
The Conv«Qtion of 1888 did not cotas in to i^rce ba fon 
the /4iglo«.grench Declaration of 1904, France refused to 
r&tify the convention because tiritain, who had occupied Egypt 
s ince 1682, reserved her r igh t to use the Canal for safeguardin 
he r posi t ion in Egypt, 
Since 1882 to 1954, Bri ta in assumed de-facto respono 
s l b i l i t y for the defence of the ^uex canal and i t s aaTigatioci, 
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Xn 1914r Egypt becasm « *t>rot«ctorat«* of Britain and in 
1923 by f i« Treaty of Lauannaa Turkey transferred a l l i t « 
rights and t i t l e over the ouess Canal to Britain conferred 
in the ConvKition of Constwitinople of 1888» Zn 1922» 
however* Britain granted Egypt independence but reserved 
so le responsibi l i ty for the defence and security of the C^al 
Further* under the ^alo^EavpUan ^Kirewnent of 1936. the 
Suez Canal was recognised as an integral part of Egyptian 
terri tory but i^rticle VIIZ gave Britain the responsibil ity 
of ttie -^ ues Canal's detence* In fact* Britain merely recognised 
an exist ing state of a i fa irs as her position remain unaffected* 
Egypt becaaie sole Hi sovereign of the Suez Canal only after 
the evacuation of a l l British troops from the Suez Canal 
zones in 19S4* Both parties expressed determination to uphold 
the Convoition of Constantinople of 1888* 
During the tMO ^^rld »''iar8* the Suez Canal became a 
point of struggle* I t was closed for enemy shipping but was 
opened both for neutrals and a l l i e s states* Britain* as 
de.faats sovereign^ was x90Lm responsible for the defence of 
the Canal .However* during i^orld f*&r Z* navigation through 
the canal was interzupted by submarine a c t i v i t i e s of Germany* 
But Britain freely uscKi the canal for her purpose* During 
the World war ZZ* en«ay aviation and submarine a c t i v i t i e s 
made navigation in the Canal hazardous for a l l i e d states* 
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The Conventlcai of Constantinople of 1888 v«a violated* 
3inc« Falestinlan vJar (1943-1949) to the ^ Juez 
Crises (1956), the Suea Canal was blockaded to Israeli 
shipping by 2gypt on the -.round of existence of war foet%*c«n 
two states* Israel protested against the blockade and 
ccxnplained to the Security Council* Britain, France, the 
United states and other nvarltime users* too, protested 
against the Egyptian blockade as their interests were affected* 
The -ecurity Council adopted a resolution which condemned 
Egypt's blockade* Eventhen, the blockade was not withdrawn 
till Tri-^egression (1956)* 
oa July 26, 1956, l^ asser declared the nationalisation 
of tne 3u02 Canal Company upon tae i«iyn»nt of adequate 
com:ensa ion for unexpired period* Tie act of nationalisation 
was a result of certain chronological events* In 1955, Egypt 
after Israeli arrrjed raids into G-aza strip, approached the 
United States for arms but got nothing* Consequently, 
£cypt approached Czechoslovakia to jmrchase substantial 
it 
Ofuan^ ies of arm^s which materialised* The agreement 
dra- itically changed the situatic^i* The United States and 
Britain %*ere alartned* Tne agreement meant for them Russia 
presence in Egypt-Csschslovakia-being an ally of the 
Soviet Russia* The United States had already been giving 
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aid to Israel and other Arab states as a device to 
keep the Soviet Russia ont of that region and to maintain 
influence in thoae states* But by Ca«ch-ogy-t arms deal, 
Russia gained a firm foothold in the Middle --ast« Then, 
the United states with aritain and ./orld Bank i ropoaed 
to finance the construction f the Aswan Dam. The proposal 
intended to disueade Egypt moving closer towards the 
Soveit Russia. Egypt was holding negotiation with the 
Soviet Russia and contin e to attack the Baghdad pact 
and anti-uestem co?"paign« T'lis inc^  nsed the -nited 
States and Britain, Therefore, the United -states cancelled 
the -swan ijam proposal by citing that -f yptian econorry 
v;as too unstable to face burden. Britain and v.orld 
Bank proe^tly withdrew their offers. 
The eoncellati n of the ?^ swan Dam proposal annoyed 
Hasser, He, then, nationalised t^ ie Suez Canal Company 
to build the Aswan Dam fxrom its income. The nationalisation 
of the Ccsnpany was a stroke on policy and interests of 
Britain, France and the United states. The Three Powers 
challenged the legality of the naticxilisatian and contended 
that nationalisaticm of the Company has avowedly made to 
serve national pctspose rather than international purpose 
of the Canal, Fxrom strict legal point of view, the Sues Canftl 
Coni>any was an Egyptian Company operated in its territory 
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and governed by the laws and custoniea of that country 
(/article 16 of the Firman of 1366) .^  Consequently, nationali-
sation of the Suez Canal Ccinpany, under international 
law was justified and legal like any other act of 
nationalisation any where in the A'orld (for example 
nationalisation of '^nglo-Ieaninan oil ccxnpany) • Further, 
there was no evidence to justifV that the Company gave 
up its international character* The nationalisation 
accelerated the expiration of the Concession by twelve 
years but then Nasser promised to pay adequate compensaticm 
\n^ ich was paid in 1958* l^ asser's act was also undoubtedly 
politically motivated. Nasser nationalised the Canal 
Company in retaliation for western refusal to finance the 
Dam* It was to d&fy western influence and interest, and 
to demonstrate inde|:«ndence and sovereignty of £gypt* 
nationalisation brought a major international crisis* 
The Three Powers applied eccmcmic sanction against Egypt* 
The British and French govemments pla3Ded to use force 
irr3T\ediately to seijse the Canal and allowed their forces 
to move to eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus* aut their 
plan was abondoned because the United States d:|.d not 
support the use of force and pursuaded both Britain and 
France for peaceful negotiation* i^ owever, negotiation 
took place but Britain and France were not in favour of 
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negotiation «ven v^en %sMKr agreed to negotiate and accepted 
the six-principles proposed by Britain. Kain objective %ias 
to Xeep en the fiction of negotiatic^ before resort to 
force because Britain and France needed time to make 
their armed forces ready and to gain United States support 
to get oil supply in case of the Canal blockage or cutting • 
of pipeline and to stand off the Soviet Russia threat* 
The use of force was consistent with their policy through 
out the crisis and decision to do so was taken anx:mg 
Britain* France and Israel in strict privacy. On October 
29« 1956« Israeli forces invaded Egyptian territory % ^ i ^ 
was later Joined by Anglo-French military forces* The 
trio-a gressicn was strongly condermed by the United 
States* the Soviet Russia and most of the Arab-vXsian 
nations. The acjgression outra^d the feeling of Arab 
St tes. Both the United States and the Soviet Russia 
api;ealed the United States security Council to consider 
steps for 1B± immsdiate CsaSSsg^ icm of hostilities and 
withdrawl of all foreign powers fron Egyptian territory. 
The Security Council failed to take concerste actic»n 
because pf the negative vote cast by Britain and France. 
Then* the General Assembly* first time under its Special 
F^ mergency 3ession* was able to stop war and compelled all 
151) 
for:?ign foxxrea from Egyptian territory to withdraw and 
established UN i-mer^ncy Forces in the Suez Canal sones 
on the consent of Jigypt. This was don© under the Uniting 
for ^eace Resolution^ 
l-egally, ^^nglo-French-Israeli military acticxi was 
in violation of intomational law and the UIJ Charter 
(Article 2« *ara, 3 and 4)• Their action was in no way 
in pursuance of U2^  decision^ n r on the recornmendation 
of the Security Council. Thouc^ they put forward several 
jus t i f i cat ions trying to be f i t t e d into context of 
international law and right of self-defence* Israe l i claimed 
the right of self-defence against the repeated fedayeen raids* 
continued blockade of the Suez Canal and Gulf of /v^aba to 
i t s shipping and to the continued threat implied by 
'^-gyp^lsn's ass rtation of existence of war with object 
of eliminating I srae l . But a l l th i s do not provide excuse 
to resort to force in self -defence. Under international 
law, a state can use force in case of an arrned attacX only 
(Article 51 of the UN Charter)• The use of forc» by Israel 
fcr the grievances or for future danger was i l l e g a l . 
s imi lar i ly , Britain and France claimed right of 
"collective self-defence" under /\irticle 51 of the Charter 
152} 
in order to protecti the ir v i t a l interest* They argu«d 
that in order to stop h o s t i l i t i e s , to )raep open the 
Canal for traff ic* and to establ ish a regime for the Canal 
assuring for future freedom of t r a f f i c , they are sendiny 
the ir forces . But the ir claim to act as a "volunteer 
policeiT«n* could not be jus t i f i ed by international law 
and the UN Charter. The 5^eRtoer s tates cc>uld not taT«e 
military action without authorisation of the Security 
Council. Therefore, the action of a l l the three s ta tes 
violated the t err i tor ia l integrity and po l i t i ca l independence 
of Egypt. Consequently, the action of a l l the three 
s tates was against international law. The Tri-aggression 
was a lso p o l i t i c a l l y motivated. For them, Nasser became 
a symbol and apparent scuxxre of d i f f i c u l t i e s . Britain and 
France were troubled primarily by tiie erosion of their 
h i s tor ic position in the Middle East owing to the ser ies 
of action and po l i c i e s taken by Nasser. The nationalisaticm 
of the Suez Canal Company further reinforced distrusts and 
h o s t i l i t y and challenged t i e i r h i s tor ic role and in teres t s . 
Hasser success was considairad by them a threat to 
undermine '*nglo-^'ranch interests and encourage other 
Arab s t a t e s . If attack had succeeded, Britain would 
"nave again occupied the 3uez Canal aone, French would be 
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b e n e f i t e d by th© overthrow of l i a s se r and the reby end 
Egypt ian sup o r t f o r tl-je . - . iger ians ; and I s r a e l would 
annex t J© S i n a i l ^ n i n s u l a t o t h e i r s t a t e and open 3uesB 
"anal f o r sliii^piny. 3ut t hey f a i l e d in t i i e i r rootives. 
B r i t a i n and France l o s t t h e i r p o s i t i o n , honour and 
p r e s t i g e , ':>ritish economy j e o p a r d i s e d and t h e Juez 
Canal was blocked by -gypt* Tlie Juez Canal and i t s 
Ccanpany s t ayed in t h e u n f e t t e r e d c o n t r o l of '^gypt. 
Through:rat t he -^ea C r i s i s , t h e Sov ie t Russia 
s u r p o r t e d Cgypt a a i n s t western powers . The ntain o b j e c t i v e 
of t h e Sov ie t S-ussia %«as t o use t h e c r i s i s t o enhance 
i t 3 r<?»ltion and in f luence in t h e l i iddle Eas t and t o 
d iver t ; t h e a t t e n t i o n of the world n a t i o n s frorr, i t s own 
l l l e c a l i n t e r v e n t i o n i n Hungary, 
The Uni ted S t a t e s took an a c t i v e r c l e in t h e .->uez 
c r i s i s a g a i n s t he r a l l i e s - j r i t a i n ^ ; and t r a n c e . I t s 
p o l i c y in the c r i s i s was largcsly donina ted by e f f o r t s 
t o r c s c l v e t h e d i s p u t e p e a c e f u l l y , t o p revent t o r e s o r t 
t o f o r c e , t o observe UN C h a r t e r p r i n c i p l e s and o b l i g a t i o n s . 
I t s cups o r t f o r I'N p r i n c i p l e s was r e i n f o r c e d by many 
i T a c t i c a l and p ' ^ l i t i c a l f a c t o r s . The b a s i c i n t e r e s t s of 
t'»0 I'nit-^d 5tat<^s in the reg ion w s t o p rese rve s t a b i l i t y 
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and minimize Soviet penetrat ion ao fnr ag o s s l b l o . 
The United s t a t e s was a l so deterxad from adopting and 
supporting the Anglo-French act ion because of i t a i n t e r e s t s 
in the Panama Canal* -since tne United i^tates vfas not 
prepared to accept in t e rna t iona l operation of the Panama 
Canal which I s s t a t e g i c a l l y very irnpozrtant for her» 
Therefore, the ^uoz canal was not so c ruc ia l for i t s 
economy but was important in th3 context of i t s global 
s t r a t egy and in i t s s t ruggle t o contain the conmmnist 
Russia, Further , support t o i t s a l l i e s woiild havo made 
condemnaticv.a of the Soviet intevention in Hungary d i f f i -
c u l t . Consequently, the '-nitf;c1 J t e t e s pressur ised Bri tain 
to evacuate from the Suez Canal Zones, I t intsndad to f i l l 
the'*vacuum," I t vjas the r e s u l t of tho United ctr . tes 
a t t i t u d e during the c r i s i s tl^^t -gypt ncved c lo se r t o 
the United Sta tes s ince 1973, insp i t e cf many s t r a i n s 
(1967 and 1973 Arab- I s rae l i * ars j end nade u l t imate ly 
Camp David Agreetient poss ib le , 
3ince the na t iona l i s a t i on of the 3uez Canal Company, 
navigation of thci Canal i s c.cvemod and regulated by the 
i:c,yptian Daclaration cf 1957, corjfirndng the *-onvention 
of Conatantinopla of 1888, ^lago hav*2 no meaning/ ships of 
a l l nation wolco:T>e t o navigate tinrc-'ugh the Cuas Canal, 
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APFZt:DIX - A 
TEXT OP FIRMAN OP CCa^ CSSSION 
Granted by the Khedive Mohammed Pasha al-Sald to 
Ferdinand de Lesseps 
Ouir friend Mona. Ferdinand de Lesseps, having 
called our attention to the advantages which would result 
to Egypt from the Junction of the Mediterranean and Ked 
Seas, by a navigable passage for large vessels, and having 
given us to understand the possibility of forming a company 
for this purpose composed of capitalists of all nations; 
we have accepted the arrangernents which he has submitted 
to us, and by these presents grant him exclusive power for 
the establishment and direction of a Universal Company, 
for cutting through the Isthmus of Suez, and the construc-
tion of a canal between the two Seas, with authority to 
to undertake or cause to be iindertaken all the necessai^ f 
works and erections, on condition that the Company shall 
previously indemnify all private persons in case of dis-
possession for the public benefit. And all within limits, 
upon the conditions and under the responsibilities, settled 
in the following Articles, 
ARTICLE I t 
Mona, Ferdinand de Lesseps shall form a company, the 
direction of which we confide to him, under the name of 
the UlIIVLRSAL SUEZ f'ARITIlX CAi: L Cu III ANY, for cutting 
through the Ishmus of Sues, the construction of a passage 
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s u i t a b l e for «xtenBlv« navigation* thB foundatioo of 
appropriation of two s u f f i c i e n t entrancoa, one frcwj t.'i« 
Mediterranean and tbe other frcxR the Red Sea« and th& 
establisht?ffint of one or two porta* 
ARTICLE I I t 
The Director of the Company shall be always appointed 
by the Sgyptian Government, and selected, as far as practi-
cable, from the shareholders most interested in the undsr-
taking* 
ARTICLE I I I I 
the term of the grant i s ninety«4)ine y e a r s , conmianeing 
frcMn the day of the opening of the Canal of the two Seas* 
AllTICLE IV t 
Tn9 works snail be executed at the sole cost of the 
Ccwpany, and all the necessary land not belonging to private 
persons shall be granted to it free of cost* The fortifica-
tions which the Government shall think proper to establish 
shall not be at the cost of the Company* 
ARTICLE V I 
The ;:gyptian Govcmncnt s h a l l recoive from the 
Company annually f i f t e e n per cent of the net p r o f i t s shown 
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by the balance sheet* Without prejudice t o the i n t e r e s t and 
dividends accruing from the share which the Goveimnient 
reserves the r i g h t of taking upon i t s own account a t 
t h e i r issue* and without any guarantee on i t s p a r t e i t h e r 
for the execution of the works or for the operat ions of 
the Ccxnpanyi the remainder of the net p ro f i t s s h a l l be 
divided as followaj Seventy-five per cent t o the benef i t 
of the CCTnpanyi ten per cent t o the benef i t of the members 
instrumental in i t s foundation. 
ARTICLE VI t 
The tariffs of dues for the passage of the Canal 
of Suez, to be agreed upcm between the Company and the 
Viceroy of Egypt, and collected by the Cc»npany*s agents, 
shall be always equal for all nations; no particular 
advantage can ever be stipulated for the exclusive benefit 
of any one country, 
ARTICLE VII t 
In case the Ccwnpany should consider it necessary to 
connect the Nile by a navigable cut with the direct passage 
of the Isthmus, and in case the Maritime Canal should follow 
an indirect course, the Egyptian Government will give up 
to the CompeaiY ^® uncultivated lands belonging to the 
public dcsnain, which shall be irrigated and cultivated at 
the expense of the Company, or by its instrumentality. 
The Company shall enjoy the said lands for ten 
years free of taxes, corranencing from the day of the opening 
of the canal; during the remaining eighty-nine years of 
the grant, the Company shall pay tithes to the Egyptian 
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Goveminent, after vfhlch period it cannot continue in 
possession o£ the lands above mentioned without paying 
to the said Govoxmraent an imr>ost ©qual to that appointed 
for lands of the sanie description* 
/ARTICLE VIII t 
To avoid all difficulty on the subject of the land* 
which are to be given upto the Company, a plan drawn by 
l-U Linant Bey# our Engineer Corrroissioner attached to the 
Company* shall indicate the lands granted both for the line 
snd the establishments of the Maritime Canal and for the 
alJjnontary Canal from the Nile, as well as for the purpose 
of cultivation, conformably to the stipulations of Article 
VII. 
It is moreover understood, that all specrilaticn is 
forbidden frcm the present tijfie, upon the lahda to be 
granted from the public domain, and ^ at the lands previously 
belonging to private persons and which the proprietors cay 
hereafter wish to have irrigated by the waters of the 
alimentary Canal, made at the cost of the Corpany, shall 
pay a rent of«««« per feddan cultivated (or a rent amicably 
settled between the Goveminent and the Company) • 
ARTICLiu IX I 
llie Company i s further allowed to extract from the 
mines and quarries belonging to the public dcanain, any 
materials nadessazY for -tiie works of the canal and the 
erections connected thorewitJi, without paying dues; i t 
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alia 11 a l s o enjoy the r l ^ t of f ree entry for a l l rr«chin«s 
and roateriala whlc^ I t s h a l l Import from abroad f o r the 
purpoaea of carrying out t h i s grant* 
ARTICLE X t 
At the expirsjtion of the C ;nce«sion the Sgyptlan 
Government w i l l take the place of the cc^pany# and enjoy 
a l l i t s r lghta without r e s e r v a t i o n , t h e sa id Govemnsant w i l l 
e n t e r i n t o f u l l possess ion of the Canal of thm two Seas« and 
of a l l the establ ishments connected therewith* The indemnity 
t o be allowed the Cc^npany f o r the relincpjiishiTient of i t s 
p lant and moveables* s h a l l be arranged by araicable agreenwnt 
or by arb i t ra t ion* 
ARTICU: XI I 
1!^ .e s t a t u t e s of the Soc ie ty s h a l l be moreover 
sxjtwitted t o us by the Director of the Company* and tnust 
have the sanct ion of our approbatic^* Any mcdificatic«js 
t h a t may be h e r e a f t e r introduced nust previous ly rece ive 
our sanction* The sa id s t a t u t e s s h a l l s e t £orth the nai»s 
of the founders* tho l i s t of whom we reserve t o oursel^ms 
t .e r i g h t of approving* Thim l i s t s h a l l include those 
persons ^ o labours* s t u d i e s , e x e r t i o n s or c a p i t a l havt 
previous ly contr ibuted t o the execut ion of the grand 
undertaking of the Canal of Sues* 
ARTZCLi:.: XII t 
Finally* vm promise our true and hearty co-operation* 
and that of all the functionaries of -gyiit in facilitating 
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the executlcjn and sc carrying out of the present powers. 
To tny at tached f r iend 
PSRDINAKD DE LSSSEPS 
Of h i ^ birth and elevated rank 
Cairo, 30th November, 1954* 
The grant made to the Company having to be ratified 
by his Iinperial Majesty the Sultan, I send you this copy 
that you may keep it in your possession* With regard to the 
works connected with the excavation of the Canal of Suez, 
they are not to be commenced until after they are authorised 
by the Sviblime Porte. 
3 Rairadan, 1271 
(The Viceroy's Seal) 
A true translation of the Turkish text 
KOENIG 3EY, 
Secretary of Mandates to 
His Highness the Viceroy, 
Alexandria, May 19th, 1855, 
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APPENDIX - B 
CHARTER OP CONCESSIOK AND BOOK OP CHARGES 
for the Construction and '.'orking of 
THE SUEZ GRA^ 'D MARITE-S CA13AL mD DEP213DENCIES 
WO Mohamjmed«-Said Pasha* Viceroy of Egypt« consldaring 
our charter bearing date the 30th Koven4>er# 1954* by n^icAt 
we have granted t o our f r i end M« Ferdinand de Lessepe 
e x c l u s i v e power t o c o n s t i t u t e and d i r e c t a Universal Company 
f o r c u t t i n g the Isthmus of Sues# opening a passage s u i t a b l e 
for large v e s s e l s * forming or adapting two s u f f i c i e n t entrancms* 
one c«) thm Mediterranena* the other on th» Red Sea* and 
e s t a b l i s h i n g one or two ports* as the case may bet 
H« Ferdinand de Lessep8# having represented t o us 
t h a t In order t o c o n s t i t u t e a corpany as tLhove described 
uncter the forms end condi t ions genera l ly adopted for coiqpanies 
of that naturs* i t i s expedient to st ipulate beforehand 
by a fu l l er and mors speci f ic document* the burthens* 
oblig«tlcns« and services to which that company wi l l be 
subjected on the one part* and the concessions* limminlties* 
and advanta.es to which i t w i l l be entit led* as a l so the 
f a c i l i t i e s %mich wi l l be accorded to i t for i t s adninistra-
tic^i* an the other partt 
Have decreed tis follows the conditions of the 
ccsicessl<:»3 whic^ i s the subject matter of these presents* 
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I CH/\RGES 
ARTICLE I t 
Thm Co(^ p«ny founded by our friend K. Ferdinand <!• 
Leasop* la virtue of our charter of th« 30th Nov«n4>©r,ie54# 
shal l exAcut* a t i t s own coat, riek, and dawa<3e a l l tJi« 
necQssary workii and con»tnjctlon« for the e8tabllshen.ent of» 
1st A canal navigable by larc^i vassals between Suez 
on ti\e lied sea* and th» Oulf of Pelusium on tlie 
Red Sea« and the Gulf of i^eluslum on the Hediterraneeni 
2nd A canal of icrgatlon adapted to the river t ra f f i c <rf 
the Ni le , jolnija$ that r iver to the abova-roentioned 
^%^iti^)e Canal; 
3rd Two branches for irrigation and supply* striking out 
of the preceding canal, and in the direction 
respectively of 3uez and ^elusium* 
The wrrks shall be couJpleted within the period of 
six years, unavoidable hindrances and delays excepted* 
ARTICLE II I 
The Company shall have the rig^t to execute the MOtkm 
they have undertaken, then^ selves and under their c»m 
management, or to cause tl^ em to be executed by contractors 
by saeans of public tender or private contrrct under penalties* 
In all oases, four-fifths of the wortanen eniployed Ui;Oii 
these works shall be Egyptians* 
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hRllCLE. Ill I 
The Canal navl^K^la by large vessels shall be 
constructed of the depth and wldt^ fixed by the mdbfMim 
of the International Scientific Commiesicn* 
Conformably with this scheme* it will commence at 
the port of Suesy it will pass through the basin of the 
Bitter LaHes and x^aloe Timsah* and will debouehe Into tiM 
^%diterraiMian at whatever point in the Gulf of E'elusimii 
may be determined in the final plans to be prepared by ttw 
engineers of the Coropany* 
ARTICLE IV 
The canal of IrriQation adapted to the river traffie« 
according to the terms of the said scheme# shall commence 
in the vicinity of the city of Cairo* follow the wadi 
Tumilat (ancient land of GcMihen)» and will fall into the 
Grand Maritiiae Canal at lake Timsah* 
ARTICLE V t 
The branches froiB the above Canal shall stri>» out 
from it above the debouchure into Lake Timash* from whidi 
point they shall proceed* on one side to Sues* and on the 
other to Paluslum* parallel to the Grand Haritima Canal* 
ARTICLE VI I 
Lake Timsah s ha l l be converted in to an inland harbour 
capable of receiving imasels of the h ighes t tonnage* 
The Cc4i^ny shal l moreover be bound* if iMcessaryt 
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1st To constxruct a harbcnir of re£uge at the entranos of 
the FAritln« Can&I into the Gulf of ^ elusiumf 
2nd To Improve the port and roadstead of Sues so that 
it shall equally afford a shelter to vessels* 
ARTICLE VII I 
The Maritime Canal« the ports connected thexwwith 
as also turn Junction Canal of the Nile and the branch 
canalst shall be permanently maintained in good condition 
by the Company and at tlieir expense* 
ARTICLE VIII I 
The owners of ccmtiguous lands desirous of irrigating 
their property by means of water courses frcan the Company's 
canals shall (^ tain perrdssion so to do in consideration 
of the paynient of an indemnity or rent« the amount whereoE 
shall be fixed according to Article 17 hereinafter recited* 
ARTICLE DC t 
•'^m reserve the right of appointing a t the o f f i c i a l 
headquarters of the Cc»npany a special coienissioner* whose 
salary they shal l pay and '^o shal l represent a t the Board 
of Direction the rights and interests of tim i-gyptian 
Governrrjent in the execution of these presents* 
If the principal off ice of the Company be established 
elsewhere than in ^tgypt, the Company shal l bo represented a t 
1«S) 
Alexandria by a superior agent ftimlshed vrlth a l l aedaaaary 
powers £or seciirlng the proper raanagenient of t^e concern ai^ 
the relationa of the Cor^ pany with our Goveminent. 
I I . 
ARTICLE X t 
For the construction of the Canals awl their depen-
dencies tmntloned in the foregoing articles, tha Egyptian 
Government grants to tha Company free of impost or rant# 
the uaa and anjoyr*ent of all lands not the property of 
individuals which may be fcund necessary* 
It lilcewisa grants to the CoEopany the use and 
enjoyment of all uncultivated lands not the property of 
individuals which shall have bean irrigated and cultivated 
by their cara and at their expense* with these provisost 
1st Itiat lands cos^rised under the latter head shall 
be free of impost dxiring ten years c»ily, to date 
from their being put in a productive condition! 
2nd That aftstr that i>eriod tliey shall oa subject for 
the ramaindar of tho term of cone© as ion, to the 
same obligations and imposts to which aire subjected 
under like circumstances* the lands in other 
provinces of --gypti 
> 
3rd That the company shall afterwards* themselves or 
through their agents* continue in the use and anjoy« 
ment of these lands and the water-courses necessary 
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to their fertilisation* subject to payment to th« 
Egyptian Govemnient o£ the imposts assessed upon 
lands under like conditions* 
ARTICLE XI I 
For determining the area and boundaries of the 
lands concedsd to the Company under Article X, reference 
is made to the plans hereunto annexed* in which plans the 
lands conceded for the construction of the Canals and their 
dependencies free of impost or rent* conformably to clause 
1 is coloured black* and the land conceded for the purpose 
of cultivation* on paying cexrtain duties conformably with 
Clause 2 is coloured blue. 
All acts and deeds done subsequently to our charter 
of the 30th November* 1854* the effect of which would be to 
give to individuals as against the company either claims 
to compensation iirhich were not then vested in the ownership 
of the lands* or claims to compensation more considerable 
than th.;se %diich the owners could then Justly advance* 
shall be considered void* 
ARTICLE XII I 
1h« iigyptian Oovemroent will deliver to the Con^ pany 
should the ease arise* all lands the property of private 
individuals* whereof possession should be necessary for 
the esmcuticm of the works and the carrying into effect o£ 
the concession* subject to the payment of Just compensation 
to the parties concerned. 
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CoR^pensatlon f o r tempojrary occupation or dtt£Init ios 
appropriation i ^ a l l as far as poss ib ia be determined 
arricably* in case of disagreement the terms s h a l l be f i xed 
by a co<irt of a r b i t r a t i o n deciding suranarily and composed oft 
1 s t An a r b i t r a t o r chosen by the Conqpanyt 
2nd An a r b i t r a t o r chosen by t^e in tares ted part ies f 
3rd A th ird artoiraty^r appointed by u s . 
i:he d e c i s i o n s of the court of arb i t ra t ion s h a l l be 
executed without further process , and subject t o no appeal . 
ARTICCL XIII t 
The Egyptian Government grants t o the l e a s i n g CORipany* 
f o r the whole period of the concession* the p r i v i l e g e of 
drawing fran the minos and quarries belonging t o the public 
dCMBiain, without paying duty, impost, or co«npensation, a l l 
necessary mater ia l s for th© conatruct ion and maintenance of 
the works and bu i ld ings of the undertaking. I t moreover 
exempts the Company from a l l d u t i e s of customs, entrance dtses 
and other , on the importation i n t o Sgypt of a l l machinery and 
mater ia ls whatsoever ii^ich they s h a l l bring frorn fore ign 
countr ie s for eraplyment in the ccnstructicm of the worlcs 
or working the undertaking. 
ARTICLE XIV I 
We solemnly d^calre for our part and that of our 
succes sors , S'lbject t o the r a t i f i c a t i o n of His Imperial Majesty 
the Sultan, tha t the Grand Maritime Canal frcxn Sues to 
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PttlusiuiB and the porta appertaining thereto* shall always 
remain open as a neutral passage to e-smry merchant ship 
crossing from one sea to another* lAthout any distinction* 
exoluslon* or preference of persons or nationalities* on 
payment (tf t^ ie dues and observance of the regulations 
established by the Universal Co^>any lessee for the use of 
the said carml and its dependencies* 
ARTICLE XV I 
In pursuance of the principle laid down in tlie foze-
going Article* the Universal Ccxnpany can in no case grant 
to any vessel* company* or individual* any advantage or 
favour not accorded to all other vessels* cotupanies* or 
individuals on the same conditions* 
ARTICLE XVI I 
The term of tl^te Cc^ apany's existence is fixed at 99 
years reclwnlng froia the con^letion of the wor>cs and the 
opening of the Haritine canal to large vessels* 
At the expiratlcm of the said term* the Egyptian 
Oovemment shall enter into j^ o^ssession of the Maritime 
Canal constructed by the Company* upon condition* in that 
event* of talcing all the working stock and appliances and 
stores ei^loyed and provided for the naval department of 
the enterprise* and paying tb the Company such amount for 
the same as shall be determined either amicably or by the 
decisin of u sworn appraisers* 
Nevertheless* if the Company should retain the eomsess-
ion for a succession of tenns of 99 years* the amount 
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stipulatetd to be paid to the :igyptian Governn»nt by 
Article XVIIIf hereinafter recited* shall be raised £or the 
second term to 20 per cent, for the third term to 25 
per cent, and so on augmenting at the rate of 5 per cent 
for each term, but so as never to exceed on the whole 
35 por cent of the not proceeds of the unckirtaking» 
ARTICLE XVII t 
To indemnify the Company for tiie expenses of 
construction, maintenance and working, charged upon them 
by these presents, we autliorise the Company henceforth, 
and during the whole term of their lease, as determined by 
Clauses 1 and 3 of the preceding Article, to levy and 
receive for passa^ je through and eontrance into the canals 
and ports thereunto apiiertaining, tools and charges for 
navigation, pilotage, towage or harbour dues, according 
to tari'ifs which they shall be at liberty to modify at all 
tirnes, upon the following express conditionsi 
Ist That t^ese dues be collected, witliout exception 
or favour, frcan all ships under like conditions! 
2nd T^ iat the tariffs bs published three months 
before they come ..into force, in the capitals 
and principal corf^ jercial ports of all nations 
whom It may concern; 
3rd That for the simple right of passage through 
tlis Canal the maximum toll shall be ten francs 
per meaaurernent ton on ships and per head on 
passengers, and that the same shall never be 
exceeded* 
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Th« Company may alao« for ^ranting the privilage of 
establishing water-oouraest upon the requaat of indiividuala 
by virtue of A£i:icle VIII# raceiva d\«sa# according to 
tariffs to ba hareaftar aattlad* proportionable to the quan-
tity of water diverted and the extent of the lands irrigatad* 
ARTICLE XVIII t 
Nevertheless in cons ldacat i :n of the concess ions of 
land and other advantages accorded t o the Company by the 
preceding Art i c l e s^ wa reserve on behalf of the Egyptian 
Government a c la im of 15 per cent cm the net p r o f i t s of 
each year# accord t o the dividend s e t t l e d and declared by 
the General Meeting of Shareholders* 
ABTIGLE XIX t 
The l i s t Of Foundation Members who have contr ib .ted 
by t h e i r e x e r t i o n s , profess ional lab^Mrs* and c a p i t £ l t o the 
r e a l i s a t i o n of the undertaking before the e s tab l i shenent of 
the Corox>any, s h a l l be s e t t l e d by u s . 
After t:^e sa id payn»nt t o the Egyptian Govermnent, 
according t o A r t i c l e XVIII above r e c i t e d , there s h a l l be 
divldhad out of the net annual p r o f i t s of the undertaking 
one share of 10 per cent among the Foundation ^«mbera or 
t h e i r h e i r s or ass igns* 
ARTICLE XX I 
Independently of the tln:« necessary for the execution 
of the works, our friond emd authorlaad a ont, ?1* Ferdinand 
de Lesseps, shall preside over and direct the Cocnpany, as 
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original founder* during ten year* from the first day 
on Which the term of conceasion for 99 years shall begin 
to run# by the terms of Article XVI above contained. 
ARTICLE XXI t 
The Articles of Association hereunto annexed of the 
Ccmipany established under the title of THE SUE2 MARITIME CANAL 
UNIV?:RSAL COHFAirr, are hereby approved* and the present 
approval shall have force as an authority for ita consti-
tution in the form of soci«3tes Anonymes to date frcmi the 
day when the entire capital of the Company shall be completely 
subscribed* 
ARTICLE XXII I 
In witness of the i n t e r e s t which we f e e l in the success 
of the undertaking* we promise t o the company the l o y a l 
co->operation of the Egyptian Government* and we expressly* 
by these presents* c a l l upon the funct ionar ies and agents 
of a l l our administrat ive departments t o give a id and prote-
c t i o n a t a l l t imes t o the Company. 
Our engineers* Linant-Bey and Mougel-Bey* whose 
s e r v i c e s we place a t the d isposal of the Company f o r the 
d i r e c t i o n and conduct of the works ordered by the sa id 
Company* s h a l l have the superintendence of the workmen* 
and s h a l l be charged with the enforcing of regulat ions 
respect ing the execut ion of the works* 
ARTICLE XXIIl t 
A l l provis ions of our charter of the 30th Noveirber* 
1854* and others which are i n c o n s i s t e n t with the c l a u s e s 
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and condition* of the present book of charges, which aloiM 
shall constitute the lav in respect cf the concession to 
v^ich it applies* are hereby revoked. 
Done at Alexandria* 5th January *1856« 
To my devoted friend of high birth and elevatsd rank, 
MONS. FERDEIAMD DE LIS3EP3 
T^e concesslcm accorded t o the Suez Canal Universal 
Company* requiring the r a t i f i c a t i o n of His Inqperial Majesty 
the Sultan* I remit you t i i s authent ic copy in order that 
you may c o n s t i t u t e t^e sa id Financia l Company, As regards 
the works for c u t t i n g the Isthmus* the Company may execute 
them as soon s s the author isat ion of the Sublime Porte has 
been accorded t o me* 
Alexandria* the 26 Rebi-al-akher* 1272(5th Jan«*1856} 
(l!he Viceroy's S e a l . ) 
Translated according to the original in the Turkish 
language* deposited in the Archives of the Cabinet. 
KOi;NIG 3.-:Y* 
Secretary of Mandates to 
His Highness the Viceroy, 
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APPENDIX » C 
TEXT OF COKVEHTION 
Between Great Bzlt ian« Germany^ '^uetri«u»Hungary# Sp/a in 
France , I t a l y * !rhe Ne the r l ands , Russ ia , -grid Turkey, 
r e s p e c t i n g t h e f r ee navigatlcKi o£ t h e Suez mari t ime Cana l . 
Signed a t C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . Octolier 29, 1B88* 
AxRTICLE I I 
The Suez Marit ime Canal s h a l l always be f r e e and open, 
i n t ime of war a s in t ime of peace , t o every v e s s e l of 
coimierce o r o f war, wi thou t d i s t i n c t i o n of f l a g , 
Consequa i t l y , t h e High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s agree n o t i n 
any way to i n t e r f e r e with the f r e e use of the Canal i n t ime 
of wcr as in t ime of p e a c e . 
The Canal s h a l l neve r t o be sub jec ted t o t h e e x e r c i s e 
of the r i g h t of b lockade . 
ARTICLE I I t 
The High Contrcict ing E^arties, r ecogn i s ing t h a t t he 
Fresh *"ater Canal i s indisp«Misable t o the Karit iroe Canal 
t ake n o t e of the engag<»nie»it9 of His Highness t h e khedive 
towords t h e Un ive r sa l Suez Canal Compsny as r ega rds t h e 
Zresh ^^ater Canalf which engagements a r e s t i p u l a t e d in a 
Conventicai bea r ing the d a t e of 18th March, 1963, con t a in ing 
an expose and four . a r t i c l e s . 
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Th«y undertAktt not to interfere in any way with ^ e 
security of that Canal and its branchea* the working of 
which shall not be exposed to any attempt at obstruction* 
ARTICLE XXX t 
The H i ^ Contr cting Parties likewise undertake to 
respect the plant* establiirtuoents* buildings* and %rarks of 
the HaritiiM Canal and of the Fresh water canal, 
ARTICLE IV • 
The Iteritime Canal remaining open in tirne of war 
as a free passage* even t o ships of %Rir of be l l ige ren t s* 
according t o the terras of Ar t i c l e I of the present Treaty* 
the H i ^ Contracting Pa r t i e s agree t h a t no r i ^ t of war* 
no a c t of h o s t i l i t y * nor any a c t having for i t s <A>Ject to 
obstr^jct tiie free navigaticai of the Canal* s h a l l be comml* 
t t e d in the Canal and i t s por ts of access* as well as within 
a radius of th ree marine miles from those ports* even 
though the Ottoman Empire should be one of the b e l l i g e r e n t 
Powers* 
Vessels of war of b e l l i g e r e n t s sha l l not rev io tua l 
o r take in s to r e s in the Canal and i t s por ts of access* 
except in so f a r as may s t r i c t l y necessary* Ihe t r a n s i t of 
tlie aforesaid vesse ls throu^^ the Canal sha l l be effected 
with the l e a s t possible delay* in accordance with the 
Regulations in force* and without any other intermissi^A 
than t h a t r e s u l t i n g from the n e c e s s i t i e s of the Mirvioe* 
Their s tay a t Port Said and in the roadstead of Sues 
s h a l l not exceed twenty<*four hovirs* esosept in case of d i s t r e s s* 
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In suc^ cas« they shall b« bound to laav* as soon as possible* 
An Interval of twenty-four hours shall always elapse betwMoi 
the sailing of a belligerent ship frcmi one of the ports c£ 
access and the departure of a ship belonging to the hostile 
i^ ower, 
ARTICLE V I 
In time of war bolligenrent Powers shal l not disentsack 
nor errbark within the Canal and i t s ports of access e i ther 
troops* Runitions* or materials of war* But in case of an 
accidental hindrance in the Canal# nien nay be enbarked or 
disennbarked at the ports of access by detachments not 
exceeding 1*000 men* with a corresponding amount of wir 
material* 
ARTICLE VI I 
Prizes shall be subjcKsted* in all respects* to the 
same rules as the vessels of war of belligerents* 
ARTICLE VII t 
The Powers shall not keep any vessel of war in the 
waters of the Canal (including Lake Tirosah and the Bitter 
Lakes)* 
Nevertheless* they may station vessels of %rar in th« 
ports of access of Port Said and Sues* the nunber of which 
shall not exceed two for each Power* 
This right shall not be eiuixrcised by belligerents* 
ARTICLE VIII I 
Ihe Agents in Egypt of the Signatory Powers of the 
present Treaty shall be charged to watch over its execution* 
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In case o£ any event threatening the security or the free 
passage of the Canal* they shal l nwet on the sumnons of three 
of the ir nun&>er under the presidency of their Doyen, in order 
to proceed to the necessary verif icat ions* They shal l inform 
the Khedival Govemn«nt of the danger which they may have 
perceived, in order that Govemnient may take proper steps 
to insure the protecticm and the free use of the Canal* 
Under any circunwstances, they shal l meet once a year to 
take note of the due execution of the Treaty* 
The la8tp*n«nticmed meetings shal l take place under 
the presidency of a Special Cofrsrnl sioner nominated for that 
purpose by the Imperial >^ttoiTwn Government* A Commissioner 
o£ the Khedive may a lso take part in the meeting, and may 
preside over i t in case of the absence of the Ottoman 
Conmiss ic3ier • 
They shall especial ly denand the suppressicm of 
any work or the dispersion of any assemblage on e i ther banX 
of the Canal, the object or e f fec t of %ihich miijht li be to 
interfere with the l iberty and the entixre security of the 
navigaticm* 
ARTICLE IX I 
The -gyptian Government shall, within the limits of 
its powers resulting from the Firmans, and under the con* 
ditions provided for in the present Treaty, take the necessary 
measures for insuring the execution of the said Treaty* 
In case the i::gyptian Govezmrnent shall not have 
sufficient means at its disposal, it shall call upon the 
Imperial ottoman Government, v^ich shall take the necessary 
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measures to respond to such appeali shal l give notice 
theretf to the Signatory Powers of the Declaraticm of 
London of the 17th ^sarch, 1885| and sha l l , i f necessary 
concert with them on the s\ibject« 
The pzovisicms of Artic les IV, V, VII, and VIII 
shal l not interfere with the measures \«hich shal l be taken 
In virttie of the present Airticle* 
ARTICXX X I 
Similarly, the provisions of Articles IV, V, VII, 
and VIII, shal l not interfere with the measures whidli His 
mjes t ry the Sultan and His Hi^ness the Khedive, in the 
name of His Imperial Majesty, and within t^ie l imi ts of the 
Firmans granted, m i ^ t find i t necessary to mice for securing 
by the ir own forces the defence of £gypt and the maintenance 
of public order* 
In case His Ijmperial ^teje^ty the sultan, or His 
Hi^ness the Khedive, i^ould find i t necessary to avail 
themselves of the exceptions for %/hich this Article provides, 
the Signatory Povrars of the Declaration of London shal l be 
not i f ied thereof by the i&nperial Ottoman Government* 
I t i s l ikewise understood that the pxxivisions of 
the four Artic les aforesaid shal l in no case occasion any 
obstacle to the measures which the Imperial Ottoman Government 
may think i t necessary to tal<e in order to insure by i t s 
own forces the defence of i t s other possessions situated on 
the eastern coast of the Red Sea* 
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ARTICLE XI t 
Tha measures whix:h aha 11 ba taken in the cases 
provided for by Articles IX and x of the present Treaty 
shall not interfere with the frea use of the Canal, In the 
sanie cases, tha erection of permanent fortifications contrary 
to tt»e provisions of Article VIII is prohibited. 
ARTICLE XII I 
Bie Higlh Contracting Parties , by application of the 
principle of equality as r<$gards the free use of the canal, 
a principle which fomw one of the bases of the present 
Treaty, agroa that norm of then shal l en<teavour to obtain 
with respect to the Canal t err i tor ia l or commsrcial advantagas 
or privi leges in any international arrangements Mhld^ may ba 
concluded* Fk^reover, the rights of Turkey as the terr i tor ia l 
^ower are reserved* 
;KTICLE XIII I 
With the exception of the obligations expressly 
provided by the clauses of the present Treaty, the sovereign 
rights of His Imperial fiajesty the Sultan and the ri?^ts 
and iimunitias of His Hig^iness the Khedive, resulting from 
the Finnans, are in no <May affected* 
ARTICLE XIV 
The H i ^ Contracting i'arties agrea that the cngagentents 
resulting from the present Treaty shall not be limited by 
the duration of the Acts of Concession of the '>^ niversal Suas 
Canal Conapany* 
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ARTICLE XV I 
The stipulations o£ tii« present Tmaty shall not 
Interfere with the sanitary measures in foxca in Hgypt* 
ARTICLE XVI t 
The Hi^ ph Contracting P a r t i e s undertalce t o br ing the 
present Treaty t o the Icnowled^ of the Sta tes lAiich have not 
signed i t# inv i t ing them t o accede t o i t * 
ARTICLE XVII t 
The present Treaty i^all be ratified* and the 
ratificaticms shall be exchanged at Consantinople* within 
the space of one month* or sooner* if possible. 
In faith of -lAiich the respective Plenipotentiaries 
have signed the present Treaty* and have affixed to it the 
seal of their arms* 
Dof^ at Constantinople^ 
the 29th day of the month of ^ stotoer* 
in the year 1888* 
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ANGLO EGYPTIAN AG I^EKENT OF AUGUST 26, 1936 
Txreaty of -'^llianc« betwewi t i la I -a jes ty , i n r e s p e c t 
of t h e United Kingdom, and His Majesty t h e King of 
Egypt. 
( . ici t if ic^it ions exchanged a t Cairo on i^ecember 22,1936) 
/•i«ricLS VII I 
In view of the t a c t t h a t t he ^uez Cana l , w h i l s t 
be .ng an i n t e g r a l p a r t of L'gypt, i s a u n i v e r s a l means of 
corrjnunlcation as a l s o an e s s e n t i a l ir^ans of coiimunication 
betvieen t h e d i l f e r e n t i>arts of t h e B r i t i s h Snxpire, His 
Kajes ty t h e King of Egypt, u n t i l such t ime a s t h e High 
Con t r ac t i ng P a r t i e s agree t h a t t he Egj-ptian ^rray i s in a 
p o s i t i o n t o ensure :jy i t s ovm r e s o u r c e s t h e l i b e r t y and 
e n t i r e s e c u r i t y of n a v i g a t i o n of t h e Cana l , a u t h o r i s e s His 
Majesty Ihe King and mpieror to s t a t i o n fo rce s i n r:gyptian 
t e r r i i t o t y i n t h e v i c i n i t y of t h e Cenal , i n t h e zone 
s p e c i f i e d in t h e *^nex t o t h i s ^v r t i c l s , w i th a view t o 
ensur ing in co -ope ra t io i . w i th tlie Egyptian fo rce s t h e 
d e i ^ i c e of t h e cana l* Ihe d e t a i l e d arrangements fo r t h e 
c a r r y i n g i n t o e f f e c t of tiriis ' v r t i c l e a r e c o n t a i n e d in 
t h e ^^nex h e r e t o * ihe pre^^ence of t h e s e f o r c e s i ^ a l l n o t 
c o n s t i t u t e in any manner an occupa t ion and w i l l in no 
way p r e j u d i c e t h e sovereign r i g h t s of i:gypt« 
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I t i s understood that at the «id of the period 
of twenty years specified in Article 16 the question 
Whether the presence of British forces i s no longer 
necessary owing to the fact that the Egyptian i^>rmy i« in a 
position to ensure by i t s own resources the l iberty 
and entire security of navigation of the Canal may* i t 
the High Contr«ucting Parties do not agree there^i* be 
submitted to the Council of the League of Nations for 
decision in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant 
in force at the tin» of signature of the present treaty 
or to such other person or body of persons for decision 
in accordance with such other procedure as the High 
Contracting Parties m may agree. 
(ArticlmB ^tnd /tnnexe to / ir t lc le SIII omitted) 
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^?mf^ •> i 
ANGLO-SGyPTLM? AGRI.EK:KT R£GARDIHG IH£ SUES CANAL 
BASS,OCTOBSR X9^  1954 
Agretimsiit !3etM8eii th« Gov«nunent of tite United Klngdon 
of Qxmat Britain and Korthttm Irvland and t^« Egyptian 
C!ov«mn»nt Regarding th« 3vmn canal Baaa 
Ilia Govexnraant of tha Unitad Kingdcm of Great 
Britain and £lorthem Ireland and tha Govemiaant of tha 
Rapublie of Egypt# 
oeairing to establ ish Anglos gyptian relatione on 
a new baaia of mutual vmderatanaing and firm friendidilp* 
Have agreed aa folloiw t 
AF^ TICLE 1 t 
Her Majesty's Forc»s tiiall be oompletaly withdrewei 
from Egyptian terr i tory in accot^ance with the Sc^edula 
s e t forth in F^rt A of Annex Z within a period of twenty 
months fron the data of signature of the present 
Agreement* 
ARTICLE 2 t 
The Govermaent of the United Kingdom declare that 
the Treaty of Alliance signed in London on the 26th of 
August* 1936# with the Agreed Minute« Exchanged £3otes« 
Convention concerning the insr.unitiss sr.d privi leges 
enjoyed by the British Forces in Lgypt and a l l other 
subsidiary agreenents« i s terminated* 
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ARTICLE 3 I 
Partao of th« pre«*nt SUAB Cmnml B S M * %Aiidh ar* 
llstftd in App«ndix A to Annax ZX, •halX hm kept in «ff iolAnt 
working ordsr and capabia of immdiata uaa in aecosdanoa 
with tha proviaiona of Articla 4 of tha pr^aant Agraamant* 
To thia mn& thay shall ba or^^niaad with tha proviaiona 
of Aneax ZX» 
ARTICLE 4 t 
In tha avent of an armed attack by an outaida ^owar 
on any country Which at tiia data of signatura c^ tha 
presant Agra«»Mnt ia a party to tha Traaty of Joint 
Dafai^a batwaan Arab Laagua stataa* ai^ad in Cairo on 
tha 13th of April# 19S0# or on TurHay, Egypt aliall afford 
to tha Unitad icingdan auch facilitica aa may ba iMcaaaary 
in order to placa tha Saaa aa a war footing and to oparata 
it affectively* TtxBa^ facilitiea shall include tha uaa 
of i^ gyptian porta within tha lirolta of what is strictly 
indispensable for the abovei><»ntionad purposes* 
AIiTICLE S t 
In the avent of tha return of British Forces to tha 
Suez Canal 3aaa area in accordance with tha ; revisions 
of />zrticle 4t these forces shall withdraw irnnediataly 
upon the cessation of the hostilities referred to in that 
Article, 
ARTICLE 6 t 
In the ev;mt of a thraat of an armed attack by an 
outaida Power n any country which a t the date of signatura 
184) 
Of the present Agreement ia a party to the Treaty of 
Joint Defence between Arab League states or on Turkey, 
there shall be immediate ccffisultation between Bgypt and 
the United Kingdon* 
ARTICLE f t 
Ihe Government of the Republic of Egypt shall afford 
over«>flying, landing and servicing facilities for notified 
flints of aircraft under Royal Air Force control* For 
the clearance of any flints of such aircraft, the 
Govamm«it of the Republic of i-gypt shall accord treatment 
no less favourable than that accorded to the aircraft 
of any other foreign country with the exception of States 
parties to the Treaty of Joint Defence between Arab ^ague 
states. % e landing and servicing facilities mentioned 
above shall be afforded at Egyptian Airfields in the Suez 
Canal Base area« 
ARTICLE 8 t 
The two contracting Governments recognise that th« 
Suez llaritime Canal, which is an integral part of Egypt, 
is a waterway economically, coirsmercially and strategically 
of international importance, and express the determination 
to uphold the Coni^ntion guaranteeing the freedcnn of 
navigation of the Canal signed at Constantinople on the 
'29th of October, 1888 • 
ARTICLE 9 t 
a) The United Kindom is accorded the rig^t to move 
and British equipment into or out of the Base at its discretion 
185) 
b) There shall be no increase above tne level of supplies 
as agreed upon in Part C of Annex II without the 
consent of the Government of the Republic of -gypt. 
ARTICLE 10 I 
The present Agreeinent does not affect and shall not 
be interpreted as affecting in any was the rights and 
obligations of the Parties under the charter of the United 
Wations. 
ARTICLE 11 t 
The Annexes and Ajv^ endices to the preaant Agreement 
shall be considar^ ad as an integral part of it. 
ARTICL3 12 I 
«) The present Agraenient shall remain in force the period 
of seven years from the date of its signature* 
b) During tho last twelve rK>nths of that period the two 
Contracting Governments shall consult together to 
decide yn such arrangements as may be necessary upon 
t^ termination of the Agreen»nt» 
o) Uftlesa both the Contracting Governments agree upon 
any extension of tim Agreement it shall tennijfiate 
seven years after the date of signature and the 
Qoven^xmnt of tue United KingdoKi shall talte away 
186) 
or dlspoMi o£ their property then remaining 
in the Base* 
ARTICLE 13 t 
The present Agreerr^nt shal l have e f fec t as thCHi<;#i 
i t had come into force on the date of signature* XnstrudMnts 
of ratificaticm shal l be exchanged in Cairo as socm as 
possible* 
In witness where of the undersignedi# being duly 
authorised thereto have sign^^d the present Agreeiraent and 
have a££i5«d th«Teto the ir seals* 
Done at Cairo, th i s nineteenth day of October, 19S4« 
in dilplicate, in the i^nglish and Arabic languages, botti 
t exts being equally authentic* 
( Annexes and appendices onitted ) 
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NATIONALIZATION LAV,' 
Ju ly 26, 1956 
Law I?o« 23S o£ 1956 KetionaXislng tha Universal C<»»pany 
of the Sues Maritime Canal 
In t^ie Naiaft of th« Nation. 
The President of the Rspublici 
Having regard t o the two Finnans of tha 30th Noveirtoer 
1854 and of thm 5th Ja^nary 1856 on the aubjeet of a 
concession r o l a t i v a t o passage in the Hxtan Canal and 
of the establishment of an Egyptian j o i n t stock canpany 
for t h a t pitrposei 
Having reyard t o Lew Mo# 192 of 1947, r e l a t i v e t o the 
concession <^ publ ic serv ices i 
Having regard t o Law No. 317 of 1952, r e l a t i v e t o i n d i v i -
dtial cont rac t s of vorkf 
Having regard t o Law No. 26 of 1954, r e l a t i v e t o joint>> 
stock ccKapenies, limitcid par tnersh ips and t o 1 incited 
l i a b i l i t y coc^paniesr 
The council of s t a t e having been c<»i8ult«d| 
ARTICLE I I 
The Universal Suez Maritime Canal CoRipany S.A.E. 
i s hereby naticmaliKed. All i t s funds and ricihts and 
obl iga t ions connected therewith are t ransfer red t o the 
S t a t e . All bodies and cormsittees a t present ex i s t i ng for 
168) 
its administration are dissolved* Shareholdsrs and 
holders of foundation bonds will be compensated for th« 
shares and bonds they possess« at their value estimated 
at the closing rate on the y Paris Bourse prior to the 
date on vihich this Law entered into effect* Payment o£ 
this compensation shall take place after completion of 
the handover to the state of 411 the funds and property 
of the nationalized company* 
ARTICLE II I 
An independent body shall undertake the management 
of the t ra f f i c in the Sues canal* This body shal l be a 
Juris t ic person and shall be attached to the Ministry 
of C<»nroerce* A decision shall be issued by the President 
of the Republic for the formation of th i s body, itfsltti 
shal l have in the administration of th i s u t i l i t y a l l ttm 
necessary powers for th i s end witiiout being bound by Goiret-
nment rules and regulations* without prejudice to ttm 
control of the State audit over the f inal balarMse sheet 
the body shal l have an independent tnidget dx^fted on th« 
l ines follofc^d in corrsnercial entorprises* The financial 
year shal l begin on July 1 and end on the l a s t day of 
June ea<^ year* The budget and the f inal balance sheet 
shal l be approved by* decision of the President of ^ e 
Republic* The £ irs t f inancial year wi l l begin from the 
date of the entering into e f fec t of th i s law and w i l l 
end on the l a s t day of June, 1957* The body i s authorized 
to delegate one or rnore of i t s rr^ srbejrs to carry out 
i t s decisions or to carry out whatever, tasks i t entrusts 
to hiiB or them* I t i s authorized to form from amongst 
189) 
its mombers and other* tachnical committees to assist 
it in researches and studies• The body shall be represented 
by its ^ resident before judieieX* goverrmiental and other 
quarters* and in its transactions wititi others* 
ARTICLE ZXZ t 
All funds and rights of t*tis nationalized company 
in tlie ivepublic of ^ gy;.t and abroad ^all be frozen* 
sanies* bodies and individuals are forbidden to dispose 
of these funds in any %my or to spend any sums or to 
settle any claim or liabilities except by a decision 
of the body provided for in Article ZZ* 
ARTICLE IV I 
The body shal l retain a l l the present o f f i c ia l s* 
en^loyees iiiorlcmen of the nationalised coft^ pany* They msst 
continue to carry out t2ieir duties* Ho erne of them i s 
in any way or for any reason* authorized to leave or 
relinquish h i s r^ost esosept with the permission of the 
body provided for in Article II* 
ARTICLE V t 
He who contravenes the rules of Article II shall ba 
punished with imprisonment and fine equal to three times 
the amount involv:^ d in the case* rie who contravenes the 
rules of Article IV shall be punished with imprisonment 
in addititm to his being deprived of any right to gratuity* 
pension or compensation* 
1»0>» 
ARTICLE VI I 
Thia decre« ji^ all b« pubXliAied In th« 0££icial 
Gasetttt and Shall hav« the powar of Xaw« It ^ lall 
enter into ef£«ct ots the date of Its publlgitioB* 
The Minister of Commerce is to la sua the necessary 
decisions for its executicm* 
The present decision shall bear the seal of the 
State and shall be executed as one of its lam* 
DECXblON 
The President of the Republic 
Having regard to ar t i c l e Two of Law «©• 285 of lt56 
relat ive to the nationalization of the universal Company 
of the ouez Maritime Canal 
DECI^ 'ES 
Art. 1 The comp3sitio; of the /authority for the -administ-
ration of the Sues canalt 
( Here follows a l i s t of 12 names } 
'^rt« 2 The Mini^iter o€ Commerce i s charged with the ex«:ution 
of the present decision^ which wi l l onter into force 
on the date of i t s publication (26*7»1956)* 
(Gamal <^ bdel Nasser*} 
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DECLARATION ON T?IE SUEZ CANAL 
APRIL 24, 1957 
In •Xaboz«tion of tho principles a«t forth in 
the ir nMiiaoractd'jri dated Heroh 18« 1957« l^e qovem—nt 
of ^9ypt« in accord with the Ccmetantinople Convention 
of 1888 end idui Charter of United Nations, raalce hereby the 
following Declaration on the Suea Canal and the arrengeiaente 
for i ta operatioo* 
Reaffirmation of Ccmventicm i 
1* I t remains the unaltered policy and firm purpose of 
ttte Govemmsnt of Sigypt to respect the textas and the 
s p i r i t of tftie Constantinople conventicm of 1888 and 
the rigtit BOA obligations aris ing therefroou The 
Oovemment of £gypt wi l l continuMi to respect, observe 
and implement thera* 
2* Observance of the Convention and of t^e Charter of the 
United Nations i 
'While reaffirming the ir date rrHination to respect 
the terrns and the s p i r i t of the Constantinc^le Convention 
of 1688 and to abide by the charter and the priiMiiples 
and purposes of the United Nations, the Govenunsnt of 
192} 
S^ SYPt ar» ecmf laant that the other signatoria* ^ 
the «aid Convention and a l l ot^ars ocmcNinuBd irlXl ba 
galdad by tha aasaa s«aol.^ ni« 
3* Freadom of navigation* t o l l s end davelo^xitant o£ tha 
Canal t 
Tha GovarraEtant of £^ gypt ara mosa particularly 
dttarmined t 
a) To afford and saintain frea and unintarraptad 
navigation for all nations vlthia tha liralta c^ ai^ in 
accoranca with tha provialona o£ the Conataatinopla 
convention of 3,888f 
h) That toXla shall oontlnua to bm lav:Uid in aeeCNCdasw* 
witi^  tbe last agrae!tiant# eoneltided on April 28# 19i6# 
between the Goverrjt»at of Egypt and tha Sues Canal 
Maritime Coo^ pany^  and that any increase in tha currant 
rata of tolls within any ta«ialva roontiis« If it tateas 
plaoa« iOiall ha limited to 1 per cant« any inoreas* 
beyond that level to be tiie result of negotiations^ 
and failing agreamant# ba sattl isd by axbitratioo accosw 
ding to the procaduras sat forth in paragraph 7 (b)f 
e) That tha Canal ia maintalnaa and davalopmant in 
accordance with tha progressive requirarnents of irodam 
193) 
navigation and that such mintananca and dveXo];sMnt 
shall imsluda tha 8tit and 9th prograrms o£ tlw Suas 
Canal liaritima Conrpany and such ix^ toveroants to timn 
as ara considared nacassary* 
4* Operation and ^^nagemsnt i 
The canal « will be operatad and isan^ ged by tha 
autcmofnous Suaz Canal Authority astablishad by tha 
GovernfRant of Sgypt on Jlily 26, 1956* Tha Gov^rmnant 
o£ Sgypt ara looking fomord with eonfidanca to continued 
co-operation with the nations of the world in advancing 
the usQfrxlness of the canal* To that end the ^^vemneat 
of Egypt would welcome and encourage oo-operatioa 
between the Sues Canal Authority and representatives 
ctf shipping and trade* 
S* Financial arrangatnants t 
a) Tolls Shall be pable in advance to the account of 
the Suez Canal Authority at any bank as may be 
authorised by it* Zn pursuance of tliis* ti-^e Sues 
Canal Authority has authorised tha Maticoal Bank 
of International settleifient to accept - n its behalf 
payi^nt of the canal tolls* 
194) 
b) The Sues Canal Authority shall pay to the Goverranant 
of Egypt 5 per cent of all the gross receipt* as 
royalty* 
c) "Hie Sue* Canal Authority will establish a suea 
Canal Capital and Developnant Fund into %^ich 
shall be paid 25 per cent of all gross receipts* 
This fund will assure that these shall be 
available to th« Suex Canal ..uthority adeq[uate 
resources to meet the needs of develop^ s^ent and 
Cepital expenditure for the fulfillment of the 
responsibilities thoy have assxiTMsd and are fully 
determined to discharge* 
6* Canal Code i 
The ri':ulations governing the Canal« including tite 
deta i l s of i t s operaticffif are embodied in tiio canal 
code, vMlch i s the law of the Canal* Due notice wi l l 
bo given of any alteratlcm in the code« and any such 
alteration* i f i t af fects the principles and corroit-
rnonts in this Declaration and i s challenged or 
corrrplained against for tliat reas<»i« shall be 4h»alt 
with in accordance with the procedure s e t forth 
in paragraph (7) (b) * 
195) 
7, Dlstrlmination and Complaints relating to the Canal 
code t 
Constantinople Convention of l e s s , the duez 
Canal / \u thori ty , by the terms of i t s cha r t e r can 
be in no cfise grant sny ves se l s , comt-ciy or 
other partly "any advantage or favour not accortSed 
t o other ves se l s , companies or p a r t i e s on tiie 
same condi t ions , 
b) complaints of cUscrimlnation or v io la t ion of the 
canal code sha l l be sought t o bo r<fijSOlvQd by the 
coniplaining party by reference t o the Cuea Canal 
A-utJYority, In Uie event t h a t such a reference 
docs not re to lve the par ty or the /.utJ^iority, t o 
an arbi trat ion ' t r ibuna l composed of one noriinee 
of the complc-ining par ty , one of the Authority 
and a t h i r d s t o be choosen b^ both. In case of 
disagreement. Such t h i r d member wi l l be chcos&n 
by the Prosident of the I n t e m e t i o r a l Zo\xrt of 
Ju s t i ce upon tae appl ica t ion of e i t he r pa r ty , 
c) The decision of the a r b i t r a t i o n t r ibuna l sha l l be 
rtade by a majority of I t s merrbers. The decision 
sha l l be binding upon the p a r t i e s when they are 
196) 
rendeired and thay must be ca r r i ed out in good 
faltJi, 
d) The Govemrmnt of .uigypt w i l l study fur ther appro-
p r i c t c a ranva; .-mt-B t'"'3t c-'-'-l^. bu r..^J« C^r I«iet 
f inding, conaultaticm and a r b i t r a t i o n on compla-
i n t s r e l a t i n g t o the canal code, 
3 , CofTspensation and Claims t 
The question of compsnsation and c la lns in 
coTinecti with the na t iona l i s a t ion of the .'^ uez Canal 
Maritime CcKnpany s h a l l , unless agi^ed between the 
pa r t i e s concerned, fca refer red t o a r b i t r a t i o n in 
accordance with the ®stablish®d i n t s m a t i o r e l p r e c t i c e , 
9 . Disputes, Disagre^rr.'^nts or differences a r i s i n g out 
of the Convention 5n<? t ^ i s '>eclaration t 
tt) Disputes or disagreerrsnts a r i s i n g in respect of 
the Constantinople convention of 1S88 or t h i s 
:)eclairation sha l l be s s t t l s d in accord^^nce with 
the Char ter of tne United Nations. 
b> differences a r i s i r g bet>?een the pairties t o the 
said Convention ii? resf^cect of the i n t - r p r e t s t i o n 
or the a p p l i c a o i l i t y of i t s provision, if not 
otherwise resolved, wi l l be r e l e r red t o the 
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In te rna t iona l Covirt of J'^stl-^w, 'Thw r,ovnrriT™»*it 
of figypt woiild taka the necc3E*»ry steps in order 
t c accept the C3rriivul£':-;rY jv^rrid>-iiction or the 
Int '*matlcnal Court of J u s t i c e In conf Irrrdty with 
the provisions of Ajrt. 36 of i t s s t a t u t e , 
10» Status of t h i s declara t ion t 
The Government of ^gypt make t h i s declara t ion 
t»*iich r e - a f f i r r ^ and i s in fu l l accord with the 
terms and s p i r i t of the Constantinople Convention 
of 1888« as en expression of t h i l r desi re and 
determination t o enable the ZUG'Z Canal to be an 
e f f i c i e n t and adeciuate waterway l inking the nat ions 
of the world anu serving the cause of iioace and 
prosper i ty , 
T i i s declaraticin, with the obl igat ions therei j i , 
cons t i t u t e an in te rna t iona l irvstnorncnt and wi l l be 
deposited and r ec i s t a r ed with the Sec re t s r i e t e of 
the United M a t i n s * 
APPENDdX <m H 
TABLE I t SUEZ CAMAL TRAFFIC^ 1869 - 1983 
TOtysil T r a n s i t s and Tonnage 
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Yeae T o t a l Nuntoer 
of T r a n s i t s 
Ne t S u e s 
Tcmnage 
1369 
1870 
1871 
1872 
1873 
1874 
1875 
1876 
1877 
1878 
1879 
1180 
1881 
13S2 
1883 
1384 
1385 
1S86 
1887 
1888 
1889 
1890 
1891 
1392 
1893 
1894 
10 
406 
765 
1,032 
1,173 
1 ,264 
1 ,494 
1 ,457 
1 ,663 
1,593 
1 ,477 
2 , 0 2 6 
2 , 7 2 7 
3 , 1 9 3 
3 , 3 0 7 
3 , 2 8 4 
3 , 6 2 4 
3 ,100 
3 , 1 3 7 
3 ,440 
3 , 4 2 5 
3 ,389 
4 , 2 0 7 
3 ,559 
3 , 3 4 1 
3 , 3 5 2 
11,280 
436,609 
761,467 
1,160,744 
1,367,768 
1,631,650 
2,009,984 
2,096,772 
2,355,448 
2,269,678 
2,263,332 
3,057,422 
4,136,730 
5,074,809 
5,77i,862 
5,071,501 
6,335,753 
5,767,656 
5,903,024 
6,64 ,B34 
6,783,187 
6,090,094 
8,698,777 
7,712,029 
7,659,060 
8,039,175 
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Year 
1895 
1896 
1897 
1S99 
1899 
1900 
1901 
1902 
1903 
1904 
1905 
1906 
1907 
1908 
1909 
1910 
1911 
1912 
1913 
1914 
1915 
1916 
1917 
1918 
1919 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
Total N\in43«r 
of Transits 
3,434 
3,409 
2,986 
3,503 
3,607 
3,441 
3,699 
3,7CB 
3,761 
4,237 
4,116 
3,975 
4,267 
3,795 
4,239 
4,533 
4,969 
5,373 
5,035 
4,302 
3,708 
3,110 
2,353 
2,522 
3,986 
4,009 
3,975 
4,345 
4,621 
5,122 
5,337 
Nat Sues 
Tonnage 
0,448,333 
8,560,234 
7,299,374 
9,238,603 
9,895,630 
9,733,152 
10,823,840 
11,248,413 
11,907,288 
13,401,835 
13,134,105 
13,445,504 
14,728,434 
13,633,283 
15,407,527 
16,531,8^8 
13,324,794 
20,275,120 
20,033,884 
19,409,495 
15,266,155 
12,325,347 
8,368,918 
9,251,601 
16,013,302 
17,574,657 
la ,118 ,999 
20,743,245 
22,730,162 
25,109,882 
26,761,935 
2C0) 
Y«ar 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1P45 
1946 
1947 
19 4S 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1934 
1955 
1956 
1957 (Apr./Jec.) 
Total Hxju!to«r 
of Tranits 
4,980 
5,545 
6,084 
6,274 
5, 761 
5,366 
5,032 
-t^$ *k dfS 
5,663 
5,99t 
5,877 
6,635 
6,171 
5,277 
2,539 
i,ao4 
1,646 
2, 262 
3,320 
4,206 
5,057 
5,972 
8,666 
10,420 
11,751 
11,694 
11*694 
12,731 
13,215 
14,668 
13,291 
10,958 
M«t Su«z 
Tonnac^ 
26,060,377 
28,962,048 
31,905,902 
33,466,014 
31,668,759 
30,027,966 
20,340,290 
30,676,672 
31,750,802 
32,810,963 
32,373,883 
36,491,332 
34,413,187 
29,573,394 
13,535,712 
3,262,841 
7,027,763 
11,273,802 
16,124,952 
25,0C4,966 
32,731,631 
36,576,531 
55,081,056 
63,861,548 
81,795,523 
80,356,338 
26,643,186 
92,905,439 
102,493,851 
115,756,393 
107,006,000 
89.911 
201) 
Y T o t a l HumJMir n e t Suaas 
of T r«n i t a Tonnage 
154,479 
163,386 
185,322 
187,059 
197,837 
210,493 
227,991 
246,017 
274,250 
127,825 
187,759 
220,477 
243,260 
266,171 
281,305 
324,356 
363,538 
n . n. 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1^67(Jan-liay) 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
17,342 
17,731 
13,734 
13,148 
13,513 
19,146 
19,943 
20,2f.9 
21,250 
9,652 
16,8C6 
19,703 
21,266 
20,363 
20,795 
21,577 
22,545 
25,000 
r i - i . - not a v a i l a b l e , 
T/.BLE I I t COKP..I< .^TIVE I i^:.T<^4C£o IN 
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Sea i^sutes 
Lor-fJon t c Pers ian <?ulf 
London tc ."oDbc-sa 
LorKlon to ^orsb'-iy 
London t o C a l c u t t a 
London t c Colombo 
London t o -Singapore 
London t o tenang 
London t o -ydney 
Lonoon to • e i x i n g t o n 
ix>nv-^n t o Kor-gi.oriG 
1 
t 
1 
•J' 
1 
1 
t 
i = ctl-:^iic:nc"c to lrGor:ie£.lG 
N^apfjlP t o ;>A8P>/a S r i t r e - i 
Miles 
Via ^uez 
1 
6,400 
6,014 
6,260 
7,933 
6,702 
6,240 
7,950 
11,630 
12,650 
5,&£0 
U,5C2 
2,178 
• 
'Via Cap* 
\ , ,., ,„,„ 
11,300 
10,720 
11,450 
10,350 
11,575 
11,285 
12,450 
13,250 
13,01S 
11,150 
10,85C 
1 
I 
• 
• 
{ 
1 
J 1 
Days 
/ i a ouea , 
37 
30 
3?. 
40 
34 
41 
40 
58 
63 
46 
4:> 
11 
Via cape 
65 
43 
54 
57 
52 
58 
56 
62 
66 
65 
U6 
54 
KCTi; I .-according t o Bindra , A ,p . - ; , , -uez Ihrompa&is, 
d i s t a n c e s between London to Bombay v ia -uez 
and Via cape o t Good Hope a r e 6,200 t o 10,700 m i l e s . 
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